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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation addresses gaps in anthropological knowledge about how 
reciprocity—and a specifically Andean form of reciprocity—works in disaster and 
resettlement settings. This study looks at the practices of reciprocity in a disaster-affected 
community (Manzano) and a disaster-induced resettlement (Pusuca) in the Andean 
highlands of Ecuador. Specifically, it examines two aspects of reciprocal exchange 
practices in these sites. It first looks at some of the factors that affect the continuity of 
reciprocal exchange practices, which other studies have found to play a vital role in 
recovery from disasters and resettlement. It then looks to the roles of unequal power 
relations in the practices of reciprocity and a particularly Andean form of reciprocity and 
cooperative labor, the minga. The study identifies power-laden dynamics in the practice 
of reciprocity that tend to be overlooked in studies of social support and mutual aid in 
disasters and resettlements. I argue that these dynamics are critical to an examination of 
reciprocity in these contexts because they have important implications for the distribution 
of relief and development resources. 
This study employed an iterative, mixed-method, 3-phase research strategy in the 
recursive discovery and corroboration of analytical domains and the evaluation of study 
hypotheses. In the first phase, exploratory observation, key informant interviews, and 
archival searches identified specific terms, practices, and events in order to design 
effective structured interview questions. In the second phase, I administered structured 
interviews to obtain quantitative indicators of reciprocal exchanges between group 
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members, distribution of development benefits and collective resources, and occupational 
and socioeconomic data. In the third phase, I conducted focused observation and 
documentation of participation in decision-making, plus patterns of influence in public 
negotiations of development strategies and aid allocation.  
The expectation of hypothesis 1 was that wage employment and residential 
distance would be negatively associated with minga participation. The results were mixed 
between the two sites. In Manzano, wage employment was not significantly associated 
with records of minga participation, but there was a significant negative correlation with 
residential distance and minga participation. In Pusuca, there were significant negative 
correlations with wage employment and residential distance with records of minga 
participation. The expectation of hypothesis 2 was that household exchange participation 
would be positively associated with minga participation. Multiple tests of the association 
between household minga attendance and total household exchange participation found 
positive associations between these two variables in Manzano, but not in Pusuca.  
For hypothesis 3a, the expectation was that total household exchange participation 
would be positively associated with brokerage and decision-making power and statistical 
tests found a significant positive correlation between these variables in both sites. The 
implication is that one way that politically powerful individuals exercise and maintain 
their power is through forming reciprocal exchange ties. Those with more ties are more 
likely to act as brokers between their neighbors and scarce aid and development resources 
and more likely to have their views and agendas supported in local decision-making 
processes.  
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Hypothesis 3b tests the assumption that households connected through reciprocal 
exchange relations to highly connected households access a greater share of relief and 
development resources than others. Statistical tests indicated a significant positive 
association between being connected to highly connected households and project benefit 
inclusion in both sites. This suggests that it is not only the powerful that access scarce 
extra-local resources, but also their less connected allies, which can be taken as evidence 
of privileged inclusion as a form of power in both sites.  
This study contributes to anthropological knowledge about the political economy 
of reciprocity in disaster-induced resettlements in two ways. First, it looks more broadly 
at the range of factors that could influence the continuity or disruption of practices of 
cooperation and reciprocal exchange in resettlement than other studies, which focuses on 
the narrow influence of policy practice. In this study, I draw on the economic 
anthropology of reciprocity and posit a possible role of wider political economic 
processes—growing integration into the capitalist wage labor economy—as an added 
explanatory factor for the dissolution of reciprocal exchange relations in post-disaster and 
resettlement contexts. The second way in which I seek to build upon these studies is by 
foregrounding the ways in which power relations are bound up in reciprocal exchange 
relations.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation addresses gaps in anthropological knowledge about how 
reciprocity—and specifically Andean forms of reciprocity—works in disaster and 
resettlement settings. This study examines the practices of reciprocity in a disaster-
affected community and a disaster-induced resettlement in the Andean highlands of 
Ecuador. Specifically, it examines two aspects of reciprocal exchange practices in these 
sites. It first looks at some of the factors that affect the continuity of reciprocal exchange 
practices, which other studies have found to play a vital role in recovery from disasters 
and resettlement. It then examines the roles of unequal power relations in the dynamics of 
reciprocity and a particularly Andean form of reciprocity and cooperative labor, the 
minga. In so doing, it identifies power-laden dynamics in the practice of reciprocity that 
tend to be overlooked in studies of social support and mutual aid in disasters and 
resettlements. I argue that these dynamics are critical to an examination of reciprocity in 
these contexts because they have important implications for the distribution of scarce 
relief and development resources. 
Globally, natural disasters affected nearly 255 million people in 2011 (Guha-Sapir 
et al. 2012) and forced displacement and resettlement affects more than 30 million people 
each year (UNHCR 2010). These phenomena are destructive of livelihoods and wellbeing 
and compel affected people to adapt to new environments, lifeways, and subsistence 
efforts (Jones and Murphy 2009; de Wet 2006). To help shed light on an issue that is 
truly global in scale, this study builds upon research on reciprocity and unequal power 
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relations by testing appropriate hypotheses for disaster-affected and resettled groups. A 
wealth of anecdotal references to latent conflict, weakened alliances, exploitation, 
opportunism and resistance to social hierarchies in the resettlement literature (Cernea 
2003; Koenig 2001; Behura and Nayak 1993; Baboo 1992) indicates the potential 
contribution of a systematic study of this topic. A central goal of this study is to address 
gaps in the research literature regarding how reciprocity, cooperative labor, and local 
power structures change in the processes of disaster, displacement and resettlement and 
how informal exchange relationships are linked to survival in these contexts. In this 
study, I examine the tension between cooperative, mutual support practices and unequal 
power relations and how they influence individuals' access to scarce resources in 
resettlement. 
Because disasters and resettlement involve varying degrees of change in patterns 
of individual and group access to resources, institutions and services (Jones and Murphy 
2009; de Wet 2006), anthropologists have looked to pre-existing informal relations 
involving the mutual exchange of labor and material for agricultural production (Scudder 
1985; Marx 1990) or goods and services in order to cope with the scarcity and isolation 
of impoverishment that accompanies disaster and displacement (Porter et al. 2008; 
Avenarius and Johnson 2004; Cernea 2006). However, such studies underemphasize 
diverse experiences within groups (Beazley 2009; Malkki 1995) and the extent to which 
disaster relief efforts and group-based resettlement schemes empower social and 
economic elites, reify gendered hierarchies, manipulate allegiances, and engender social 
conflict (Cernea 2003, 1997; Koenig 2001). Disaster researchers and the communities 
and institutions responding to disaster-induced resettlement consistently emphasize the 
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critical roles played by social networks and informal exchanges of social support in the 
processes of disaster mitigation and recovery. One persistent question is how social 
support networks survive the risks inherent in displacement and resettlement (Whiteford 
and Tobin 2009; Avenarius and Johnson 2004; Cernea 2006, 2003, 1997). 
Disasters and resettlements homogenize the needs and experiences of relocated 
households, but it also provides opportunities and constraints that shape adaptations to 
the resettlement context. Among disaster-related resettlements, numerous cases exist in 
which marginalized groups mobilized and demanded more accountability and response 
from the state, political leaders, and multinational non-governmental organizations 
(Oliver-Smith 2006). Such marginalized groups often seek a political strategy that makes 
them appear more homogeneous than they really are. A political economic framework 
suggests a major factor in variation in resource access within these communities lies in 
the relationship between reciprocal exchange relations and political power. This study 
examines how hierarchical exchange relations in resettlement communities are associated 
with political strategies and influences of actors occupying various positions in the 
overall exchange network.  
Mingas are communal labor groups—common throughout the Andes—that 
organize community members into regular and ad-hoc work parties for projects ranging 
from community infrastructure and agriculture to social services and political action. 
Typically, a member of each family participates in the minga. Several authors have 
studied the patterned, asymmetrical reciprocity bound up in minga exchanges and 
relations including the expression, concealment, exercise and disputes of class, power and 
identity (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; Mayer 2002, 1974; Mitchell 1991; Orlove 1977; 
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Whitten 1969). A core problem addressed by this dissertation is that no prior study has 
examined the role of mingas and associated reciprocity in disaster mitigation or 
resettlement. The proposed research asks the following questions: 
 How are social relations and practices affected by changing ecological conditions 
and economic strategies in disaster-induced resettlements? 
 How are power relations produced and exercised in the cultural practices of 
collective labor and reciprocity leveraged in this context? 
 To what extent do these practices influence the distribution of scarce development 
resources in the resettlement process?  
These questions frame a critical examination of the emergent dynamics of 
political power under conditions of crisis and change; of the encounter between rural 
cultures at the margins of the state and capitalist economies in the processes of disasters 
and resettlement. Study hypotheses anticipated that participation in mingas to depend on 
the degree of involvement in wage labor, the tangible benefits of participation, and the 
extent to which relationships connect individuals to the group. Political power was 
expected to be directly related to actors’ locations in the hierarchical flow of reciprocal 
exchanges, which was expected to bear upon the distributions of scarce resources in the 
study sites. 
 In order to explore these important issues, I developed a mixed-method research 
design aimed at capturing variation in core study variables through the recursive 
discovery and corroboration of analytical domains and the evaluation of study hypotheses 
(Driscoll et al. 2007). This strategy employed a range of common anthropological data 
collection methods—archival research, key informant interviews, participant observation, 
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and semi-structured interviews—that build upon one another in an iterative process that 
identified specific terms, practices, and events in order to design effective data collection 
tools at each successive stage of the research process (Bernard 2011:213), while also 
serving to build relationships, identify key informants, and locate and enter settings most 
relevant to the study (Bestor 2002; Cromley 1999). 
 Fieldwork for this study took place from August 2011 to January 2012, during 
which time I resided in the town of Penipe, Chimborazo, Ecuador, adjacent to one of the 
several disaster-induced resettlements in the region, and participated in the daily activities 
of each of the two research communities nearby. This was, however, not the first time I 
lived and conducted research in these sites. In 2009, I lived and worked in Penipe for 
eleven months as a fieldworker for a National Science Foundation-funded research 
project on social networks and social support in areas of chronic disaster and resettlement 
under the guidance of project PIs and CoPIs Dr. Linda Whiteford, Dr. Graham Tobin, Dr. 
Eric Jones, and Dr. Arthur Murphy (NSF 0751264/0751265, Collaborative Research – 
Social Networks in Chronic Disasters: Exposure, Evacuation, and Resettlement). During 
this time, I conducted detailed censuses, resource and wellbeing profiles, and personal 
network interviews in households in both of the proposed research sites. My work in the 
region in 2009 helped me understand the feasibility and the constraints of conducting of 
research in the proposed sites, and it afforded me the opportunity to build a wealth of 
relationships and rapport, plus secure the stated consent of the research subjects in 
advance. More importantly, it helped me to identify local practices and institutions that 
were crucial to developing the research questions and design of the present study. 
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Importance of the Research 
The sheer scale of impact of disasters and resettlement commands attention from 
social scientists to examine their root causes and processes of response and recovery. On 
average, disasters affect more than one quarter of the world’s population each year 
(Sahil-Gupta 2012) and more than thirty million people are forced into resettlements each 
year as a result of violent conflict, development, and natural disasters (UNHCR 2010). 
But disasters are important for theoretical reasons as well. Research in contexts of crisis 
and change enables scholars to interrogate the structures of state and society as they are 
exposed under these conditions (Greenhouse 2002). Here, we find forms of human 
agency contesting social structures and revealing important aspects of societies, cultures, 
and political economies that might otherwise be obscured or latent and which provide 
special opportunities for evaluating and developing social theory (Martínez Novo 
2008:90). In these contexts, relations of unequal power are thrown into relief in what has 
been called a crise revelatrice (Sahlins 1972) that can expose social and political 
economic inequities and create apertures for both their rectification and their reification. 
At times, this may be true for disaster-affected and resettled people themselves, for whom 
these crises may constitute a sort of “structuring idiom” that expose the dynamics of 
power, domination, and exploitation that affect their livelihoods (Henry 2005).  
Ecuador, too, is a compelling place to conduct such a study, as it is commonly 
overlooked in the broad scope of Latin American studies (Handelsman 2000:xiv). 
Scholars outside of the country have not paid the same attention to Ecuador as they have 
to other South American nations (Peloso 2003:125). In Ecuador, chronic and large scale 
social and political economic changes have long proven challenging to anthropologists 
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and social theorists (Martínez Novo 2008:90). The small cadre of American 
anthropologists that has focused on Ecuador (cf. Whitten 2003) has been criticized by 
Ecuadorian anthropologists for idealizing indigenous cultural practices and identities 
while remaining conspicuously silent on political economy and the unequal power 
relations that inhere in indigenous cultures (de la Torre 2006:250). The present study 
addresses these lacunae in anthropological studies of Ecuador by building on the work of 
Ecuadorian anthropologists that have examined power relations and political economy 
(Bretón 2008, 2003, 2001, 1997; Bretón and García 2003; Martínez 2003a, b) and 
American anthropologists that have focused on critical aspects of political economy 
(Jones 2003), cooperation (Jones 2004) and disasters and resettlement (Whiteford and 
Tobin 2009, 2004). This study employs the theoretical toolkit of political economy, with 
its emphasis on mode of production and the control of scarce resources as fundamental to 
forms of social organization, to examine local forms of reciprocity and unequal power 
relations in ethnically mestizo communities. Moreover, this study examines these 
practices in a disaster and resettlement context that draws local communities into 
increased involvement with the state and multinational development organizations 
because the involvement of these actors has important implications for the politics and 
economy of recovery. 
 The present study takes as its point of departure the increasingly popular scholarly 
interest in local forms of social support and cooperation in disaster and resettlement relief 
and recovery (Kaniasty 2012; Jones et al. 2010; Whiteford and Tobin 2009; Norris et al. 
2005; Whiteford et al. 2005; Hurlbert et al. 2001; Cernea 1997; Bartolome 1984). I 
identify two primary ways in which these studies can be improved. First, resettlement 
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researchers have pointed to the ways in which resettlement schemes frequently displace 
kin and neighbors in ways that disrupt or destroy the social networks that sustain mutual 
aid and cooperation that could otherwise aid in the recovery process and in the growth 
and development of resettlement communities (cf. Cernea 2006, 2007, 1997). As has 
been pointed out elsewhere, this is primarily a model of inadequate inputs in the policy 
and implementation process (de Wet 2006b). It focuses on the immediate limitations of 
policy and resettlement administration and does not take into account the complexity of 
political economy and processes beyond the immediate scope of resettlement projects. In 
this study, I draw on the economic anthropology of reciprocity and posit a possible role 
of wider political economic processes—specifically, growing integration into the 
capitalist wage labor economy—as an added explanatory factor for the dissolution of 
reciprocal exchange relations in post-disaster and resettlement contexts. Thus, in one 
hypothesis, I expected wage labor employment to be negatively associated with 
participation in minga reciprocity. In so doing, I build upon the long history of 
anthropological studies that have identified modes of production as fundamental to the 
social organization of politics and economy. 
 The second way in which I seek to build upon these studies is by foregrounding 
the ways in which power relations are bound up in reciprocal exchange relations 
(Narotzky and Moreno 2002; Mitchell 1991; Orlove 1977; Whitten 1969). Studies of 
social support in disaster contexts have identified some key relationships between 
peoples’ social networks and the types of support they receive. One representative study 
found that individuals with smaller, denser networks were more likely to receive informal 
social support, while individuals with larger, less dense social networks were more likely 
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to receive support from institutions (Hurlbert et al. 2001). Assuming that individuals with 
these distinct network characteristics coexist in the same communities, I expected these 
differences to have important implications for the distribution of political power and 
relief and development resources. Drawing again upon economic anthropology and 
Andean research, I found a wealth of evidence from past studies suggesting that minga 
reciprocity is sustained by asymmetrical exchange relations typical of patron-client 
relations. These patron-client relations articulate with the broader context of Ecuador’s 
clientalist political system and suggest that the more powerful actors in local exchange 
networks are likely to act as brokers between local and extra-local organizations in 
disaster relief and resettlement. This is expected to be a primary source of political power 
and one factor that might explain the unequal distribution of resources in disaster and 
resettlement contexts.  
Review of the Chapters 
The literature review chapter is roughly divided into six parts, which establish a 
general theoretical framework, while reviewing the empirical justifications for the study 
hypotheses. The first section begins by outlining the general framework of political 
economy (Jones 2010; Watts 2000), which examines the dialectic tensions between 
modes of production and between classes in a society by focusing on power as a 
relational dynamic predicated on access and control of scarce resources. Political 
economy frameworks have proven apt at integrating subjects as complex as the politics of 
disasters and resettlement (Jones and Murphy 2009; Oliver-Smith 2010; Abala-Bertrand 
1993) and rural Andean culture (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; Bretón and Garcia 2003; de 
la Torre 2006; Wolf 1955) and such a framework is therefore appropriate for a study that 
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seeks to integrate these domains. The framework I develop also works from 
anthropological studies of disaster and resettlement. This includes placing disadvantaged 
groups squarely in the center of analysis by emphasizing that disasters and resettlements 
are not merely the result of environmental events, but are also products of the unequal 
distribution of certain populations in hazardous regions and unsustainable prevention, 
response, and recovery procedures and infrastructure (Oliver-Smith 2009b; Wisner et al. 
2004). The impacts (anticipated or otherwise) of disasters, displacement, and resettlement 
tend to “cascade” and perpetually undermine peoples’ capacity to mitigate or effectively 
adapt to chronic hazards and post-disaster and resettlement conditions (Whiteford and 
Tobin 2009; de Wet 2006b; Cernea 2003). While often appearing individually, these risks 
have cumulative and cascading impacts on peoples’ ability to mitigate or recover from 
chronic disasters. Throughout this chapter, I return to the recurring theme of access and 
control of scarce resources as the key domain of the production and exercise of power. 
The remainder of the chapter focuses on the study of reciprocity and each of the 
succeeding five sections follow a similar format that begins with the reciprocity as it has 
been studied in disasters and resettlement, which is followed by the economic 
anthropology of reciprocity, then specific studies of Andean reciprocity, and then a model 
of reciprocity and power in disaster and resettlement contexts. 
The second section of the literature review establishes a general framework for 
the political economy of reciprocity and the ways in which the reciprocal exchange 
practices are closely tied to the mode of production (primary production vs. capitalist 
wage labor). In disasters and resettlement, the partial or complete destruction or loss of 
land and agricultural resources is an almost universal outcome (Cernea 2003, 1997, 
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1996a; de Wet 2006, 1996), increasing the likelihood of a transition from primary 
production to wage labor (cf. Nayak 2000). The notion that reciprocal exchange practices 
are rooted in the specific conditions of pre-capitalist societies goes back to the earliest 
studies of reciprocity in anthropology. Research on Andean reciprocity and cooperative 
labor has identified a dialectical tension between these practices and the encroachment of 
capitalism, but the relationship is clearly complex. Researchers tend to examine 
capitalism and Andean reciprocity as contending domains but not necessarily the clash of 
two systems (Harvey 2002:62). The displacement of the primary agricultural mode of 
production brought on by wage labor employment is both theoretically and empirically 
associated with the dissolution of Andean cultural strategies (Martínez Novo 2008).  
 The third section of the literature review goes beyond examining reciprocity as it 
relates to the dominant mode of production by examining the power relations inherent in 
the reciprocal exchange relations presumed to serve the purposes of mutual aid. A 
political economic framework suggests a major factor in variation in power and resource 
access within these communities lies in the relationship between reciprocal exchange 
relations and political power. Political actors may exploit disaster situations by portraying 
themselves as major players in the delivery of aid and relief efforts have often reified 
dominant political and economic interests (Wisner et al. 2004; Chairetakis 1991). In 
surveying the patterned flow of exchanges in minga reciprocity, a generalized pattern 
emerges in which material resources tend to flow downward, while labor and loyalty flow 
from the bottom up, in spite of an explicit ideology of mingas as egalitarian associations 
(Mayer 2002; Mitchell 1991; Deere 1990; Whitten 1969). Following Bourdieu (1977), 
the model I develop questions the notion that reciprocity was associated with social 
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cohesion and instead argues that reciprocal exchange practices are part of the 
reproduction of society; a reproduction of asymmetrical power relations vis-à-vis bonds 
of dependence established in reciprocal exchanges. 
The fourth section of the literature review situates the study of reciprocity in the 
context of the development encounter between communities, the state, and non-
governmental organizations and explores the roles of local power structures in 
transmitting extra-local influences (Schweizer 1997:746). This section highlights the role 
of reciprocal exchange relations as they produce local “brokers,” powerful individuals in 
leadership positions within communities and institutions who set the agendas for 
decision-making contexts and “translate” the needs of one group to the other (Mosse and 
Lewis 2006). Power may have its origins in control of scarce resources, but brokerage 
power is necessarily derived through relationships with “outsiders” (e.g., the state, NGOs, 
etc.) and exercised in the process of defining agendas and influencing the outcomes of 
(often volatile or risky) decision-making processes (see also Elyachar 2002). The 
destruction and loss of means of primary production through disaster, displacement, and 
resettlement precipitates a significant shift toward access and control of the flows of aid 
from state institutions and non-governmental organizations as the primary resources of 
political competition (de Wet 1996b:338-339). The distribution of access and control 
over new resource bases is a decidedly political process (de Wet 2006a:7) where social 
actors frequently maneuver to acquire or consolidate control of resources by pressuring 
institutions to honor competing claims of legitimacy and entitlement (Mosse 2005; Henry 
2002; Oliver-Smith 2006, 1996; Scudder and Colson 1982).  
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The fifth section of the literature review introduces gender as an important factor 
in power relations everywhere and specifically important in disaster and resettlement 
contexts because it has important implications for the distribution of scarce resources and 
therefore recovery or wellbeing. Cultures and social groups are often divided by class and 
ethnicity and they are always somehow divided by gender (Nagengast 2004:113). 
Gender-based inequalities contribute to vulnerability in disasters and resettlement 
(Willinger 2008; Wisner et al. 2004; Bolin et al. 1998; Hewitt 1995; Enarson and Morrow 
1998). Gender is therefore expected to factor into the distribution of risk, power, and 
resources in each of the study hypotheses. 
The sixth and final section of the literature review introduces the study 
hypotheses. The first is that the resettlement of network members in different sites and 
the transition to wage labor employment are negatively associated with participation in 
mingas (cooperative labor groups based on reciprocity). This is expected because of 
decreased reliance on reciprocal relations for resources by wage laborers (H1). The 
second hypothesis is that political power is exercised in mingas by individuals providing 
material resources to members of the group through reciprocal exchanges that are 
reciprocated through participation in mingas. Specifically, minga participation is 
expected to be positively correlated with the receipt by most people of material items 
from leaders in exchange for their participation (H2).  
The third hypothesis examines the proposition that political power in a 
resettlement setting is based on access and control over scarce development resources, 
and that this power is maintained and exercised through exchange networks and unique 
ties to sources of aid and development resources. More specifically, this analysis will test 
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two claims: (H3a) influence over collective negotiations and benefit allocation is 
positively associated with the extent of a household’s total exchange relations with other 
households in the community, and; (H3b) more powerful actors and their allies will have 
a greater share of development benefits than others.  
Chapter three establishes the ethnographic setting of the present study by 
describing the history, geography, political economy, and daily life in the two study sites, 
which are located in the central Andean cordillera in northwest Chimborazo Province of 
Ecuador, on the southern rim of the active stratovolcano Mt. Tungurahua. The first site is 
a village named Manzano, whose residents were displaced and resettled as a result of the 
1999 and 2006 eruptions of Mt. Tungurahua. At the time of research in 2011, although 
the majority of Manzano villagers had been resettled into one of three resettlement 
villages, Manzano continued to function as a village, with many residents continuing to 
live and grow crops and raise animals in the village largely due to a lack of economic 
resources in the resettlements. The second site, Pusuca, is a resettlement community of 45 
homes built by an Ecuadorian non-profit, the Esquel Foundation, and the state and 
national governments. Pusuca is home to 40 households displaced from villages near 
Manzano due to the 1999 and 2006 eruptions of Mt. Tungurahua. These two sites were 
selected because they are both known to organize regular cooperative labor parties 
(mingas) through village councils but also because they differed in key respects. The 
resettlement village of Pusuca includes land for crops and animals for each resettler 
household while the majority of Manzano villagers were relocated to resettlements with 
no land, productive resources, or employment opportunities (although five households in 
Pusuca are originally from Manzano). Secondly, while Pusuca lies well outside Mt. 
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Tungurahua’s high risk zone, Manzano lies in the shadow of the volcano and its people 
must contend with a chronic hazard situation that places their animals, crops, property, 
and health at risk. Finally, each village is tied to different governmental and non-
governmental institutions and is governed in distinct ways that will be discussed further 
below. In the remainder of the chapter, I describe the broader historical and political 
economic context of these two sites, with a focus on the cascading impacts of disaster and 
resettlement, followed by detailed descriptions of each site, with attention to the political 
and reciprocal exchange practices that are of interest to the study. 
Chapter four details the methodology of the present study. This study employed 
an iterative, mixed-method, 3-phase methodological strategy that involved the recursive 
discovery and corroboration of analytical domains and the evaluation of study hypotheses 
(Driscoll et al. 2007; LeCompte and Schensul 1999). Before beginning my research 
activities, I first secured lodging in Penipe, near the resettlement site, and reconnected 
with key informants and acquaintances in the study sites. Next, I began phase one of my 
data collection by conducting exploratory observation, key informant interviews, and 
archival searches to identify specific terms, practices, and events in order to design 
effective structured interview questions (Bernard 2011:150), while also serving to build 
relationships, identify key informants, and locate and enter settings most relevant to the 
study (Bestor 2002; Cromley 1999). Specific objectives of this phase were to identify 
village households, household members’ current place of residence, and to develop a 
thorough list of venues and times of group meetings and assemblies, specific items and 
services exchanged, and aid and development programs in each community. In the 
second phase, I administered structured interviews to obtain quantitative indicators of 
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reciprocal exchanges between group members (Mayer 2002, 1974; Schweizer 1997), 
minga participation, distribution of development benefits and collective resources (Mosse 
2005, 1998; Salmen 2002, 1987), occupational and socioeconomic data (Pant 2007; 
Bebbington 1999), and perceived influence in village affairs and benefit distribution 
(Lubell et al. 2009; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004; Salmen 2002, 1987). In the third phase, I 
conducted focused observation and documentation of participation and influence in 
decision-making, plus patterns of influence in public negotiations of development 
strategies and aid allocation (Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2005, 1998). In the analysis 
phase, I compiled and coded both qualitative and quantitative data for descriptive 
analysis (Bernard 2011:300) and conducted correlations and regression analyses 
(Thompson 2006) to evaluate and test each of my study hypotheses.  
Chapter five presents the results of the study, which are organized around the 
study hypotheses. The expectation of hypothesis 1 was that wage employment and 
residential distance would be negatively associated with minga participation. The results 
were mixed between the two sites. In Manzano, wage employment was not significantly 
associated with records of minga participation, but there was a significant negative 
correlation with residential distance and minga participation. In Pusuca, there were 
significant negative correlations with wage employment and residential distance with 
records of minga participation. When testing the association between residential distance 
and wage labor with self-reported minga participation, we find significant negative 
correlations with wage labor and residential distance in Manzano, but not in Pusuca. 
Qualitative data obtained through semi-structured interviews provide important context to 
these findings. The expectation of hypothesis 2 was that household exchange 
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participation would be positively associated with minga participation. Multiple tests of 
the association between household minga attendance and total household exchange 
participation found positive associations between these two variables in Manzano, but not 
in Pusuca. As with hypothesis 1, qualitative explanations from respondents provide some 
context to these findings. In Pusuca, more than 50 percent of respondents cited obligation 
as their reason for participating in mingas, whereas in Manzano only a quarter of 
respondents cited this rationale. 
For hypothesis 3a, the expectation was that total household exchange participation 
would be positively associated with brokerage and decision-making power and statistical 
tests found a significant positive correlation between these variables in both sites. The 
implication is that one way that politically powerful individuals exercise and maintain 
their power is through forming reciprocal exchange ties. Those with more ties are more 
likely to act as brokers between their neighbors and scarce aid and development resources 
and more likely to have their views and agendas supported in local decision-making 
processes. Hypothesis 3b was designed to test the assumption that households connected 
through reciprocal exchange relations to highly connected households access a greater 
share of relief and development resources than others. Statistical tests found a significant 
positive association between being connected to highly connected households and project 
benefit inclusion in both sites. This suggests that it is not only the powerful that access 
these scarce extra-local resources, but also their less connected allies, which can be taken 
as evidence of privileged inclusion as a form of power in both sites. As with the first two 
hypotheses, self-reported explanations for non-inclusion provide some context here as 
well.  
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Chapter six presents a discussion of the study findings, some of which were 
anticipated by the hypotheses, while others were not. Some findings that were not 
anticipated by the hypotheses were nonetheless consistent with ethnographic observations 
that provide necessary explanatory context to each finding. The findings for hypothesis 
one are somewhat counterintuitive in that the traditional village mingas were not 
significantly destabilized by residential distance and wage labor incorporation, whereas 
these factors did significantly inhibit minga practice in the resettlement based on newly-
established institutions. In Manzano, it is clear that minga participation was primarily 
disarticulated by the exclusionary practices of traditional leadership structures. At the 
same time, many from Manzano also exhibited a greater awareness of unequal power 
relations and the asymmetric distribution of resources in the villages in the wake of the 
eruptions, displacement, and resettlement. Findings in Pusuca suggest that the tension 
between minga participation and wage employment has a great deal to do with the 
structuring of time and the unequal power to do so.  
Minga participation in Manzano was significantly associated with the density of a 
household’s reciprocal exchange relations with the group. Here, what we see is more 
consistent with the model of minga as dyadic contract (Whitten 1969), where people’s 
participation is based on their reciprocal exchanges with others. We do not find this same 
relationship in Pusuca because participation was mandatory for all households, regardless 
of their ties to others in the group. However, as mentioned above, Pusuca was a very new 
community at the time of research (just 2 years old) and, although more than half of the 
resettlers were from the same village origin, the types of reciprocity that existed in 
Manzano had not yet developed in Pusuca. What is clear from statistical tests of 
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interview and archival data and from ethnographic observations is that mingas in 
Manzano were based largely on personal relationships that involve reciprocal exchange 
relations, while mingas in Pusuca were based instead on institutional parameters. Unlike 
Pusuca, where the intervention of a non-governmental resettlement organization helped 
build new political institutions and a system of bylaws for participation and project 
inclusion, political power in Manzano was based on the traditionally male-dominated 
patron-client political networks that have characterized the region for more than a 
century. Yet one of the ways in which politically powerful individuals maintain and 
exercise their power in both sites is through exchange relationships. Those with more 
exchange ties are more likely to be turned to for access to scarce development resources 
and to have their views and agendas supported. Forms of exchange helped build and 
maintain trust between disaster-affected people and resettlers just as they had prior to the 
disasters and resettlements. They also serve to build and maintain power in several ways, 
which are discussed in detail. Statistical tests also found a significant positive association 
between the extent of exchange relations with powerful households and inclusion in 
disaster relief and development projects, as expected in hypothesis 3b. The conclusion is 
that it is not only the powerful who benefit from unique ties to outside resources, but also 
their less powerful allies within their communities.  
The chapter concludes with a review of the study findings as they relate to 
theories of power. Study findings call into question certain theoretical models of disasters 
and resettlement, while confirming others. For one, models of disasters and resettlement 
that focus on these phenomena as departures from routine culture and practice are 
problematic because they presume a sort of pre- and post-resettlement stasis and bracket 
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out potentially perennial tensions of routine cultures and allows for a return to a 
presumed “normal.” I say problematic because it largely ignores the tensions and 
inequities that exist in communities prior to resettlement and which might affect recovery 
and the political and economic sustainability of resettlements. Second, several existing 
analytical frameworks for the study of disasters and resettlement are found inadequate 
because of a lack of attention to power. I found that the dialectical tension between wage 
employment and minga participation was not necessarily one of fundamental opposition, 
but instead built on the unequal distribution of power to structure time and organize 
mingas. Third, the findings of this study call into question models of cooperation that 
explicitly rely upon the social, cultural, and economic homogeneity of social groups as a 
basic condition for cooperation. In contrast, it is apparent that the more heterogeneous 
site of Pusuca was more effectively and inclusively organized than the homogeneous site 
of Manzano. Fourth, study findings identify the complexity of gender as it factors into 
power and the distribution of resources in the study sites. Finally, the discussion chapter 
places the findings in the context of historical factors, specifically the extent to which the 
sustained recruitment of participants for the production of common resources is the 
source of political power in the study sites and the ways in which this articulates with the 
clientelist political system of Ecuador. Institutional interventions by the resettlement 
agency in Pusuca provided productive resources to all resettlers, promoted the poor and 
marginal to positions of leadership, and generally avoided the reification of local power 
relations, their efforts leave wider social and political structures unchanged. 
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The concluding chapter reviews the findings of the study and highlights their 
relevance for anthropological inquiry in general and the study of reciprocity and 
cooperation in disaster and resettlement contexts in particular. The chapter then considers 
the limitations of the current study, which include limitations in the study design, while 
identifying ways in which the study could be improved, and cautioning against 
generalizing study findings based on the small sample of sites (n=2). I then present 
several recommendations for further study by suggesting a comparative study of forms of 
reciprocity and cooperation in multiple contexts, including a variety of Andean, 
disaster/non-disaster, resettlement/non-resettlement sites. I identify a core set of questions 
and variables that could improve anthropological knowledge about the ways in which 
different forms of reciprocity and cooperation operate in these contexts. The chapter then 
concludes with a set of recommendations that resettlement agencies might consider when 
working with similar populations and the development challenges associated with 
resettlement and working with local economic strategies, institutions, and practices. 
Place in Anthropological Inquiry 
This is a study which can contribute to anthropological and broader 
interdisciplinary knowledge about reciprocity and cooperation in the contexts of Andean 
culture, disasters, resettlement, and development. As a detailed examination of local 
practices, which is guided by theories of culture, power, and economy (Eriksen 2004), 
this study sits squarely in the realm of anthropological inquiry. It follows Bourdieu’s 
(1977:11) reiteration of the ethnographic endeavor, which is to privilege the description 
and analysis of actual practices over stated cultural rules and norms. According to 
Henrietta Moore (1999:2), the uniqueness of anthropological study is not only related to 
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its focus on alterity and cultural difference, but on its unique capacities to explore the 
ways in which local practices and forms of alterity are situated in and produced in the 
context of unequal power relations. Knauft (1996:50) has referred to this as a “critical 
humanism,” which entails the detailed documentation of the fullness of people’s lives 
while exposing and critiquing forms of inequality and domination (see also Knauft 2006). 
The anthropological project so envisioned must therefore often situate specific sites of 
ethnographic study in the context of a globalized world, examining the ways in which 
specific local practices respond and contribute to global dynamics (Moore 1999:10). This 
leads naturally to the study of the ways in which development schemes reify and/or 
produce existing power relations and inequalities (Knauft 2006:415) and the ways in 
which disasters and resettlements are part of the longue durée of historical vulnerability 
(Oliver-Smith 2009b; de Wet 2006b; Henry 2005; Wisner et al. 2004). This project goes 
beyond all-purpose critiques of global processes by focusing on specific actors engaged 
in development schemes that obtain at the local level but which also entail mid-range 
interactions between actors and agencies (Knauft 2006:418-422). 
 According to Carrier and Miller (2005:25), one of anthropology’s most significant 
advantages over economics is the capacity to situate “economic processes with the lives 
of economic agents.” This project therefore tests hypotheses about the economic 
strategies of local actors and the ways in which they articulate with broader political 
economic systems. It likewise takes up some of the project of political anthropologists, 
who Thomassen (2008:267) says remain viable because they focus on “ethnographic 
study of localized political organization and practices, such as patron-client relations, that 
fall outside the regulated domains of the state.” In this study, the complementary projects 
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of economic and political anthropology are synthesized by applying the uniquely 
anthropological approach to political economy in the study of reciprocity, cooperation, 
and politics of disasters and resettlement. This approach goes beyond mere reference to 
wider global economies and political systems and delves into localized practices and their 
articulation with both the modes of production and the institutions and social systems 
which produce, modify, and constrain their influence (Roseberry 1988:179). 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Studying Reciprocity in Disaster-Induced Resettlements in the Andes 
This dissertation examines the ways in which a specifically Andean form of 
reciprocity, the minga, works in disaster-induced resettlement settings. In times of crisis, 
such as disasters, their aftermath, and the common outcome of resettlement, people rely 
not only on governments and non-governmental organizations but also on one another for 
support, often drawing on pre-existing social networks of reciprocity. These reciprocal 
exchange relations often experience crises as their members are displaced and seek 
alternative strategies for access to scarce resources essential for livelihoods and survival. 
As a part of these processes, groups and individuals are often thrust into contact with a 
variety of state and non-governmental organizations that provide resources and support 
for relief and development. In these contexts, relations of unequal power are thrown into 
relief in what has been called a crise revelatrice (Sahlins 1972) that can expose social and 
political economic inequities and create apertures for both their rectification and their 
reification.  
The unequal power that inheres both in the social networks of disaster-affected 
resettlers and the ties between their communities and outside institutions can have 
consequences for the distribution of scare relief and development resources, placing 
people at unequal risk for impoverishment. This study examines these processes in the 
particular context of two disaster-induced resettlements in the Andean highlands of 
Ecuador by formulating and testing three principal hypotheses. The first is that the 
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resettlement of kin and community members in different sites and the transition to wage 
labor employment are negatively associated with participation in mingas (cooperative 
labor groups based on reciprocity). This is expected because of decreased reliance on 
reciprocal relations for resources by wage laborers (H1). The second hypothesis is that 
political power is exercised in mingas by individuals providing material resources to 
members of the group through reciprocal exchanges that are reciprocated through 
participation in mingas. Specifically, minga participation is expected to be positively 
correlated with the receipt by most people of material items from leaders in exchange for 
their participation (H2). The third hypothesis examines the proposition that political 
power in a resettlement setting is based on access and control over scarce development 
resources, and that this power is maintained and exercised through exchange networks 
and unique ties to sources of aid and development resources. More specifically, this 
analysis will test two claims: (H3a) influence over collective negotiations and benefit 
allocation is positively associated with the extent of a household’s total exchange 
relations with other households in the community, and; (H3b) more powerful actors and 
their allies will have a greater share of development benefits than others.  
This analytical framework goes beyond existing models of anthropological 
inquiry in disaster recovery and resettlement in three key regards, each challenging the 
persistent concept of disaster-affected people and forced resettlers as powerless victims 
(pace Beazley 2009) in different ways. Specifically, the first hypothesis examines both 
imposed institutional factors (resettlement in different locations) and the agency 
exercised by households adapting to changing ecological conditions by pursuing 
alternative economic strategies (wage labor). The second hypothesis challenges the 
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tendency in disaster and resettlement research to treat reciprocal exchange relations as 
undifferentiated forms of mutual aid and support. The third hypothesis goes beyond 
existing frameworks that assume that the primary power relations in disasters and 
resettlements are between groups and institutions by examining power relations among 
resettlers and disaster-affected people and the ways in which they influence the 
distribution of resources in resettlement. To introduce the literature supporting this 
framework, I first review understandings of how unequal access to resources is exploited 
to access or maintain power, often referred to as political economy. I then highlight the 
relevant issues in this domain as they have emerged in the literature on disasters, 
resettlement, and development. Following this, I review reciprocity from a framework 
that considers how production and distribution are generated via relationships between 
raw materials (including land), tools (including infrastructure), and labor. In capitalism, 
money and finance are the grease that helps these factors of production work together. In 
some small-scale agricultural settings, like my field sites, it is reciprocity that provides at 
least some of the oil. I therefore focus on Andean forms of reciprocity. Finally, I 
conclude by situating the study of reciprocity in the context of the politics of resource 
distribution as it is negotiated by different actors and institutions in resettlement. 
Disasters, Resettlement, and Power  
One of the enduring commitments of anthropology is to critically examine and 
theorize inequality, power, and domination (Knauft 2006, 1996). For anthropologists, it is 
not enough to identify the presence or absence of these phenomena at macro-level scales. 
Rather, one of the more important tasks of anthropology is to investigate the details of 
power and inequality as they are practiced, experienced, and interconnected (Knauft 
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2006, 1996; Moore 1999; Scheper-Hughes 1992). In this dissertation, I am concerned 
with three key questions: 1) How are social relations and practices affected by changing 
ecological conditions and economic strategies in disaster-induced resettlements? 2) How 
are power relations produced and exercised in the cultural practices of collective labor 
and reciprocity leveraged in this context? 3) To what extent do these practices influence 
the distribution of scarce development resources in the resettlement process? These 
questions lead somewhat naturally to the toolkit of political economy (Jones 2010; Watts 
2000), which examines the dialectic tensions between modes of production and between 
classes in a society by focusing on power as a relational dynamic predicated on access 
and control of scarce resources. Political economy frameworks have proven apt at 
integrating subjects as complex as the politics of relief and resettlement (Jones and 
Murphy 2009; Oliver-Smith 2010; Abala-Bertrand 1993) and rural Andean culture 
(Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; Bretón and Garcia 2003; de la Torre 2006; Wolf 1955). 
Political economy is a theoretical framework that examines the construction of social 
order through economic production, political prestige, and ideology (Blanton et al. 1996). 
Jones (2010:80-81), building from Blanton et al., characterizes anthropological political 
economy as an approach to studying the production and maintenance of power through 
focusing on primary efforts of elites in these three domains of economics, politics and 
ideology; access and control of scarce resources; accumulating prestige through unique 
ties outside the group vs. prestige emerging from rituals; plus, appeals to common 
ideology. Throughout this chapter, I return to these key facets of the maintenance of 
power. 
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Disaster and Resettlement Risks and Impacts: Stages, Triggers, Cascades 
Several works review anthropological contributions to disaster research (Jones 
and Murphy 2009; Gunewardena and Schuller 2008; Henry 2005; Hoffman and Oliver-
Smith 2002; Oliver-Smith 1996), resettlement (Oliver-Smith 2009a, 2005; de Wet 2006a; 
Cernea 1993), and development (Escobar 2011; Olivier de Sardan 2005; Mosse 2005). 
Disaster research has increasingly focused on power and inequality and ultimately to 
challenge popular notions of what disasters are and just how natural they may be. This 
general approach has been employed by anthropologists (Adams et al. 2011; Jones 2010; 
Oliver-Smith 2009b), geographers (Lein 2009; Collins 2008; Wisner et al. 2004; Cutter et 
al. 2003), sociologists (Freudenberg et al. 2008), social psychologists (Lindell et al. 
2006), and historians (Bankoff 2003, 2001). Anthropological studies of resettlement and 
development likewise focus on questions of impoverishment (Cernea 2003, 2000) and 
power (Escobar 2011; Mosse 2005; Lewis and Mosse 2006). Here, I highlight some of 
the more salient features of power, inequality, and models for studying disasters and 
resettlement as they relate to this particular study. 
The present study takes place in the simultaneous context of disaster-induced 
resettlement and chronic hazard conditions, a resettlement that still receives ashfall but 
which lies outside the high-risk zone of the volcano. Although in scholarship, policy, and 
public discourse, disasters tend to be viewed as sudden shocks of nature that must be 
studied by technical experts for prevention and mitigation, it is worth questioning the 
extent to which disasters are “natural” (Wisner et al. 2004). Disasters are not merely the 
result of environmental events, but are also products of the unequal distribution of certain 
populations in hazardous regions and unsustainable prevention, response, and recovery 
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procedures and infrastructure (Oliver-Smith 2009b; Wisner et al. 2004). Disaster 
frameworks that focus on environmental “triggers” (e.g., Smith 2001; Alexander 1993) or 
focus on stages of response and recovery (e.g., Platt 1999; Dynes et al. 1987) therefore 
need to be complemented with processual frameworks of political economy. Doing so 
enables analysis of processes that render some groups more vulnerable than others and 
which undermine their capacities to recover and adapt (Whiteford and Tobin 2009; 
Wisner et al. 2004). Another issue is that the environmental trigger and stages of recovery 
frameworks “assume that disasters are departures from ‘normal’ social functioning, and 
that recovery means a return to normal” (Wisner et al. 2004:10). Any implication that 
disasters or resettlements are “temporary” only obscures the fact that daily life for many 
people is experienced as chronically insecure, economically unstable, and frequently 
entails prolonged periods of crisis and trauma (Henry 2005; Bankoff 2003; Haque and 
Zaman 1993; Davis 1992; Hewett 1997, 1983; Zaman 1989; Torry 1979). It is necessary 
to shift analytical focus from both linear and cyclical “stages of recovery” models (Baird 
2010; Lindell et al. 2007) to complex and patterned impacts of disaster and resettlement. 
A political economic approach places disadvantaged groups squarely in the center of 
analysis, and allows the possibility that returning to a non-hazardous state is not a typical 
option for many groups and individuals.  
Once-popular anthropological models for studying resettlement have also proven 
inadequate because of their focus on linear and cyclical processes of crisis, transition, and 
recovery. Scudder and Colson (1982) developed a scheme for studying resettlement in 
four stages: recruitment, transition, development, and incorporation, or the “handing 
over” of resettlement administration to resettlers themselves. This analytical scheme 
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focused on the stresses that were unequally distributed by age, gender, occupation, and 
civil status at each stage. The original model was applied to voluntary resettlements, but 
was later adapted to involuntary resettlements (Scudder 1985). The problem with this 
model is that it assumes the presence of all four stages in resettlement and is therefore 
biased toward the successful resettlement processes, whereas most resettlement schemes 
tended to fail in one or more of these stages or never reach them at all (Cernea 2000; 
Cernea and Guggenheim 1996; Partridge 1989; de Wet 1988). 
Research on both disasters (Whiteford and Tobin 2009) and resettlement (Oliver-
Smith 2010; Whiteford and Tobin 2009, 2004; Colson 1999; Cernea 1997; Harrell-Bond 
1986) consistently demonstrates that the risks and problems encountered in recovery and 
resettlement beget further vulnerabilities and greater impoverishment. The impacts 
(anticipated or otherwise) of disasters, displacement, and resettlement tend to “cascade” 
and perpetually undermine peoples’ capacity to mitigate or effectively adapt to chronic 
hazards and post-disaster and resettlement conditions (Whiteford and Tobin 2009; de Wet 
2006b; Cernea 2003).  
Cernea (2003, 2000, 1997) made impoverishment risks the centerpiece of his 
model for the study of resettlement. He identified eight core risks encountered in 
resettlement that he considers variable domains central to planning, predicting, and 
evaluating the outcomes of resettlement. These are landlessness, joblessness, 
homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to 
common property resources, and disarticulation of social groups (Cernea 2003). The risks 
outlined in Cernea’s model have been consistently identified in resettlements in Asia (Shi 
et al. 2002; Agnihotri 1996; Hakim 2000; Nayak 2000; Mahapatra 1999; Ota 1996; 
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Thangaraj 1996), Africa (Kibreab 2000; Schmidt-Soltau 2003), and South America 
(Muggah 2000). The conceptual building blocks of Whiteford and Tobin’s (2009, 2004) 
Cascade of Impacts model share much in common with Cernea’s model. The Cascade of 
Impacts model was born out of research on disasters in Ecuador and identifies core 
variable domains (environment, economics, health, and social capital) quite similar to 
Cernea's Impoverishment Risks and Resettlement model (IRR) that, while appearing 
individually, have cumulative and cascading impacts on peoples’ ability to mitigate or 
recover from chronic disasters. 
Helpful as these models are, they have several shortcomings. Although the 
variables in Cernea’s impoverishment risks in resettlement model might provide an index 
of status and attributes, they say little about the relational contexts within which these 
conditions are produced and they categorically overlook potential inequalities among 
resettled peoples. Ethnographic studies must go further to examine the specific ways in 
which social inequalities inhere in the unequal distribution of risk and resources in 
disasters and resettlement and avoid homogenizing disaster-affected people by class, 
culture, ethnicity, and gender. Whiteford and Tobin’s model, while placing social issues 
at the center of analysis, does not provide a clear definition of social capital from which 
to work. Another general problem with disaster and resettlement studies is that they 
portray disaster-affected people as passive, powerless victims (Beazley 2009; Hewitt 
1997). Political economic studies do focus on structural inequalities, but from an 
anthropological perspective there is a problem of scale, as they tend to characterize 
societies or large groups and do not typically investigate the internal politics of particular 
social groups. A first step in this direction is to examine the specific reciprocal exchange 
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relations in disaster-induced resettlements in order to identify the variables that might 
affect the distribution of social and institutional support. 
The first hypothesis in this study focuses on the core risks of social disarticulation 
and landlessness associated with resettlement. Social disarticulation refers to the 
dismantling and displacement of communities, kinship groups, and other forms of social 
organization (Cernea 1997). In the process, “life-sustaining informal networks of 
reciprocal help, local voluntary associations, and self-organized mutual service are 
disrupted,” resulting in “a net loss of valuable ‘social capital’” (Cernea 1997:1575). This 
has long-term consequences that compound other more tangible losses (Sowell 1996; 
Baboo 1992). In addition to the displacement of social groups and relations in 
resettlement, the partial or complete destruction or loss of land and agricultural resources 
is an almost universal outcome (Cernea 2003, 1997, 1996a; de Wet 2006, 1996), 
increasing the likelihood of a transition from primary production to wage labor (cf. 
Nayak 2000). Even under non-crisis circumstances, the displacement of the primary 
agricultural mode of production and the transition to wage labor employment is both 
theoretically and empirically associated with the dissolution of Andean cultural strategies 
(Martínez Novo 2008:94), a topic to which I will return below. 
The second and third hypotheses go beyond social disarticulation by examining 
the power relations inherent in the reciprocal exchange relations presumed to serve the 
purposes of mutual aid in Cernea’s model. Disaster-induced resettlement homogenizes 
the needs and experiences of relocated households in many ways, but it also provides 
opportunities and constraints that shape adaptations to the resettlement context. Among 
disaster-related resettlements, numerous cases exist in which marginalized groups 
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mobilized and demanded more accountability and response from the state, political 
leaders, and multinational NGOs (Oliver-Smith 2006a). Such marginalized groups often 
seek a political strategy that makes them appear more homogeneous than they really are. 
However, research suggests that disaster-affected peoples and resettlers are not powerless 
(cf. Beazley 2009), nor are they merely empowered in their collective political strategies. 
A political economic framework suggests a major factor in variation in power and 
resource access within these communities lies in the relationship between reciprocal 
exchange relations and political power. 
Disarticulation of Reciprocity: Moral Economy and the Capitalist World System 
Resettlement is not merely a process of economic restitution and development. It 
involves the severing of social ties. According to Cernea (1997:1575-1576):  
“if poverty is not only an absence of material means—such as land, shelter, work, 
food—but also powerlessness, dependency, and vulnerability, then the 
disarticulation of communities and the loss of reciprocity networks are significant 
factors in aggravating poverty” 
Displaced persons are often sorted into shelters and settlements that break up 
families and extended kin relations (Harrell-Bond 1986, 1993; Van Damme 1995). 
Conditions of scarcity in interim shelters and resettlements often compound health and 
stress issues and undermine the capacities many groups have to mitigate crises through 
mutual aid (Whiteford and Tobin 2009, 2004; Wisner 2006; Chan 1995). Where 
resettlement schemes focus on agriculture and other rural plans, issues such as the 
availability and quality of land and water, access to services, credit, and settler 
cooperation become exceptionally important (Cernea 2000; Marx 1990; Scudder 1985; 
Rogge 1981; Thomas 1981). Some note the development of a dependency upon the 
services provided through resettlement plans for day-to-day needs (Gonzalez-Parra and 
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Simon 2008; Cernea 2003; Goodland 1997; Scudder 1997; Oliver-Smith 1992). Disaster 
victims are routinely treated as problematic objects of strategy and not as subjects with 
problem-solving potential (Whiteford and Tobin 2004; Kottak 1985). In spite of progress 
toward preventative models in disaster relief and mitigation policies at the subnational, 
national, and international levels, the practice of disaster management remains—
especially in my research context in Ecuador—predominantly a matter of post hoc 
treatment and reaction (Macias and Aguirre 2006; Whiteford and Tobin 2004; Wisner et 
al. 2004; Solberg et al. 2003). Aside from being generally chaotic, this general trend in 
practice means that the directly and indirectly affected populations are acted upon and 
therefore do not exercise much agency in initial evacuations and mitigation initiatives 
(Whiteford and Tobin 2004; Wisner et al. 2004). In the immediate situation, victims are 
forced to abandon property they are unlikely to recuperate. What little transferable wealth 
they might have is lost along with their productive resources (Whiteford and Tobin 
2004). Moreover, an issue that has increasingly taken focal prominence in disaster 
research, is the extent to which family members, extended kin, and other units of social 
organization are severed in hasty evacuations, thereby often exacerbating the resounding 
social, emotional, economic, health, and political costs of disaster mitigation (Whiteford 
and Tobin 2009, 2004, 2001; Jones et al. 2007; Norris et al. 2005; Avenarious and 
Johnson 2004; Unger and Powell 1980).  
There are perhaps several risk factors that might affect the continuity of reciprocal 
exchange and cooperation practices in disaster-induced resettlements, but I have chosen 
to focus on two, for reasons discussed below. The first is that neighbors and kin are 
frequently relocated to different resettlements and there is a resulting dissolution of the 
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networks that sustain reciprocity and cooperation (Whiteford and Tobin 2009, 2004, 
2001; Cernea 2003, 1996a; Anderson and Woodrow 1989). Although this risk requires 
only empirical testing and no real theoretical justification, it is important to account for 
because of the frequency of the incidence of displacing community members to different 
sites in resettlement and because this is a known factor in my study sites (see chapter 3). 
The second risk factor that might affect the continuity of reciprocity and cooperation in 
rural resettlements is a transition in the mode of production from primary production to 
wage labor. One consistently documented issue in the anthropology of resettlements is 
the relocation of agricultural producers to landless resettlements (Cernea 1996a), which is 
the case with one of the two sites in this study and will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapter. With the transition to landlessness, many resettlers are expected to 
seek out alternative economic strategies, with wage labor often chief among them (Nayak 
2000). This leads to an issue that has been of perennial interest in anthropology, 
especially in the context of studies of reciprocity. Specifically, if reciprocal exchange 
relations and practices are predicated on pre-capitalist modes of production and 
adaptations to specific environmental conditions, does the transition to a capitalist mode 
of production—brought on by changing environmental conditions—result in the 
dissolution of these relations and practices?  
The notion that reciprocal exchange practices are rooted in the specific conditions 
of pre-capitalist societies goes back to the earliest studies of reciprocity in anthropology. 
The anthropology of reciprocity can be traced back to Mauss’ seminal work, The Gift 
(2006 [1925]), a work which in many ways remains central to the anthropology of 
exchange and reciprocity today (cf. Hann 2006; Yan 2005; Godelier 1999). Gift 
36 
 
exchange, according to Mauss, is characterized by moral obligations of giving, receiving, 
and returning. In gift exchanging societies, refusing to give and refusing to accept are 
both hostile acts that reject the social order and the relations essential for maintaining that 
order (Mauss 2006 [1925]:13). In these societies, where there are no formal political 
institutions, gift exchanges foster the development of social ties of mutual obligation 
between adults. Gift exchange is therefore only theoretically voluntary; in practice, it is 
obligatory. Mauss developed an evolutionary scheme that included three stages. First, 
“total prestations” are social exchanges of non-economic transfers between groups, where 
gift giving is ubiquitous and essential for social integration. In the second stage, gift 
exchanges are engaged in between “moral persons” of different groups. In this stage, 
social institutions such as trade and the state, have assumed some of the roles of the gift. 
Lastly, commodity exchanges in the markets of modern societies have marginalized the 
role of the gift.  
Mauss has been criticized for romanticizing traditional societies and for “an 
implicit evolutionism" (Eriksen 2004:89). Like Malinowski, Mauss’ analysis of kula 
trade calls attention to the fact that exchange need not necessarily be economically 
profitable and must also be situated in cultural contexts (Eriksen 2004:87). The analysis 
in The Gift has been criticized for overstating the distinctions between the societies in his 
evolutionary scheme, as there is ample evidence of the importance of reciprocal exchange 
in modern societies (Granovetter 1973; Stack 1974; Susser 1982). Malinowski (2005 
[1922]), for example, documents many instances of the sale of an animal, which may 
later be gifted and subsequently bartered and, ultimately, consumed, providing ample 
evidence that multiple spheres of exchange might coexist although this does not diminish 
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the fact that Kula provides a structure for various systems of exchange. The notion of 
mutually-exclusive systems of exchange remains a relevant issue—both theoretically and 
empirically—in anthropology today. 
Malinowski rejected much of Mauss’ interpretation of kula exchange and 
substituted the principle of reciprocity for Mauss’ “spirit of the gift” in social exchange 
by arguing that economic obligations are sustained by the threat of social and economic 
sanctions (Malinowski 1985 [1926]). Contrary to Mauss, who envisioned a moral order 
sustaining gift exchange and fostering the development of social cohesion, Malinowski 
claimed that people give and reciprocate in order to receive and continue receiving, 
which he considered the foundation of Melanesian social order (Malinowski 1985 
[1926]).  
Karl Polanyi, in his master work The Great Transformation (2001 [1944]), 
claimed that old-world feudalism and tribalism are contexts in which behavior was 
embedded in social and institutional contexts whose explicit functions were other than 
economic and governed by moral and cultural rules rather than economic ones. Polanyi 
(2001 [1944]), like Mauss, argued that economic exchange was once subsumed by social 
relations where reciprocity was the norm, but after the emergence of capitalism, social 
relations were subsumed by economic exchange. Peasant and non-market economies 
were categorically distinct from Western market capitalism and from each other in 
important ways that rendered formalist inquiry incapable of yielding valid comparative 
insights (Dalton 1961). The “great transformation” he spoke of came about when 
capitalism emerged and replaced pre-capitalist organizing mechanisms by forming social 
relations according to explicitly economic principles, which were then reflected back in 
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to the moral economy (Barth et al. 2005). Economic anthropologists following Polanyi’s 
theory maintained that the economies of different societies were based on distinct cultural 
processes and therefore deserve to be understood on their own terms (Isaac 1993; Sahlins 
1972; Halperin 1977). 
Spheres and Continuums of Exchange 
The theories of Mauss (2006 [1925]), Malinowski (1985 [1926]), and Polanyi 
(2001 [1944]) all relied on some concept of a moral economy or social contract enabling 
reciprocal exchange practices that were mutually exclusive with or at least in tension with 
market exchange practices (see also Narotzky and Moreno 2002:285). However, the 
notion that reciprocal exchange is mutually exclusive with market exchange systems has 
come under scrutiny. In their studies of the Tiv in Nigeria, Laura and Paul Bohannan 
(1959) found that, prior to colonization, the Tiv distinguished between “economic 
spheres” where certain goods circulated separately and there were strict rules for 
conversion between spheres. During the colonial period, when money and market 
exchange were introduced, the economic spheres dissolved as monetary value became the 
standard. More recently, in research in Norway, Lien (1992) and Døving (2001) found 
economic spheres coexisting in modern monetary economies. Granovetter’s (1973) 
landmark study on the “strength of weak ties” examined the job-seeking strategies of 
urban professionals and found that they tended to find job leads through “weak ties,” or 
people with whom they were only tangentially connected. In contrast to prevailing 
theories that capitalism subsumed relationships under economic relations—a key tenet of 
Polanyi’s “great transformation” theory—Granovetter found that modern economic 
behavior in market economies was in fact embedded in non-economic contexts. 
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Appadurai (1986:11-13), Carrier (1990:20-25), Parry (1986:465), and Bloch and Parry 
(1989:8-12) likewise abandoned the radical opposition between gift and commodity 
economies in favor of overlapping continua that include these as extremes. 
Sahlins (1974) acknowledged a debt to Mauss and Polanyi, but went on to 
criticize their use of reciprocity as an ideal type. Sahlins conceived of his forms of 
reciprocity as a sort of continuum, from positive (generalized) to negative, with balanced 
reciprocity in the center. Sahlins identified relational distance as the most important 
covariant of the continuum, but these forms of reciprocity could exist in the same time 
and place and among the same actors. The relationship between actors is fundamental to 
Sahlins’ theory. Relationships could absorb the pressures of rising exchange rates in 
times of scarcity and “the flexibility of the system depends on the social structure of the 
trade relation” (Sahlins 1974:313). The “norms” of reciprocity were relative and 
relational in Sahlins’ framework, in contrast to the abstract and absolute norms of 
reciprocity in Mauss and Polanyi. 
Support Networks of the Urban Poor 
In considering the place of reciprocity in pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of 
production, we might also consider the reciprocal exchange networks of the urban poor, 
most famously described by Stack (1974), Lomnitz (1977), Susser (1984), and Gonzalez 
de la Rocha (2001). These authors have been cited by resettlement researchers as 
examples of the types of support networks that are important factors in recovery from 
disasters (Jones et al. 2011) and resettlement (Bartolome 1984). These ethnographies 
described reciprocal exchanges of mutual aid that were produced in the context of 
modern capitalist economies, though they existed at the margins as adaptations to the 
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scarcity and isolation of urban poverty. These reciprocal exchange repertoires exhibited a 
dialectical tension with the capitalist market, as they were adaptations to market 
exclusion. Susser (1984) describes how poor women found it difficult to meet the dueling 
demands of low-wage employment and their mutual support networks. Low wage 
employment made it impossible to meet their reciprocal obligations, such as shared 
childcare and meal sharing, meaning that they would have to find a way to pay for these 
services, which greatly diminished the potential payoff of employment. Significantly, 
these were reciprocal exchange relations produced at the margins of the capitalist system 
and, while produced in the context of capitalist development, they are nonetheless 
adaptations to exclusion from the development process. 
Dialectics of Andean Exchange Systems 
 Because this study is concerned with reciprocity in disaster-induced resettlements 
in the Ecuadorian Andes, it is important to consider the ways in which particularly 
Andean practices of reciprocity have been studied in relation to changing modes of 
production. Reciprocity, kinship, and communal labor have long been identified by 
anthropologists as essential domains of Andean productive and cultural practice 
(Martínez Novo 2008; Mayer 2005; Harvey 2002; Harris 2000). These practices are 
historical products of subsistence cultivation and small-scale animal husbandry (Harvey 
2002) that demand seasonal investments of labor beyond what households can provide 
(Harris 2005), fostering the coordination of a form of reciprocity termed “exchange 
labor” (after Erasmus 1956). Moreover, ecological variables such as drought, volcanic 
activity, or erosion that periodically affect households’ abilities to meet subsistence needs 
are additional incentives for the practices of delayed reciprocal exchange of consumption 
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goods and other forms of mutual aid (Martínez Novo 2008; Mayer 2005). Reciprocal 
exchanges are so pervasive throughout the Andes that the Quechua terms ayni (dyadic 
reciprocal exchange) and minga (collective exchange labor) are invoked by peasant and 
indigenous movements to mobilize resistance to capitalism, state intrusions, and 
multinational development organizations by contrasting the virtues of mutual aid in 
Andean culture with the greed and exploitation of the market (Poole 2009; Mayer 2005; 
Taussig 1980). 
 Ecuadorian anthropologists began to debate the potential consequences of the 
erosion of the Andean cultural practices of reciprocity and cooperative labor by the 
encroachment of capitalism in the wake of agrarian reforms in the 1970s (Martínez Novo 
2008; Seligman 2008; Chiriboga 1988; Martínez 1984; Farga and Almeida 1981). Many 
wondered if indigenous and peasant groups would become “proletarianized” by the 
displacement of primary production by wage labor in the region (e.g., Mintz 1974). These 
issues have remained central to Ecuadorian and Andean research throughout phases of 
development and resistance in the Andes. As economic and political reforms throughout 
the Andean region have had uneven effects (Harvey 2002; Becker 2000; de la Torre 
2000), the question remains as to whether or not Andean reciprocity and cooperative 
labor constitute “threatened form[s] of social insurance” (Wutich 2007). 
The displacement of the primary agricultural mode of production brought on by 
wage labor employment is both theoretically and empirically associated with the 
dissolution of Andean cultural strategies (Martínez Novo 2008). In her work in the 
Andean highlands of Northern Peru, Deere (1990:103) found that the wealthy often avoid 
reciprocating minga labor because they host too many laborers at once to return the labor 
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themselves and instead reciprocate with feasting. In the wake of the monetization of rural 
economies in the 1970s, she also noted a transition to paid labor over minga reciprocity 
(Deere 1990:204). Likewise, Mayer (2002) found that wages are increasingly paid by 
village big men in the Peruvian highlands in order to avoid the obligations to reciprocate 
with many laborers (Mayer 2002:14). Also working in Peru, Mitchell (1991) found that 
paid labor had marginalized the practice of mingas, but also found that minga practice 
endured as an alternative to the dispersal of limited cash reserves, on the one hand, and 
the provision of labor for wages of meager purchasing power on the other (Mitchell 
1991).  
Jones (2003) employed a world system framework in his comparative 
ethnographic analysis of class-based networks in peasant villages in Ecuador. His central 
question focused on the extent to which closure between class networks would be 
associated with degrees of village integration into regional capitalist economies, indicated 
by the prevalence of wage labor over agricultural production. Jones found that the class 
compositions of networks were more salient with integration; that is, the transition from 
primary production to wage labor facilitated the development of social networks with 
more homogenous class compositions (Jones 2003:6). He attributes this largely to wage 
employment constraining the ability of individuals to maintain social responsibilities 
across class lines, which may have left them with “no other choice than to interact only 
with people from their own socioeconomic level” (Jones 2003:15).  
Research on Andean reciprocity and cooperative labor has identified a dialectical 
tension between these practices and the encroachment of capitalism, but the relationship 
is clearly complex. Researchers tend to examine capitalism and Andean reciprocity as 
43 
 
contending domains but not necessarily the clash of two systems (Harvey 2002:62). As 
with researchers studying reciprocity outside the Andean region, Andean researchers 
have pointed to “spheres” of exchange which individuals and households might engage in 
simultaneously and which might interact with one another (Mayer 2005; Harvey 2002; 
Fonseca Martel 1972:52). However, it is important to note that recognizing the 
coexistence of exchange practices is not tantamount to a rejection of the dialectical 
tension between them. Bourdieu (1977:173) recognized a tension between market and 
gift economies, as conveyed in his case of the North African mason who, after working 
for pay for several years in France, refuses an invitation to a ritual meal with a client so 
as not to diminish the expectation of payment. This is a rejection of the transformation of 
the monetary value of labor into gifts (Bourdieu 1977:173). 
From Social Support and Social Capital to Reciprocity and Power  
The community is important because it is typically seen as: a locus of 
knowledge, a site of regulation and management, a source of identity  (a 
repository of “tradition”), an institutional nexus of power, authority, 
governance, and accountability, an object of state control, and a theater of 
resistance and struggle (of social movement, and potentially of alternate 
visions of development). It is often invoked as a unity, as an undifferentiated 
entity with intrinsic powers, which speaks with a single voice…. 
Communities, of course, are nothing of the sort – Watts (2000:266-267) 
Studies of social support and social capital have been important complements to 
studies of risk, marginality, and impoverishment because they emphasize the agency of 
disaster-affected and resettled people. In a disaster or resettlement, some groups and 
communities are less susceptible to risk and demonstrate patterns of successful coping or 
adaptation (Porio 2011; Norris et al. 2008; Robinson 2005; Werner and Smith 1992). 
While historical and structural factors bear upon disaster-affected people, it is also 
important to recognize the agency and adaptive capacities of disaster-affected peoples by 
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looking at forms of collective action and the exchange of social support (Kaniasty 2012; 
Jones et al. 2011; Elliot et al. 2010; Wisner et al. 2004). Although there are many reviews 
of the concept of social capital (Kadushin 2011; Lin 2001), in disaster studies it generally 
refers to the variation in resources accessible through social networks (Norris et al. 2008; 
Masten and Obradovic 2008; Wisner et al. 2004; Hurlbert et al. 2001).  
Because disasters and resettlement involve varying degrees of change in patterns 
of individual and group access to resources, institutions, and services (de Wet 2006a), 
researchers have looked to pre-existing and emergent informal relations involving mutual 
aid and the exchange of labor and material for primary production (Moritz et al. 2012; 
Bollig 2006; Colson 2003, 1973; Marx 1990; Caldwell et al. 1986; Scudder 1985) or 
goods and services in order to cope with the risks and vulnerability that accompany 
disaster and displacement (Porter et al. 2008; Cernea 2006, 2003; Wisner et al. 2004; 
Avenarius and Johnson 2004). Unger and Powell’s (1980) study of families under stress 
found that they looked to different categories of people for various kinds of aid. Turning 
to social networks as a complement or alternative to institutional aid has been found to 
enhance individual and group recovery (Kaniasty 2012; Jones et al. 2011; Aldrich 2011; 
Perry et al. 2008; Ibañez et al. 2004; Whiteford and Tobin 2009; Hurlbert et al. 2001; 
Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999; Marx 1990; Robinson et al. 1986). The forging of 
patron-client bonds and reciprocal exchange relations are common adaptations (Shipton 
1990; Caldwell et al. 1986; Dahl and Hjort 1979), but they can become strained in 
protracted recovery periods (Shipton 1990; van Apeldoorn 1981). These kinds of 
reciprocal exchange relations can be dyadic (i.e., between individuals) or concentric (i.e., 
redistribution by central leaders) (Shipton 1990:368). Kin are common types of ties in 
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reciprocal exchange relations, but land shortage can place significant strains on these 
relations (Shipton 1990; Iliffe 1987).  
In their study of wellbeing and social support in the aftermath of Hurricane Floyd 
in North Carolina in the summer of 1999, Avenarius and Johnson (2004) found that a 
lack of weak ties led to difficulties in obtaining sufficient support for recovery. In their 
research on Hurricane Andrew, Hurlbert and colleagues (2001:212) found that personal 
networks of “greater size, lower density, and greater geographic range” were positively 
associated with the receipt of institutional support in the wake of the disaster. They found 
also that individuals embedded in dense networks that reliably provided informal support 
also exhibited the lowest levels of access to support from outside the group, especially 
formal support from institutions (Hurlbert et al. 2001). Research has also found that the 
poor tend to access less social support than do the wealthy (Jones et al. 2011; Elliott et al. 
2010; Norris et al. 2004; Hurlbert et al. 2001) and ample evidence also suggests that 
volunteerism from core networks is frequently followed by a decrease in availability of 
support and an increase in conflict and weakened social networks (Ritchie 2012; Henry 
2005; Norris et al. 2004; Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 2002; Bolin et al. 1998; Palinkas et 
al. 1993).  
A great deal of research has found evidence that group-based strategies that keep 
communities together help maintain and foster cooperation and recovery in resettlement. 
Many such research models have tended to valorize the social cohesion of “tight-knit” 
kin networks in “integrated” communities with high levels of participation in local 
organizations and cooperation (cf. Aldrich 2011; Cernea 2001, 1997). In his study of 
resettlements in Egypt, Sudan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, Scudder (1985:129) found that 
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cooperation for agricultural production was greatest in group-based and more 
homogeneous resettlements, where resettlers were from the same kinship networks, 
villages, castes, religions, and ethnicities. In his ethnohistorical study of a South African 
resettlement, de Wet (1996) found that agnatic kinship accounted for a minority of cases 
of cooperation for agricultural labor prior to resettlement, but this became one of the 
dominant relations involved in cooperation after resettlement. He concludes that prior to 
resettlement, cooperation was based on social ties forged among neighbors over time, 
whereas there was a low level of trust among new neighbors in resettlement, which 
facilitated a transition to greater reliance on kinship for labor exchange. By breaking up 
prior social groupings and their antecedent ecological conditions, resettlement agencies 
eliminate crucial reciprocal exchange relations and undermine the conditions for 
recovery (de Wet 1993). Kibreab (2000:321) found that social groups were dislocated in 
Eritrean refugee resettlements in the Sudan, making cooperation and reciprocity difficult 
to foster and thus, like many others, recommends group-based resettlements that 
maintain existing communities. He also found a breakdown of community organizations 
in the resettlements that resulted in the “amoebic proliferation of leaders competing for 
power and the material benefits associated with it” (Kibreab 2000:321). In their studies 
of social capital and development in rural India, Krishna and Uphoff (2002:97) found 
that social homogeneity facilitates collective action while heterogeneity tends to deter it, 
although later Jones (2004) found heterogeneity to be useful a specific points in the 
evolution of collective action, and Ruttan (2008, 2006) further built on this work find 
that the role of heterogeneity depends on the domain of heterogeneity, the measure of 
collective action, and the type of (natural) resource engaged. Finally, in their study of 
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resettlements in Israel, Sebenius and colleagues (2005:242) found that impoverishment 
was greater where resettlements broke up old social groupings and recovery was greater 
in group-based resettlements that kept communities intact. 
One significant problem with studies of social capital, social support, and group-
based resettlements is that they lack a theory of power. These studies underemphasize 
diverse experiences within groups (Malkki 1995) and the extent to which disaster relief 
and group-based resettlement schemes empower social and economic elites, reify 
gendered hierarchies, manipulate allegiances, and engender social conflict (Clark-Kazak 
2009; Koenig 2001). Disaster and resettlement literature is full of accounts of latent 
conflict, strained alliances, exploitation, opportunism, and resistance to established social 
hierarchies (Oliver-Smith and Button 2005; Robinson 2003; Behura and Nayak 1993; 
Oliver-Smith 1992, 1979; Baboo 1992). Political actors may exploit disaster situations by 
portraying themselves as major players in the delivery of aid and relief efforts have often 
reified dominant political and economic interests (Wisner et al. 2004; Chairetakis 1991). 
In their study of the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, Robinson and colleagues (1986) 
found that community and student groups felt empowered to mobilize and demand more 
accountability from the ruling political party. Oliver-Smith and Button (2005) further 
point out that disaster events and fallouts are not free of implication in political unrest, 
genocide, terrorism, religious persecution, or other forms of violent upheaval capable of 
further displacing populations and replacing governments (see also Johnston 2006, 2001; 
Wisner et al. 2004). Salzman (2004:123) argues that disaster-affected people may have 
similar interests but, lacking common ones (such as collective ownership of resources), 
48 
 
“competition for the limited good is not balanced by the solidarity of cooperation, 
sharing, and support, leaving each to weigh his or her separate interests.”  
Because the development of resettlements necessarily involves the definition and 
regulation of access to resources, it is necessary to address the unequal power that inheres 
in the social relations and institutions that administer these processes. Looking at some of 
the findings on differential access to social support in disasters and resettlement, if some 
individuals have greater access to formal and/or informal support in their networks, does 
this have some implication for the distribution of resources in recovery and resettlement? 
Furthermore, in the context of social support exchanges and cooperation, do individuals 
with different degrees of access to scarce development resources exercise greater power 
over those who do not? And what degree of influence do more connected people have 
over the distribution of resources in resettlement? In order to address these lingering 
questions, it is necessary to address the role of power in reciprocity. 
Reciprocity can be described as “a mutually contingent exchange of benefits 
between two or more units” (Gouldner 1960:164) and a form of mutual dependence. But 
reciprocity also includes “disruptive potentialities of power” (Gouldner 1960:165) where 
unequal power relations produce quantitative variation in the value of exchanges. In other 
words, the power to determine what is equivalent in otherwise generalized reciprocal 
exchanges varies between actors, such that there is a continuum of reciprocal exchanges 
ranging from balanced to negative, with the latter considered a form of exploitation. 
Bourdieu (1977) rejected the notion that reciprocity was associated with social cohesion 
and instead argued that reciprocal exchange practices were part of the reproduction of 
society; a reproduction of asymmetrical power relations vis-à-vis bonds of dependence 
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established in reciprocal exchanges. According to Bourdieu, “the symmetry of gift 
exchange” gives way to “the dissymmetry of ostentatious redistribution” upon which 
political authority is predicated (Bourdieu 1977:210). The reproduction of systems of 
domination is based on this conversion of “economic capital” into “symbolic capital,” 
which obscures material interests and legitimizes relations based on economic 
dependence and exploitation “in terms of an all-embracing moral order" (Narotzky and 
Moreno 2002:287). The redistribution described by Polanyi and Sahlins is for Bourdieu 
“a means of enabling the social reproduction of relations based on domination and 
exploitation" (Narotzky and Moreno 2002:287).  
Importantly, Sahlins (1974) also conceived of gift giving and reciprocity as 
exercises and legitimations of unequal power relations, another point at odds with 
Polanyi and Mauss’ use of reciprocity as an ideal type. To begin with, the giver is always 
the superior actor in a reciprocal exchange and may gain prestige or power while the 
recipient simultaneously becomes a debtor. The very act of giving may produce an 
unequal relationship. This proposition was expanded by Sahlins’ (1974:276-286) 
description of the “big men” in Melanesia, who were powerful brokers who amassed 
resources from group members and then engaged in public displays of generosity in 
which they would conspicuously distribute these surpluses in order to gain power, wealth, 
and prestige. The power of the big man was a product of his accumulation of surpluses 
and his “capacity to force a greater production from his supporters” (Sahlins 1974:276). 
This is interesting because there is a marked tension between mutual support and unequal 
power relations that plays itself out in a sort of concentric redistribution through 
reciprocity. The big man had to appeal to shared interests and norms with those from 
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whom he would claim these resources in order to legitimize his claims and the act of 
power (control over the scarce resources of the group) was subsequently transformed into 
an act of generosity in which the big man was the benefactor of the group. 
The Exercise and Reproduction of Power Relation in Andean Reciprocity 
Minga comes from the Quechua word “mit’a,” meaning “turn,” and refers to 
collective work parties that are part of a varied bundle of practices throughout the Andean 
region that mobilize social labor by means of often complex systems of reciprocity 
(Poole 2009; see also Orlove 1977). Researchers have pointed to mingas as distinct 
examples of Andean people’s historical capacities for cooperation (Colloredo-Mansfeld 
2009; Mayer 2002; Garces 1943) and mingas have played noteworthy roles in Andean 
political mobilization and social movements (Poole 2009; Rueda 1982). The shared base 
of minga labor has been said to constitute “a kind of human-made commons” (Mayer 
2002:124), but this does not necessarily mean that they are always based on common 
interests (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009:98).  
Mingas were historically mechanisms of social subordination, similarly employed 
by the Incas (Harvey 2002; Rostworowski and Morris 1999; West 1957), Spanish 
colonial administrators (Poole 2009; Stern 1988), and hacendados (Salz 1984; Burgos 
1970) to extract free labor from indigenous and peasant groups for public works and 
often personal profit. Far from being associated with cooperative egalitarian organization, 
as they often are today, minga relationships in the post-colonial hacienda era have been 
described as “caste-like” or “semi-feudal” (Alberti 1970; Fuenzalida 1970; Cotler 1968). 
With the decline of the hacienda mode of production and political economy, minga 
practice evolved differently in different parts of the Andes. In some places, mingas 
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emerged as a form of reciprocity based on repeated, voluntary, and dyadic agreements 
between ostensibly equal parties (Mayer 2002; Orlove 1977). In Chimborazo Province, 
where my research took place, the decline in the hacienda system precipitated the 
emergence of communal councils whose decision-making and practical capacities are 
almost completely underwritten by mingas. Known as “cabildos,” these village councils 
form the basis for relations between communities and outside actors. As will be discussed 
in the following chapter, the power and legitimacy of cabildos are largely derived from 
their ability to organize mingas. 
Reciprocity is one of several related practices bound up in contested domains of 
social value (Gudeman 2001:89-90). Gose (1994:11-12) recognized two basic cycles of 
reciprocity in the Peruvian Andes: ayni, based on egalitarian relations, and minka, based 
on hierarchy. Fonseca (1974) wrote a seminal article on the different types of minga 
relationships, which focused on the association of asymmetrical exchange with status or 
power relations. Mayer (2002:18) claims that reciprocity is often asymmetrical, both 
materially and in terms of the power and status distinctions that are inextricably bound up 
in Andean reciprocal exchange. Focused empirical studies include Whitten’s (1969) 
study of villages in coastal Ecuador that describe how key individuals in village 
communities had unique access to market resources and capital were consistently able to 
recruit laborers to mingas from which they alone profited by means of conspicuous 
giving to workers’ families.  
Whitten’s (1969:234) study focuses on the purposive strategies of actors in 
unequal power relations to gain “increasingly direct power over local sociopolitical 
resources, and use such power to gain indirect control over economic activities.” Village 
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work party leadership was rationalized as a rotating position for which anyone with 
accumulated prestige was eligible; in reality, leadership remained relatively constant and 
only a few local elites sustained the prestige that legitimized leadership. The same leaders 
recruited the same work parties time and again and sustained significant profit in the 
process. However, the workers did not explicitly concede any sustained loyalty to the 
work party and leader therefore had to recruit workers anew with each new project. A 
leader’s ability to replicate the class structure was itself a measure of his prestige, which 
was produced through the repeated practices of conspicuous giving to work party 
members and their households. Through the prestation of currency and materials and the 
gifting of consumption goods, the party leaders converted their economic capital into the 
symbolic capital of prestige, which class subordinates accumulated as such in their 
relations with others and thereby repeat similar conversions between economic, social, 
and symbolic capital, which resonated in the social worlds that took shape around them. 
Blanton and colleagues (1996) called attention to the ways in which elites adapt 
their political and cultural strategies based on the relative stability/instability of hazard 
conditions but, as Jones (2010:86) points out, there must be some degree of leveling or 
balance in these strategies in order for elites to retain power. Cooperation mobilized by 
reciprocity may be a strategy employed by village leaders to maintain their power and to 
promote various aspects of sustainability. In his study of the cooperatives of small-scale 
agriculturalists in coastal Ecuador, Jones (2004:13) found that individuals with little 
experience in cooperatives were more likely to trust those they perceived as wealthy and 
that they often used wealth as a means of deciding whom to trust when a cooperative was 
starting up. His findings suggest that equalization of formal power relations in 
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cooperatives was necessary for success in collective action, even though differential 
benefits were accrued between classes. The wealthy often look to organize poorer 
villagers in order to “amass the people and interest necessary to start a cooperative” 
(Jones 2004:16). Some of the wealthier members of one successful cooperative expressed 
sympathy with poorer villagers and an interest in helping them, but they were also 
interested in being able to employ them as laborers when the cooperative began collective 
cultivation projects.  
Anderson and Woodrow (1998:171) cite the case of the construction of a 
resettlement in the Colombian city of Armero for people displaced by the eruptions of the 
Nevada de Ruiz volcano in 1987. The resettlement camp was initially populated by the 
poorest and most marginalized of Armero, who lacked organizational experience. 
Representatives of the Save the Children Foundation, who administered the resettlement, 
were concerned that resettlers were growing dependent on aid rations, which they had 
hoped to scale back in favor of developing self-reliant strategies. They began looking to 
the wealthier and more prominent families who had resettled on their own, outside the 
camps. Once these elite families were recruited to work on the construction of the new 
village, the poorer resettlers began to work on the construction and other forms of 
cooperation as well. Anderson and Woodrow (1998:171) concluded that this was likely 
due to trust in the more prominent families, in addition to fearing that they would be 
excluded from benefits if they did not participate.  
Yet ethnographic evidence suggests that class distinctions are inextricably bound 
up in minga practice, as wealthier families and individuals rely on poorer community 
members in proportion to the scarcity of labor, while laborers depend on the wealthier 
54 
 
members of the community for access to both consumption and production resources 
(Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; Poole 2009; Ferraro 2004; Mayer 2002; Rappaport 1998; 
Mitchell 1991; Deere 1990). In surveying the patterned flow of exchanges in minga 
reciprocity, a generalized pattern emerges in which material resources tend to flow 
downward, while labor and loyalty flow from the bottom up, in spite of an explicit 
ideology of mingas as egalitarian associations based on either rotating or collective 
leadership (Mayer 2002; Mitchell 1991; Deere 1990; Whitten 1969). Cultural rules 
frequently dictate that minga labor must be repaid in kind (cf. Orlove 1977) but, as 
mentioned above, many regularly avoid this through a variety of strategies, including 
substituting food and feasting (Mayer 2002; Deere 1990), alcohol (Colloredo-Mansfeld 
2009), household items (Harris 2000), or loans and payment (Jones 2004; Gonzales de 
Olarte 1994). Minga practice thus develops into a process of perpetual labor recruitment 
via repeated practices of conspicuous giving to laborer households, with reciprocity 
serving as redistribution by periodically facilitating the flow of accumulated wealth and 
goods from elites to commoners. 
Disasters, Resettlement, and Development: The Role of Brokers 
Several authors have called for recognizing disasters and resettlements as 
development problems (Adams et al. 2009; Beazley 2009; Anderson and Woodrow 1998; 
Cuny 1983; Cernea 1996b). One justification for this perspective is that development can 
increase or reduce vulnerability while disasters can impede or create opportunities for 
development (Oliver-Smith 2009b). Disasters may reveal social struggles and inequalities 
in social groups and political systems (Cuny 1983:54). Some have suggested that these 
inequities be targeted by integrating the goals and strategies of sustainable development 
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in disaster relief (Henry 2005; Zetter 2003; Anderson and Woodrow 1998; Slim and 
Mitchell 1992; Kibreab 1987; Cuny 1983). Another rationale is that because all 
involuntary displacement entails the dismantling of previous productions systems and 
ways of life, all resettlements must be considered development projects (Cernea 
1996b:310). 
This study not only examines local practices in disaster-induced resettlements, it 
also examines these practices in the context of the “development encounter” between 
communities and institutions in resettlements to study the emergent network and resource 
flows and must therefore necessarily address issues of power. Within political economic 
frameworks, power is generally defined as a relational property inherent in social 
interaction and derived from the ability to control and allocate relatively scarce resources 
(Kurtz 2001; Wolf 1990; Roseberry 1988; Bourdieu 1977). Hornborg (2001:1) 
importantly adds that power is not only relational and based on unequal distributions of 
resources, but also the distribution of risks.  
Power also involves the ability to make decisions that affect others’ livelihoods 
(Narotzky 2005:81-82). Mosse and Lewis (2006) advance this framework for the study of 
power in a development context. Citing Lukes (2005), they highlight the fact that power 
is not only overt domination in decision-making and the direct control of resources, but 
also the capacity to shape agendas and decide what decisions are to be made in the first 
place. They highlight the role of “brokers,” powerful individuals in leadership positions 
within communities and institutions who set the agendas for decision-making contexts 
and “translate” the needs of one group to the other. Power may have its origins in control 
of scarce resources, but brokerage power in this necessarily derived through relationships 
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with “outsiders” (the state, NGOs, etc.) and exercised in the process of defining agendas 
and influencing the outcomes of (often volatile or risky) decision-making processes (see 
also Elyachar 2002).  
Resettlements are political systems involving complex negotiations between 
stakeholders, including institutions and multiple local actors with unequal access to both 
scarce material resources and political power. The destruction and loss of means of 
primary production through disaster, displacement, and resettlement precipitates a 
significant shift toward access and control of the flows of aid from state institutions and 
NGOs as the primary resources of political competition (de Wet 1996b:338-339). The 
distribution of access and control over new resource bases is a decidedly political process 
(de Wet 2006a:7). Social actors frequently maneuver to acquire or consolidate control of 
resources by pressuring institutions to honor competing claims of legitimacy and 
entitlement (Mosse 2005; Henry 2002; Oliver-Smith 2006, 1996; Scudder and Colson 
1982).  
In the immediate aftermath of disaster, class differences can appear to vanish in 
initial swells of altruism during a liminal period. However, reemergence tends to coincide 
with arrival of formal agencies, and class often factors significantly in the provision of 
relief (Henry 2005; Oliver-Smith 1992; Torry 1986). Relief efforts and other 
development projects have been implicated in the reification of dominant class, gender, 
and political hierarchies in several ways. In some cases, this has involved granting elites 
preferential access to ancillary, micro projects, while in others, elites control 
communication between institutions and communities, channeling both aid and project 
inclusion to favor their respective clientele (de Wet 2006; Barabas and Bartolomé 1996; 
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Chairetakis 1991; Salmen 1987; Partridge et al. 1982). For minga leaders, resettlement 
presents opportunities to advance control of political affairs, but their ability to do so is 
expected to be tightly bound to their ability to allocate scarce resources to the group 
through reciprocity. 
It is not enough to interrogate power from the perspective of the “state versus 
community” model (Beazley 2009). Attention to the power of the state and NGOs over 
communities is important, but by itself not sufficient to theory or application and 
anthropological inquiry increasingly engages mid-level connections between local and 
global processes (Knauft 2006). In development contexts, people do not only exert power 
of their own will and accord, but also through unique ties to outsiders such as NGO 
workers, state officials, and patrons (Mosse 2005). It is therefore important to examine 
the roles of brokers and intermediaries that operate between local communities and extra-
local institutions (Knauft 2006; Merry 2006; Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2005; 
Elyachar 2002). In order to anticipate the ways in which powerful brokers might emerge 
through the practices of Andean reciprocity in my research sites, it is important to 
consider how the exercise and reproduction of power has been treated studies of Andean 
reciprocity. 
Political negotiation has itself been compared to a type of reciprocal exchange 
underwritten by the deliberate inclusion or exclusion of actors in exchange relations 
(Mayer 2002; Spedding 1998; Schweizer 1997). It is therefore reasonable to anticipate 
that those individuals who exercise power through reciprocal exchange and mingas are 
more likely than other to act as brokers between their communities and outside agencies 
and therefore more likely to access and control a greater degree of relief and development 
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resources. Group dynamics in putatively participatory development projects have a 
tendency to favor the interests of those who are already powerful (Cooke and Kothari 
2001:8) and to reify existing inequalities and occasionally produce new ones (Knauft 
2006:415). In his study of the decades-long period of recovery from the 1970 earthquake 
in Peru, Doughty (1986:50) found that powerful individuals in disaster-affected 
communities constantly lobbied and manipulated state bureaucrats and political leaders 
for support for their local relief and development projects. In his study of World Bank 
development projects in La Paz, Bolivia, and Guayaquil, Ecuador, Salmen (1987) found 
that community leaders controlled communication between project administrators and 
beneficiaries, steering projects to the advantage of the leaders.  
Gender, Reciprocity, and Power in Disaster Relief and Resettlement 
Gender is an important factor in power relations everywhere and specifically 
important in disaster and resettlement contexts because it has important implications for 
the distribution of scarce resources and therefore recovery or wellbeing. Cultures and 
social groups are often divided by class and ethnicity and they are always somehow 
divided by gender (Nagengast 2004:113). Gender-based inequalities contribute to 
vulnerability in disasters and resettlement (Willinger 2008; Wisner et al. 2006; Bolin et 
al. 1998; Hewitt 1995; Enarson and Morrow 1998). There is significant evidence that 
women and female-headed households suffer more than men in disasters (Dasgupta et al. 
2010; Willinger 2008; Enarson and Morrow 1998; Bolin et al. 1998; Downs et al. 1993; 
Shipton 1990), especially in terms of mental health (Baker et al. 2005). Because there is a 
need to examine the specific ways in which social inequalities inhere in the unequal 
distribution of resources and risk in society (Wisner et al. 2006), it is important to avoid 
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homogenizing disaster-affected people by  gender in disaster and resettlement studies 
(Bolin et al. 1998:42). This study has so far considered the unequal distribution of risk 
and power in terms of access and control of scarce resources (a class-based model of 
power) in an ethnically and culturally homogenous (see chapter 3) disaster and 
resettlement context, but it remains to do so in terms of gender. 
Disasters and group-based resettlement schemes not only tend to empower social 
and economic elites and manipulate allegiances, but also to reify gendered hierarchies 
(Cernea 2003, 1997; Koenig 2001; Enarson and Morrow 1998). New opportunities post-
disaster and post-resettlement tend to fall along preexisting restrictions of gender roles 
and expectations (Wisner et al. 2006:11; Shepler 2002; Sommers 2001; Anderson and 
Woodrow 1998; Ferguson and Byrne 1994) and gender has been identified as a key factor 
affecting disaster recovery (Dasgupta et al. 2010; Das 1997). Several authors have found 
that gender is a central variable in explaining the distribution of stress in resettlement 
(Sherman and Muldinwa 2002:11; Palinkas et al. 1994; Cernea 1990; Harrell-Bond 1986; 
Scudder and Colson 1982). Gender inequality has been found to undermine family 
cooperation in slow onset disasters (Shipton 1990) and to affect the distribution of scarce 
resources post-disaster (Watts 1991). In a recent study of gender dynamics of recovery 
from disasters and resettlement conducted in Penipe (a resettlement site associated with 
the present study), women were found to endure increased burdens and stresses in post-
disaster resettlement (Schuyler 2011). 
In terms of Andean reciprocity and minga practice, women’s roles are somewhat 
ambiguous. Nonetheless, there may be important gendered dynamics of risk to minga 
practice in disaster and resettlement contexts, specifically in terms of wage labor. Gender 
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is associated with differential access to resources (Deere and Leon 2001; Harris 2000) 
and wage employment has been dominated by men while women’s participation has been 
historically marginal in the Andes (World Bank 2012). Thus, if wage labor participation 
is expected to be negatively associated with minga participation, we might expect women 
to participate in mingas more than men because they assume household responsibilities 
for minga participation. Lacking data specifically on the gendered vulnerability of 
increased residential distance in resettlement, we can nonetheless posit that, because 
women tend to access less resources post-disaster and in resettlement (Wisner et al 
2004:11; Enarson 2001), they will have less influence in determining their resettlement 
sites and will therefore be more likely than men to resettle at greater distances from their 
kin and neighbors 
More generally concerning to women’s participation in reciprocity, it is difficult 
to discern a pattern from the literature. Cross-culturally, women have generally been 
found to engage in more reciprocal exchange relations than men (Yan 2005; Komter 
1996; Susser 1982; Lomnitz 1977; Stack 1973). However, studies of informal social 
support exchanges in disaster contexts tend to find that men give and receive more 
support outside their kin networks than do women (Drabek 1986; Hurlbert et al. 2001). In 
a study of social support exchanges among non-relatives in the disaster-induced 
resettlement community of Penipe, Ecuador (a site of the current study), Burke (2010) 
found that men both gave and received more social support (material, informational, 
emotional, and work opportunities) than women. Since a recent study in one of the 
research sites found that women engage in less reciprocal exchange relations than men, it 
would have been reasonable to posit that findings for the present study would be 
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consistent. However, because men are expected to engage in wage labor more than 
women (see above), it is also reasonable to expect men to engage in less reciprocity than 
women.  
Turning to political contexts, while some have found that the transition to 
democracy in Ecuador in the late 1970s empowered indigenous groups, women, and 
Afro-Ecuadorians to successfully demand their corporatist inclusion through social 
movements (de la Torre 2006, 2003, 2002; Santana 2004; León 1997), others have noted 
that recent trends have marginalized women in local politics (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009). 
In his study of village politics in Otavalo, Ecuador, Colloredo-Mansfeld (2009) observed 
a trend of village councils being dominated by males who often had to contend with 
vocal female dissenters. He attributes this to an increased interaction between 
international donors, non-governmental organization, and village councils reinforcing one 
another’s power in ways that have favored male participation and voice over women’s. 
The recessions of the 1980s resulted in the return of many men from urban centers to 
their native villages and many sought increased political domination through serving on 
village councils , which afforded them privileged access to development projects 
(Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009:102). In rural village council meetings in Ecuador, differences 
of class, education and, most notably, gender determine actors’ authority and their ability 
to influence decision-making, and resistance to council decisions can be met with 
coercion and threats to terminate access to basic services are common (de la Torre 
2006:252). It is therefore reasonable to expect that brokerage (i.e., unique ties to outside 
organizations) will be male dominated and women will have less influence in decision-
making in village politics.  
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Finally, disaster recovery efforts often fail to address women’s issues (Enarson 
1998; Enarson and Morrow 1998). Economic recovery programs tend to provide 
compensation for lost land and wages (male dominated economic strategies), while 
leaving uncompensated paid, home-based economic activities, such as childcare, sewing, 
and laundering (female dominated economic strategies) (Enarson 2001). Because of this 
trend, I expected women to access less aid and development resources than men in my 
study sites. 
In sum, while there are justifications for gendered dynamics in the core study 
hypotheses, the gender dynamics of others are less clear. Additionally, because this study 
is designed to examine exchange between households and not within households (see 
chapter 4), I chose to address potential gendered dynamics in the reciprocal exchange 
relations by controlling for gender in lieu of formulating specific additional gender-based 
hypotheses. 
Summary of Framework 
By studying the risks posed to forms of reciprocity in resettlement, we can 
potentially learn a great deal about the ways in which the effects of disasters and 
resettlement affect social organization in affected communities and perhaps how they 
interact with other risks and processes. Cernea’s (2003, 2000) risks and resettlement 
model identifies several risks faced in resettlement, all of which are essentially risks to 
individuals and households, except for “social disarticulation,” which obtains at the 
community level (de Wet 2006b). Cernea’s “social disarticulation” is the direct outcome 
of resettlement policy and practice that breaks up social groups by placing their members 
in separate resettlements, thereby inhibiting their capacity to recover. By including the 
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additional variable of wage labor employment, this study admits a greater level of 
complexity to research on the risks posed by disasters and resettlement to local forms of 
social organization and reciprocity that articulates with wider social and political 
economic processes. Displacement of social support relations is a regular consequence of 
disasters and resettlement. By choice, necessity or force, kin and other relations move to 
separate resettlement communities or migrate seeking wage-based economic opportunity. 
This is almost always credited as significantly reducing, straining or completely 
eliminating participation in mingas and reciprocal exchange (H1). Testing such an 
analytical assumption about the opposition between tradition and modernity may prove 
“an analytic red herring” (Faubion 2000:262), but it nonetheless enables an examination 
of the inherent complexities of the outcomes of disaster-induced resettlements. 
 This study also seeks to examine the asymmetries of Andean reciprocal exchange 
relations and practices for their implications in the production of political power and the 
distribution of scarce aid and development resources in disaster-affected communities 
and disaster-induced resettlements. The first step in the direction is to examine the ways 
in which mingas are organized in the study sites. Prior research has identified a practice 
whereby powerful and wealthy leaders repeatedly recruit minga laborers through 
conspicuous giving of material items, while the leaders access all or most of the benefit 
of the minga labor. In this study, this will be examined by explicitly focusing on the ways 
in which reciprocal exchange relations factor into minga participation. Examining the 
extent to which minga participation is positively correlated with the receipt of material 
items in exchange (H2) enables us to look beyond aseptic and culture-free notions of 
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“social support” and “mutual aid” and investigate the ways in which power relations 
bound up in mingas and reciprocal exchange relations.  
 This study also goes further by examining the ways in which reciprocal exchange 
relations are implicated in forms of political power—specifically, brokerage power, or 
access and control of scarce aid and development resources through unique ties to outside 
organizations, and the direct influence over decision-making processes in each site. 
Finally, this study will examine the extent to which external aid and development 
resources are distributed based on reciprocal exchange relations in each site. This can 
potentially improve understanding about how political power is produced and maintained 
in these sites and the ways in which reciprocal exchange practices are implicated in the 
distribution of resources in disaster-affected and resettled communities. All of the 
proposed hypotheses for this study can inform our understanding of the ways in which 
social organization and reciprocal exchange practices are affected by disasters, 
displacement, and resettlement and they ways in which reciprocal exchange practices 
might simultaneously influence political power and the distribution of resources in 
disaster recovery and resettlement. The proposition that political power is based on 
access and control over scarce development resources and this power is maintained and 
exercised through reciprocal exchange networks and unique ties to sources of aid and 
development resources (H3) is an opportunity to take this analysis one step further to 
explore the extent to which "social stratification is the main transmitter of extra-local 
influences" (Schweizer 1997:746). This study also examines the gender dynamics in each 
of these study hypotheses to explore for ways in which gender might affect or be affected 
by reciprocal exchange practices, political power, and the distribution of scarce aid and 
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development resources. Focusing on the tension between cooperative, mutual support 
practices and unequal power relations in mingas of two disaster-induced resettlement 
communities in highland Ecuador is important also from an applied perspective because 
this dynamic might affect resettled individuals' access to disaster relief and development 
resources. 
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CHAPTER THREE: ETHNOGRAPHIC SETTING 
Introduction to Sites 
The majority of this study took place in two villages in the Andean highland 
province of Chimborazo, Ecuador, in the second half of 2011, although some of the 
ethnographic data for the study I also gained while working as a fieldworker for an NSF-
funded project in the same study sites in 2009 (see chapter 1). The first site is a village 
named Manzano, whose residents were displaced and resettled as a result of the 1999 and 
2006 eruptions of the Mt. Tungurahua stratovolcano. At the time of research in 2011, 
although the majority of Manzano villagers had been resettled into one of three 
resettlement villages, Manzano continued to function as a village, with many residents 
continuing to live and grow crops and raise animals in the village largely due to a lack of 
economic resources in the resettlements. The second site, Pusuca, is a resettlement 
community of 45 homes built by an Ecuadorian non-profit, the Esquel Foundation, and 
the state and national governments. Pusuca is home to 40 households displaced from 
villages near Manzano due to the 1999 and 2006 eruptions of Mt. Tungurahua.  
These two sites were selected because they are both known to organize regular 
cooperative labor parties (mingas) through village councils but also because they differed 
in key respects. The resettlement village of Pusuca includes land for crops and animals 
for each resettler household while the majority of Manzano villagers were relocated to 
resettlements with no land, productive resources, or employment opportunities (although 
five households in Pusuca are originally from Manzano). Secondly, while Pusuca lies 
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well outside Mt. Tungurahua’s high risk zone, Manzano lies in the shadow of the volcano 
and its people must contend with a chronic hazard situation that places their animals, 
crops, property, and health at risk. Finally, each village is tied to different governmental 
and non-governmental institutions and is governed in distinct ways that will be discussed 
further below. In what follows, I describe the broader historical and political economic 
context of these two sites, with a focus on the cascading impacts of disaster and 
resettlement, followed by detailed descriptions of each site, with attention to the political 
and reciprocal exchange practices that are of interest to the study. 
Location 
Manzano and Pusuca are both located in Penipe canton (county), which lies in the 
central Andean cordillera in northwest Chimborazo Province. Penipe consists of six rural 
parroquias (parishes) and one urban parroquia, the eponymous central town of Penipe. 
Penipe is located roughly 22 kilometers from the city of Riobamba and approximately 
150 kilometers south of the capital city, Quito. Canton Penipe is one of the smaller 
cantons in Ecuador, with a total population of 6739 as of 2011 (INEC 2011). Most of the 
population (69%) is concentrated in the rural areas, while the remainder lives in the 
central township, Penipe (see table 1). The altitude of Penipe Canton varies from 2280 to 
5424 meters above sea level. The southern extreme of Penipe Canton is marked by the 
dormant volcano, El Altar, and its northern extreme is marked by the active 
stratovolcano, Mt. Tungurahua, through which runs the border between the provinces of 
Chimborazo and Tungurahua. Three of Penipe’s six rural parishes—Bilbao, Puela, and El 
Altar—form the southwest flank of Mt. Tungurahua in the high risk zone for ashfall, 
lahars, pyroclastic flows, lava, and volcanic tremors. Manzano is a village of 54 
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(20%) is landless dependents of local landlords for access to productive land. Nearly half 
(47%) of households send some share of their crop yields to market. It is possible that 
resettlement has prompted increased market production, but while most (79%) report 
some crop sales prior to resettlement, soil degradation from volcanic ash has reduced 
production to meager fractions of prior levels (see also Tobin and Whiteford 2007).  
Table 1. 2011 Population & Elevation – Penipe Canton 
 Population Elevation (Meters)
Penipe Township 1007 2280 – 2500 
Parroquia Penipe 2089 2280 – 5424 
Rural Sector 4650 2280 – 5424 
Parroquia El Altar 1265 2280 – 3200 
Parroquia Matus 991 2500 – 2800 
Parroquia Puela 622 2280 – 2800 
Parroquia Bayushig 1101 2500 – 3200 
Parroquia La Candelaria 475 2800 – 3200 
Parroquia Bilbao 196 2280 – 2500 
Total – Canton Penipe  6739  
Source: INEC 2011 
There are two primary ecological zones in Penipe that correspond to altitudinal 
ranges, allowing for a somewhat diverse array of cultivars. These ecological zones can be 
divided into lowland regions (2280-2500 meters above sea level) and highland regions 
(2500-3200 meters above sea level). Smallholders in the lowlands produce mostly corn, 
beans, potatoes, fruit trees, and small livestock, such as guinea pigs, chickens, and 
rabbits. Highland production is largely concentrated on pasture and cattle-raising for 
dairy and meat, especially in the area around the volcano, whereas elsewhere in 
Chimborazo people do cultivate potatoes and other crops in the highlands. Household 
landholdings in the lowlands are typically much smaller (1-3 hectares) than highland 
landholdings (3-10 hectares), which require more territory for grazing.  
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History of the Region 
 Both research sites for the present study are in Penipe Canton, whose southern 
extreme and northern extremes are marked by the dormant volcano, El Altar, the active 
stratovolcano, Mt. Tunguraha, respectively. Mt. Tungurahua sits astraddle the border 
between the Chimborazo and Tungurahua Provinces and three of Penipe’s six rural 
parishes—Bilbao, Puela, and El Altar—form the southwest flank of Mt. Tungurahua in 
the high risk zone for ashfall, lahars, pyroclastic flows, lava, and seismic tremors. The 
effects of the recent eruptive phase of Mt. Tungurahua, which began in 1999, have been 
the subject of recent anthropological study (Whiteford and Tobin 2009). The Mt. 
Tungurahua stratovolcano is one of 21 active volcanoes in mainland Ecuador, which have 
been created along with the greater Andean cordillera by the subduction of the oceanic 
Nazca plate by the South American plate (Latrubesse 2010). The 55 volcanoes of 
Ecuador and 19 of Colombia constitute the Northern Volcanic Zone of the Andean 
volcanic belt that is part of the larger Pacific Ring of Fire, a series of oceanic trenches 
and volcanoes around the Pacific Ocean (Latrubesse 2010). The gradual subduction of 
Pacific Ocean tectonic plates against the South American continental plate accounts for 
the prevalence of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions that have significantly influenced 
South American and Ecuadorian history. Some such events worth noting are the 1797 
earthquake in Riobamba (just 22 kilometers from Penipe Canton, the site of the current 
research project), which resulted in nearly 40,000 fatalities and the complete destruction 
of the city, and an earthquake in the northern Ecuadorian town of Ibarra in 1868 likewise 
caused nearly 40,000 fatalities (Latrubesse 2010). The 1970 Ancash earthquake in Peru 
resulted in roughly 70,000 fatalities between Peru and Ecuador and has been the subject 
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of several anthropological studies (Oliver-Smith 1979, 1977). The eruption of the Nevado 
del Ruiz volcano in Colombia in 1985 caused approximately 23,000 fatalities and has 
also generated anthropological interest (Zeiderman and Ramirez 2010). 
The region that is today Penipe was settled by the Puruhá indigenous group 
between 500 and 1500ce (Freire Heredia 2005). Though much of the history of the 
Puruhá in the region is poorly attested, it is said that they successfully resisted 
colonization by the Incas through alliances with the Duchicela and by retreating into the 
remote highlands of what are today the cantons of Guano and Penipe (Freire Heredia 
2005). Here they planted grains and raised livestock, which were traded in a network of 
markets that dotted the region. By the time the Spanish reached what is today Penipe in 
1563, the Puruhá are said to have fled further east to the Amazon to resist being 
conquered (Haro 2005). This historical claim is frequently cited in the region as an 
explanation for the curious lack of indigenous communities in Penipe, although the larger 
Chimborazo Province has one of the greatest concentrations of indigenous populations in 
the nation. 
As elsewhere in Latin America, the Spanish created a hacienda economy in and 
around the riverine area what is today Riobamba and extending out as far as Penipe. 
These plantations relied on indigenous corvée labor, which is said to have been imported 
from surrounding areas after the flight of the Puruhá, and were administered by Spanish 
lords (hacendados). This economy endured in the region until well after independence in 
the mid-nineteenth century, and indigenous and mestizo peasants worked the lands of 
wealthy hacendados in exchange for access to small plots of land on which to grow 
subsistence crops well into the twentieth century. Haciendas in the region that is now 
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Penipe sustained significant damage as a result of eruptions of Mt. Tungurahua in 1773, 
when the region was evacuated (Hall et al. 1999). 
Relation of the State to Local Polities 
Not long after Ecuador achieved its independence from Spain in 1822, Penipe was 
incorporated as a parroquia (parish) of Canton Guano in 1845 (Haro 2005). The long 
nineteenth century was marked by instability and a rapid succession of largely 
authoritarian leaders (Deas 1985). During this time, Penipe grew as a satellite market 
center for the haciendas in the region, although the region was again devastated by 
eruptions of Mt. Tungurahua in 1886 and another extended period of significant eruptions 
from 1916 to 1918 (Hall et al. 1999). Between and after military coups in 1925 and 1931 
and a brief civil war in 1932, short-lived periods of democratic rule in Ecuador produced 
reforms that facilitated the growth and development of Penipe and other rural regions 
(Deas 1998; Ayala Mora 1999). Ecuador’s economy was somewhat stabilized by the 
establishment of a central bank in 1926, which assumed central authority for issuing 
national currency (the sucre) and thereby increased state revenue and ushered in a period 
of growth in transportation and communications infrastructure (Ayala Mora 1999). 
Shortly thereafter, the American stock market crash in 1929 had devastating effects on the 
Ecuadorian export economy and the hacienda system (Ayala Mora 1999). 
One of the most noteworthy reforms later in this period was the 1937 Ley de 
Organización y Régimen de Comunas, which was designed to dismantle the hacienda 
economy. This new legislation granted members of any community with at least 50 
households to rights to plots of land they had worked for more than ten years, so long as 
they formally incorporated into comunas (villages). Comunas were to be governed by 
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cabildos (village councils). Cabildos were established as local governing bodies but also 
as village representatives to the state. Interestingly, although many peasant and 
indigenous groups incorporated as comunas in the 1930s and 1940s, many chose not to, 
as the Ley de Comunas was increasingly recognized by village leaders as an extension of 
state power over rural peasant and indigenous populations (Becker 1999:535). As shown 
by archives of the Ilustre Municipio de Penipe, which was still then a parroquia of Guano 
Canton, incorporated its first two comunas in 1938, followed by another ten between 
1946 and 1960 for a total of twelve incorporated comunas and began to serve as a 
satellite market for a growing number of smallholders in the region. 
As such, the development of local political jurisdictions and traditions has been 
impacted by the agrarian reforms that transferred land from haciendas to peasants. 
Additional agrarian reforms were passed in 1964 and 1974 by the military junta that ruled 
Ecuador from 1964 until civilian rule was reestablished in 1979. The military regimes of 
this period were concerned with agrarian and other reforms in order to hasten the demise 
of the hacienda system and modernize the Ecuadorian economy (Ayala Mora 1999; 
Becker 1999). These reforms were an attempt to resolve considerable disparities in land 
distribution, as several studies in the 1950s had found that a small minority (just over 2 
percent) of large landowners controlled more than 64 percent of arable land, while only 
seven percent of land in Ecuador was owned by individuals or households with five or 
fewer hectares (Breton 2008:591). To carry out this reform, the state purchased land from 
large landowners at a premium and then sold the land to peasants and indigenous groups 
at a greatly reduced rate (Breton 2008). Though these reforms by no means conclusively 
resolved systemic disparities in land distribution, they did foster a renewed interest in 
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comuna incorporation in Ecuador in the 1960s that continued through the 1990s. After the 
1964 reforms, there was a brief burst of comuna incorporation in Penipe, with one in 
1965 and four more, including the research site of Manzano, in 1973. 
Import substitution was an economic development strategy employed by several 
Latin American countries after the mid-20th century. It essentially entailed the promotion 
of domestic production for domestic markets in an effort to minimize the economic 
volatility associated with export economies (agriculture and raw materials) vulnerable to 
shocks and fluctuations in the global system (Bulmer-Thomas 2003). Ecuador began its 
import substitution policies in late 1950s by establishing an institutional system to 
promote industry (Moncada 1980; Ayala Mora 1999). This was part of a general 
transition to capitalism as the dominant mode of production in Ecuador, one that 
transformed the landholding elites of the hacienda system into an agricultural bourgeoisie 
(Ayala Mora 1999:703; Breton 2008). As import substitution accelerated in the 1960s, so 
too did peasant protest movements to confront land concentration, contributing to the 
military coups of 1963 and 1972, which in turn implemented agrarian reforms. The 
agrarian reforms on 1964 had contradictory effects. They spelled the end of the hacienda 
system and helped the transition to capitalist agrarian production, while having almost no 
effect on land concentration (Breton 2008). Import substitution was expanded in the late 
1960s by subsidizing domestic industrial development, blocking certain imports, and 
levying significant taxes on exports (Ayala Mora 1999:708-709). Peasant gains were 
decidedly pyrrhic, as the agrarian reforms to support smallholder production (minifundia) 
granted only small plots of land and included no credit finance system or extension 
support (Ayala Mora 1999). This contributed to a reduction in agricultural production, a 
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near crisis-level increase in prices, and the exponential growth in rural-urban migration 
for wage labor (Ayala Mora 1999). The glut of migrant workers served capitalist 
interests, as industries were unable to absorb the worker population and thus able to keep 
wages low (Ayala Mora 1999). The capitalist class remained politically marginal during 
military rule in the 1960s and early 1970s, but gained power in the late 1970s as the 
military junta was reconfigured under political and economic pressure and began several 
regressive policies and practices, including passing laws that guaranteed the property of 
rural entrepreneurs and the violent suppression of worker movements (Ayala Mora 
1999:16) 
The Ecuadorian economy grew rapidly in the 1970s due to some of the limited 
gains of the import substitution period, growth in banana exports, and a boom in oil 
exports brought on by new discoveries and the OPEC oil embargo (Ayala Mora 1999). 
The country returned to civilian rule in 1979, but the country faced severe economic 
crises by the mid-1980s, largely as a result of a bust in the petroleum market and severe 
floods and droughts in different parts of the country as a result of climate changes and the 
warm ocean current “El Niño” (Sanchez-Triana and Quintero 2003:398-399). In 1987, a 
massive earthquake in the northern town of Ibarra had devastating impacts on the 
economy and on oil exports (Sanchez-Triana and Quintero 2003).  
Political Decentralization and Community Development 
After the return to civilian rule in 1979, two of the most significant developments 
in Ecuador in the 1980s were decentralizing tendencies, including the massive growth of 
municipal incorporations and decentralization programs (Martínez 2003b:164; Cameron 
2010; Larrea 1999) at the same time as the proliferation of peasant and indigenous 
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political movements nationwide (Chiriboga and Jara 2004). Although the process of 
comuna incorporation slowed in Penipe in the 1980s, with only one in 1983 and another 
in 1989, Penipe broke away from Canton Guano and incorporated as the seventh canton 
of Chimborazo Province in 1984. Today it is one of the smallest municipalities in the 
country (Haro 2005; INEC 2011). The central town, Penipe, formed the “urban” 
administrative center for the canton’s six rural parroquias—Bilbao, Puela, El Altar, 
Matus, Bayushig, and La Candelaria. The cantonización of Penipe was part of a national 
wave of new municipal incorporations; since 1985, 86 new cantons have been formed to 
bring the national total to 226, or an increase of 61 percent (INEC 2011; Martínez 
2003b:164; Larrea 1999; Asociación de Municipalidades Ecuatorianas 1999).  
Relatively rural municipal governments like Penipe —though they constitute the 
urban administrative center—have historically focused on small ad hoc public works that 
have largely excluded the rural periphery of each canton (Cameron 2010), and the 
proliferation of these rural cantons/counties has been problematic in several ways. First, 
governance has typically been weak and dominated by clientalism and paternalism 
(Ojeda Segovia 1998; Rosales 1989). Larrea (1999) refers to the growth of Ecuadorian 
cantons as a spurious urbanization that increasingly creates “municipal atomization” and 
the proliferation of administrative bodies of reduced scope and viability. Most of these 
municipalities are in fact limited administrative centers for rural regions with little in the 
way of urban economy or development impulse/capacity. As a result, they do not have 
sufficient budgets for their own administrative activities and rely heavily on budget 
allocations from the national government. These factors, combined with poorly trained 
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staff, have complicated and inhibited reform processes as well as any transitions toward 
more inclusive models of governance in Ecuador (Cameron 2010).  
Beginning in the mid-1980s, peasant organizations took shape around government 
initiatives and unrest at the grassroots level (Chiriboga and Jara 2004). Among the many 
social movements that have taken shape since the 1980s, two large umbrella 
organizations stand out: La Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador 
(CONAIE), Ecuador's largest indigenous organization, formed in 1986, and; Pachakutik 
(Pluri-National Pachakutik United Movement), a political party formed in 1996 in 
collaboration with CONAIE and other indigenous and non-indigenous peasant 
organizations (Sanchez 2006; Chiriboga 2004). Both are considered formidable 
organizations in Ecuadorian politics today, owing to their successful and repeated 
mobilization of peasants and indigenous groups in order to press for political and 
economic reforms, the recognition of indigenous identities and rights, and resistance to 
neoliberal reforms (Sanchez 2006; Chiriboga and Jara 2004; Lopez Romero 2003). 
Protests, while often quite heated, have tended to take the form of large demonstrations of 
indigenous and peasant cultural identity, including dance and song in traditional dress, 
which on several occasions significantly disrupted business and transportation in Quito 
and other major cities (Sanchez 2006; Chiriboga and Jara 2004; Lopez Romero 2003). 
Several protests succeeded in the demands of indigenous and peasant groups to present 
their proposed reforms in discussions with government leaders, as well as significant land 
grants to indigenous organizations (Lopez Romero 2003; Chiriboga and Jara 2004). 
These movements, while significant at the provincial and national level in bringing 
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indigenous groups into the political process, did little to integrate the rural mestizo 
smallholders, such as those in Canton Penipe. 
The demonstrations resulted in the abandonment of controversial initiatives, such 
as the Agrarian Reform Law of 1994 and various World Bank projects and IMF loans 
(Sanchez 2006). Beginning in 1996, Pachakutik Party candidates have continued to be 
elected to several local and congressional seats and, in collaboration with CONAIE, have 
been instrumental in the drafting of a new and highly contested federal constitution that 
explicitly recognizes indigenous identity and rights (Lopez Romero 2003; Chiriboga and 
Jara 2004). When a financial crisis, brought on by external shocks to export economies, 
hit Ecuador in the late 1990s, rapid inflation led to the abandonment of the national 
currency, the sucre, and the adoption of the US dollar in 1999 (World Bank 2004). 
CONAIE and its allies were highly opposed to dollarization and, when then-President 
Mahuad made the plan public in January 2000, large groups of peasants arrived in Quito 
from the highlands where they were joined by students, military personnel, and other 
local resident in disrupting commerce and city traffic (Sanchez 2006). Although the sucre 
was ultimately abandoned for the dollar, the sustained protests led to the ouster of 
President Mahuad, who was replaced by a provisional government until Lucio Gutiérrez 
was democratically elected three months later (Sanchez 2006). Gutiérrez would serve 
only two years before his policy decisions were met with popular protests by the same 
organizations that had been responsible for his initial success (Chiriboga and Jara 2004). 
But again, the indigenous movements were not particularly influential in Penipe in any 
direct way because, unlike the other rural cantons of Chimborazo Province, Penipe does 
not have any indigenous communities. However, these movements had tremendous 
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impact nationwide and facilitated the rise of populist politicians, such as President Rafael 
Correa in 2006, as well as charismatic indigenous political leaders in Chimborazo 
Province. 
The effects of the expansion of decentralization programs have been felt in places 
like Penipe in several ways. The rise of indigenous movements and leaders in 
Chimborazo has resulted in a significant acceleration of decentralization programs and 
participatory governance reforms (Cameron 2010; Martínez 2003b), a proliferation of 
non-governmental organization (NGO) projects (Breton 2001), and the emergence of 
mingas (cooperative work parties) as instruments of development in the region (Cameron 
2010). Since the 1990s, Ecuadorian development initiatives have focused on locally-
derived, need-based development projects, collective action of the poor, and state and 
NGO intervention (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2000:13; Martínez 2003b:167). Rural cantons 
like Penipe have focused a great deal on the creation of local development plans with 
NGOs and the establishment of participatory plans with the provincial councils, juntas 
parroquiales, and the cabildos (cf. Cameron 2010; Martínez 2003b; Breton 2001). These 
programs rely heavily on voluntary minga work parties as a means of expanding limited 
budgetary capacities for the completion of roads, irrigation canals, and potable water 
systems in Penipe and throughout Chimborazo (cf. Cameron 2010). While development 
plans have participatory values, they have not developed concrete micro-regional 
strategies, have not taken into account the local ties to global processes and institutions, 
and neither is there any focus on issues of land and wealth concentration (Martínez 
2003b:168). Some authors have claimed that the state attempting to convert cantons into 
“mini welfare states” but with no plan for developing production (Itturalde 2000). 
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In the 1990s, Penipe Canton underwent another growth spurt in comuna 
incorporation, with one in 1992, four in 1994, and another in 1995 (archives of the Ilustre 
Municipio de Penipe). Beginning in the late 1990s, and accelerating under the Correa 
administration, the federal government has attempted to resolve persistent issues with 
weak and corrupt municipal governments by instituting programs to facilitate 
modernization and administrative decentralization (Cameron 2010). A landmark 
development was the creation of juntas parroquiales rurales (rural parish councils) in the 
constitution of 1998 and the 2000 Ley de Juntas Parroquiales (Martínez 2003b:162), 
which were established to grant more democratic decision-making power to rural 
parishes and villages. These bodies were created to establish a federation of cabildos in 
each of Penipe’s six rural parroquias, with the intention of better coordinating funding, 
projects, and administration between cabildos in each parroquia.  
Administrative decentralization is intended to be a participatory and therefore 
more inclusive reform process that will facilitate rural development (Mejia Acosta et al. 
2006; Martínez 2003b; Cameron 2010). Critics have pointed out that socioeconomic 
power relations remain highly unequal (Cameron 2010; Schodt 1987) and dominated by 
persistent problems associated with clientalism, populism, corruption, instability, and 
economic crises (Cameron 2010:4). Moreover, municipal governments like that of 
Penipe, along with the juntas parroquiales, are little more than administrative centers for 
rural regions with little in the way of urban economies, so they therefore do not have 
sufficient budgets for their own administrative activities and, consequently, rely heavily 
on budget allocation from the federal government. In Penipe, accusations of favoritism 
and clientelism in government have been common. Succeeding mayors, members of the 
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municipal council (Consejo Cantonal), and members of the juntas parroquiales were 
commonly accused of steering funds and other resources to their client bases, while 
excluding others. These issues mostly focus on transportation (roads, bridges) and water 
(potable, irrigation) infrastructure, although after the 1999 and 2006 disasters, 
accusations of corruption and embezzlement were common as aid flowed from the state 
and both domestic and multinational NGOs. 
Recentralization and Community Development 
As of 2011, the inhabitants of Penipe and the rural regions of Ecuador continue to 
focus primarily on agricultural production, although many find land unavailable or else 
struggle to produce on low-productivity land (Sanchez-Paramo 2005:3). As is the case 
throughout much of the Andean region, and in spite of a renewed import substitution 
industrialization, Ecuador’s economy continues to be primarily driven by natural resource 
extraction and export (Hausmann and Klinger 2011), which makes it particularly 
vulnerable to global market fluctuations and natural disasters within its borders. Revenue 
from oil exports alone counts for more than 60 percent of Ecuador’s 17.4 billion dollar 
per year export economy (International Monetary Fund 2012). The remainder is 
generated by the export of bananas, cut flowers, shrimp, cacao, coffee, hemp, wood, and 
fish (Hausmann and Klinger 2011). Peasant access to land and housing remains marginal 
(Breton 2008) and in the primarily indigenous highland region landownership is highly 
concentrated, with less than three percent of owners holding 50 percent of all land (World 
Bank 2003b:398). Legislation for agrarian development and land reform in the late 1990s 
has failed to affect this dynamic in any significant way, largely due to the fact that there is 
no rural land registry, and therefore more than 90 percent of rural farmers continue to 
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work without ownership deeds for their lands (World Bank 2003a:31, 2003b:379). 
Unequal land distribution is frequently cited as a root cause of the popular and largely 
indigenous social movements that took place throughout Ecuador in the 1980s, 1990s, 
and early 2000s (Cameron 2010; Breton 2008; Brooke 1991). Ecuador outpaced its 
Andean neighbors in the provision of both improved drinking water and sanitation to its 
rural populations, ensuring access to an estimated 91 percent of the rural population for 
the former, and 72 percent for the latter (PAHO 2008:10). Ecuador is smaller than its 
Andean neighbors and as of 2011 per capita (PPP) income ($8,492) was significantly 
lower than that of Colombia ($10,249) and Peru ($10,062), a disparity that emerged since 
2007 when there was relative parity between these countries (International Monetary 
Fund 2012).  
The election of socialist President Rafael Correa in 2007 ushered in a renewed 
period of reform and public spending on infrastructure. Correa became the most popular 
democratically-elected president in modern Ecuadorian history by forging alliances with 
key peasant and indigenous issues. Correa declared Ecuador’s debt to foreign lenders 
illegitimate and has implemented economic and social spending policies that have 
contributed to a reduction in poverty and unemployment and increased transportation, 
irrigation, and potable water infrastructure in the rural regions. In addition to presiding 
over the drafting of a new constitution, Correa’s administration has also confronted the 
decades-old process of decentralization of government with a proliferation of new 
ministries and reforms of local governing institutions. This process of recentralization has 
expanded executive power while provincial-level and local governing bodies continue to 
promote decentralization. Correa’s administration began to decline in popularity after a 
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presidential and constitutional referendum in 2007 sparked increased tensions with the 
congress. An attempted coup in September 2010 was followed by a crackdown on the 
press that has given rise to further criticism. In the wake of the 2006 eruptions of Mt. 
Tungurahua in Chimborazo and Tungurahua Provinces, Correa toured the area and 
pledged his administration’s support for several recovery initiatives.  
As a result of these recent trends, local development in Penipe increasingly 
involves three distinct strategies that are often pursued in concert with one another. The 
first is to appeal to ministries of the federal government to fund local projects. This 
strategy is mostly pursued for education and transportation infrastructure projects, though 
it also includes public health campaigns. The second strategy is to pursue funding and 
support from the Provincial Council of Chimborazo, but this is often limited to the 
narrow purview of the annual participatory budgeting plan. This program grants funds to 
the municipal government for potable water, irrigation, roads, and environmental projects 
and is carried out under the banner of the “minga por la vida” (minga for life) program, 
which ties project funding to volunteer citizen cooperative labor participation. In Penipe, 
the municipal government sub-grants these funds to a different parroquia each year based 
on plans proposed by cabildos and juntas parroquiales in each parroquia. The third 
strategy is to apply for funding from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
foundations for economic development projects. The result has been a proliferation of 
micro-development initiatives supported by a local NGO, CEBYCAM-CES, global 
institutions such as the World Bank, and several Ecuadorian NGOs based in Quito. The 
federal government also formed Secretaria de Los Pueblos, Movimientos Sociales y 
Participacion Ciudadana (Department of Towns, Social Movements, and Citizen 
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Participation, or SPMSPC) in 2011, which works to connect local communities to state 
agencies and non-governmental organizations and programs that can support local needs 
and development interests. As of 2011, several non-governmental organizations had come 
to work with the resettlement communities in Penipe and the SPMSPC began meeting 
with cabildo leaders and community members in the village of Manzano. 
Disasters in Ecuador 
Ecuadorian history is rife with stories of natural disasters in addition to the 
Tungurahua eruptions of 1886 and 1916-25, Riobamba’s 1797 earthquake, and Ibarra’s 
1868 earthquake. Several cities in Tungurahua province were destroyed by massive 
earthquakes in 1949, and then again in 1987 (Latrubesse 2010). Just as citizens began 
recovering from devastating landslides that killed more than 50 residents near Quito in 
1966 (The New York Times 5-16-1966), a major drought claimed many lives in 1968 
(The New York Times 6-2-1968). The research sites for the current study are one village 
within the immediate risk zone around Mt. Tungurahua and one resettlement village 
recently established just outside the risk zone (but in the same canton) for people whose 
villages were destroyed in the 1999 and 2006 eruptions. 
Mt. Tungurahua began an eruptive phase in October of 1999, prompting 
temporary evacuation of approximately 26,000 villagers from the volcano’s southwestern 
flank. Ashfall, pyroclastic flows, lahars and incandescent material from more severe 
eruptions in July and August of 2006 affected roughly 650,000 area residents. In Penipe’s 
northern parroquias higher on the volcano, and in the neighboring cantons of Cotalo and 
Guano, homes were demolished, crops and productive land destroyed, and animals lost, 
killed or rendered ill (PAHO 2006). In Penipe canton alone, around 3,000 villagers were 
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unable or unwilling to return to their communities, with many residing indefinitely in 
improvised shelters or migrating to urban centers (Whiteford and Tobin 2009; Whiteford 
et al. 2005).  
1999 Eruptions of Mt. Tungurahua 
Around Penipe canton, people’s experiences and memories of the eruptions vary, 
but nearly everyone agrees that they never thought Mt. Tungurahua presented any risk 
prior to 1999. Before it came roaring back to life in October 1999, Mt. Tungurahua was 
last active from 1916 to 1918, when the volcano generated ashfalls and intense 
pyroclastic flows and then returned to slumber for nearly 80 years until 1999. 
Occasionally, someone will recall hearing stories of the 1914-1918 eruptions from their 
parents or grandparents who remembered massive days of darkness as clouds of ash 
blackened the sky and tremors shook the earth as pyroclastic flows ran down the 
mountain.  
Although Mt. Tungurahua has been scientifically monitored by the Ecuadorian 
Geophysics Institute since 1989 (Whiteford and Tobin 2009), no official information on 
risks posed by the volcano was actively disseminated to the public before the 1999 
eruptions. Several volcanic tremors caught the attention of monitoring agencies in 1994, 
but nothing rose to the level of emergency. But from July to August 1999, Mt. 
Tungurahua registered roughly twenty earthquakes and generated numerous hybrid 
eruptions, large ash plumes, and sulfur dioxide gas emissions. Authorities raised a yellow 
alert on September 15, which indicated that a major eruption was expected within weeks. 
On October 11, the volcano spewed incandescent material, several more volcanic 
explosions, and columns of ash and steam that stretched two kilometers high and reached 
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as seven kilometers from the crater. Two days later, smoke curled from the crater as ash 
fell heavy on the villages surrounding the volcano. Word quickly spread from village to 
village that danger was imminent and many began evacuating of their own accord. 
Explosions, tremors, gas emissions, and incandescent flows continued and, on October 16 
the Geophysics Institute convinced authorities to raise the alert level to orange, indicating 
an impending major eruption (Global Volcanism Program 2011). With the alert level 
raised to orange, authorities ordered the mandatory evacuation of the northern rim of the 
volcano—Baños and the surrounding areas in Tungurahua Province—and Civil Defense 
forces evacuated an estimated 25,000 residents. 
Orders to evacuate the three northernmost parroquias of Canton Penipe—Bilbao, 
Puela, and El Altar—came on November 17. The process was problematic because there 
was no clear and effective system in place to communicate emergency warnings to the 
rural populations around the volcano and the people were unfamiliar with the color-coded 
alert system. People recall that the Civil Defense and military arrived only once the 
eruptive process was well underway on the day of the evacuation, when many had 
already begun to flee the area on local busses that responded to the emergency as ash fell 
ever more heavily on the region. Once the evacuation orders were given, military 
personnel took to forcibly extracting those who refused to leave. People recall being 
terrified and unprepared to leave their homes and crops and animals as they fled in haste, 
uncertain of where they were going. By the end of the day, a total of 562 households 
(3,140 individuals) were evacuated from Canton Penipe and many others evacuated on 
their own, according to the archives of the Ilustre Municipio of Penipe. 
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Ecuadorian authorities were in many ways unprepared to handle such an 
emergency and there were no formal shelters in place to house the thousands who were 
evacuated. Many people say they were shuttled in buses and military vehicles to Penipe 
Township or the nearby cities of Riobamba in the south or Pelileo in the north, where 
they had no place to go. In the ensuing milieu, several families were separated for days or 
weeks as some found refuge in homes with family or friends or, in some cases, in 
abandoned homes. In the days that followed, radio broadcasts and word-of-mouth reports 
announced the establishment of makeshift shelters in schools, churches, and convents. 
Beds, blankets, food, water, and first aid supplies were scarce at first, but donations 
quickly accumulated. People were unable to return to their land and homes because ash 
explosions and low-level eruptive events continued through December, and lahars had 
destroyed the bridges and roads along the western slopes of the volcano. 
In all, roughly 6,500 people were unable or unwilling to return home after the 
eruptions (Ecuadorian Red Cross 8-4-07). People recall their time spent in the shelters as 
a period of despair and scarcity, as food and water were scarce and social problems arose 
due to lack of privacy and dependency on strangers and institutions for basic support. 
Many recall growing despondent at not being able to tend to their land, animals, and 
homes. Numerous families spent years alternating between shelters, rentals, and the 
homes of friends and family, though they began to return daily to their villages after the 
authorities began permitting access to the high risk zone in January 2000. 
Exact figures on the disaster’s impacts are difficult to come by. There were no 
human casualties, although there were reported upper respiratory illnesses associated 
with the ashfall (Tobin and Whiteford 2002). According to the municipal government of 
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Penipe, approximately 18,800 hectares of cultivars and 24,000 hectares of pasture were 
destroyed by ash, lava, and pyroclastic flows, for an estimated total value of nearly seven 
million dollars. Lost revenues from dairy production were estimated at $2,562 per day, 
for a total of nearly one million dollars. Animal losses were substantial and reports cite a 
loss of 42,500 cattle, 2,300 pigs, 45,000 guinea pigs, 13,000 rabbits, and 220,000 
chickens, for a total estimated value of nearly three million dollars (archives of the Ilustre 
Municipio de Penipe 2000). Total damage to infrastructure was estimated at nearly twelve 
million dollars, as five bridges, approximately 30 kilometers of primary, secondary, and 
tertiary roads, and nearly 15 kilometers of the primary irrigation canal were destroyed 
and the potable water systems sustained about $50,000 of damage. The roofs of an 
estimated 430 homes were also destroyed entirely or partially by falling incandescent 
material or the weight of accumulated ash (archives of the Ilustre Municipio de Penipe 
2000). 
In the years following the 1999 eruptions and evacuation, the small villages that 
dot the western and southwestern flank of the volcano remained virtually abandoned. 
Thousands remained in shelters and, though some returned to their lands daily, chronic 
ashfall continued to degrade the soil and destroy the limited crop yields, while periodic 
lava and pyroclastic flows and lahars created a significant public safety issue in the area. 
During this period, the Civil Defense began a process of reform, gradually being 
dissolved into a new, non-military institution, the Secretaría de Gestión de Riesgos 
(Department of Risk Management), which focused on developing risk prevention 
strategies in high risk areas. The Department of Risk Management facilitated the 
formation of Comites de Operaciones de Emergencias (Emergency Management 
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Committees, known simple as “COE”). The COEs brought together village and parroquia 
leaders, municipal and state officials, first responders, and various federal ministries to 
come up with emergency management strategies. These strategies focused on improving 
early detection, improving public alert systems by standardizing alert signals and 
informing the public, evacuation drills, the construction of small emergency management 
posts and formal shelters, and coordinating institutional responsibilities for emergency 
response and relief processes (Gestion de Riesgos 2008; Quinde and Aguilar 2007). With 
these measures in place and with the relative calm of Mt. Tungurahua in 2005, villagers 
displaced by the 1999 eruptions began to return to the high risk zone in greater numbers 
since many had not found new opportunities elsewhere and sought to re-establish their 
livelihoods on their traditional lands. However, after a relatively calm year in 2005, Mt. 
Tungurahua roared back to life in 2006. 
2006 Eruptions of Mt. Tungurahua 
In 2006 Tungurahua began a period of activity far greater than 1999 or any 
intervening years. The activity began in May with a surge in seismic activity attributed to 
increased pressure inside the volcano. On July 14 the volcano erupted, generating 
pyroclastic flows, lava flows, and large volumes of ashfall in the provinces of 
Tungurahua and Chimborazo. Large explosions rang out from the crater and shook the 
earth from 6pm and throughout the night. For several days, at least 20 pyroclastic flows 
descended the gorges along the southwestern flank Mt. Tungurahua, reaching several 
villages below. Coarse gravel also fell with the ash on many villages below. These events 
resulted in the destruction of crops and the death of numerous large and small livestock. 
The Penipe-Baños road was destroyed in four places and several bridges were partially or 
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totally destroyed. By late July, the eruptive process appeared to subside, but the 
Geophysical Institute warned that the eruption was over.  
An estimated 7000 people were evacuated from the high risk zone around 
Tungurahua on July 15th (Ecuadorian Red Cross 8-4-07). At this time, there were still an 
estimated 3000 people living in shelters from the first eruption 1999. However, many 
families (at least 300) had returned to their homes and farms in the high risk zone since 
the prior eruption. The evacuations, although in many ways chaotic and frightening for 
all involved, ran much more smoothly and safely than in 1999 because residents had prior 
experience, were more prepared, and knew where to go. Importantly, by 2006 there were 
dedicated shelters in place, although people report that conditions were scarcely better 
than they had been in prior shelters. However, there were many people who no longer 
wished to leave their communities and resisted evacuation at first. Many people slept in 
shelters and returned daily to the hillsides to tend their crops and animals, often leaving 
their children in the shelters during the day. Wanting to monitor and control access to 
villages in the high risk zone, ostensibly to prevent theft, malfeasance, and the return of 
villagers before the eruptions had subsided, the military issued identification cards to 
heads of households and frequently accompanied locals as they visited their property.  
On August 16, 2006, Mt. Tungurahua erupted more fiercely than any eruption in 
recent memory with heavy ash falls, gas emissions, lahars, lava flows, and pyroclastic 
activity leading to the evacuation of residents of three surrounding provinces. Pyroclastic 
flows again ran down the Achupashal, Mandur and La Hacienda gorges. A large 
pyroclastic flow that came down the Achupashal gorge dammed the Chambo River. 
Another pyroclastic flow the following day destroyed the village of Juive Grande and 
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completely ruined a large passage of the Penipe-Baños road. The central government 
issued a decree renewing the state of emergency in the provinces and districts mentioned 
above. 
It has been estimated that when the August 2006 eruption occurred, as many as 
1600 people who initially evacuated had returned to tend to their animals and belongings 
(Ecuadorian Red Cross 8-4-07). The eruption resulted in the death of six people and more 
than fifty others were treated for burns sustained from lava flows, incandescent rocks, 
and vapor (OCHA 8-21-06).  By the following day, there were 15,000 people in shelters. 
The Civil Defense and the various COEs focused on acquiring, transporting and 
distributing food rations and donations to the disaster victims. Task forces from the 
Ministry of Defence carried out the rescue and evacuation during the eruption. In addition 
to carrying out the evacuations and assessing ongoing risks, the Civil Defense 
coordinated and supported responding agencies, including the Red Cross, Fire 
Department, Police, and the Army, as well as a sizeable retinue of volunteers. The Civil 
Defense also handled coordination of the efforts of various government ministries and 
NGOs in the provision of care and relief to affected populations. 
Though many say that these evacuations were hectic and frightening, risk 
prevention and evacuation procedures put in place after the 1999 eruptions helped 
prepare institutions and the populace for this event and shelters had been constructed in 
Penipe and Pelileo in 2004. However, people report that conditions in the shelters were 
not much better than 1999, as there was again a scarcity of basic supplies. Unlike 1999, 
authorities allowed daily access to homes and lands in the high risk zone, but required 
people to evacuate before sundown. At least twelve villages on the western slope of Mt. 
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Tungurahua were declared destroyed by the Civil Defense (AP-CNN 8-18-06; AP 8-21-
06). At least 700 families (3,200 people) were permanently displaced and it is estimated 
that more than 650,000 people were affected by the disaster (PAHO 8-18-06; Hoy Online 
8-27-06). 
In the shelters, the situation was more difficult. People received food, water, 
medicines, and clothing, but these items were often scarce. As time went on, a pervasive 
sense of indignity sunk in as people once again were without their means of livelihood, 
their homes, and their privacy. Many were anxious again to return to their lives and 
provide for themselves and their families. Most were thankful for the aid they received, 
but many perceived inequities in the ways in which relief was distributed. There were 
accusations of favoritism and greed, with some claiming that certain individuals were 
given choice items ahead of others and some contending that aid was distributed to those 
who did not truly need it. There was tension and several disputes between families. 
Shelters were crowded and felt even more so when the many children were rowdy and 
disruptive. People felt that they had no control over their own lives. 
Resettlement 
In the interim period between the eruptions of 1999 and 2006, which was filled 
with lesser, chronic eruptive activity, several state and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) had been exploring resettlement projects for displaced residents of the high risk 
zone as part of a dual relief and prevention strategy. Newly elected President Rafael 
Correa visited Penipe shortly after the eruptions and pledged his administration’s full 
support of the construction of resettlement communities for those displaced in the 
disaster, especially for those who had remained in shelters since 1999. An Ecuadorian 
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NGO, Fundacion Esquel, submitted a resettlement plan to the Civil Defense and the 
municipal government of Penipe a mere 30 days after the August 16 eruption. By the end 
of the year, several other organizations would commit to resettlement plans. While there 
were several resettlement communities built by the state and NGOs for those displaced 
by the eruptions of Mt. Tungurahua, for the sake of space I focus here on the institutions 
and the two resettlements in Penipe Canton that serve as research sites for this 
dissertation. 
Beginning in September 2006, just after the eruptions, the Ministry of Housing 
and Urban Development (MIDUVI), along with the Civil Defense, the Ministry of 
Economic and Social Inclusion (MIES), and the municipal government of Penipe 
undertook a study of resettlement needs and feasibility in Canton Penipe. The study 
consisted of a census of the high risk zone and interviews with people in the shelters to 
determine who was in need of resettlement and who was eligible, the latter being 
determined by a lack of viable alternatives to resettlement (i.e., having secured housing 
elsewhere on their own). The final report was issued in December 2006 and 
recommended a total of 553 households for relocation. 
Officials with the Chimborazo Province offices of MIDUVI say that one 
alternative to resettlement that was debated in the early stages within MIDUVI was the 
construction of homes in the villages in the risk zone that would be built of reinforced 
concrete and resistant to ashfall and airborne pyroclastic material. This alternative was 
advocated because of a lack of land available for resettlement outside the risk zone and 
because authorities were concerned that resettlers would be unwilling or unable to forego 
their lands and agricultural livelihoods in favor of a landless resettlement. These plans 
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were ultimately discarded for at least two reasons. First, state officials found it difficult to 
justify significant public investment within the risk zone and the Civil Defense was 
understandably concerned with risk prevention, which would be problematic with 
reconstruction in the risk zone. Second, the municipality of Penipe was interested in 
reviving the urban center of Penipe Township, which had declined in population since the 
1990s. The municipality devised a plan to invoke eminent domain and purchase land on 
the southern edge of Penipe township in order to make way for 285 households, which 
would more than double the 240 occupied households already in the township and, in the 
words of one MIDUVI official, “build another Penipe.” 
MIDUVI planned to build 185 homes in an urban plan in Penipe Township, but 
planning and land acquisition lagged well into the spring of 2007, when two non-
governmental organizations joined the planning process and committed to build houses in 
the resettlements. Samaritan’s Purse, a Christian Evangelical disaster relief organization 
based in North Carolina, sent representatives to distribute aid in Penipe in the early spring 
of 2007 who were approached by then Mayor Juan Salazar to contribute to the 
resettlement effort. Samaritan’s Purse President Franklin Graham was quick to sign on 
and agreed to construct 100 homes alongside the 185 that MIDUVI planned to build in 
Penipe Township. Housing designs presented in late March called for the construction of 
a total of 285 homes in an urban plan in Penipe (El Comercio 3-29-07). Homes in Penipe 
would be constructed by MIDUVI and Samaritan’s Purse as duplexes with three 
bedrooms in each unit, as well as running water, sewer service, and electricity. The 
agreement was that the municipal government would provide the land and MIDUVI and 
Samaritan’s Purse would provide and coordinate planning, material, supervision, 
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construction, and beneficiary selection. In addition to the homes, they would also 
construct a small park in the center of the resettlement. 
Fundacion Esquel joined the process, but presented their own plans to build a 
resettlement community on a windy ridge-top eight kilometers south of the resettlement 
in Penipe, where they would build 45 homes and provide land for each resettler family. 
Esquel secured the backing of the Provincial Council of Chimborazo and several small 
NGOs, and they purchased 70 hectares of land from private owners at the intersection of 
the Chambo and Blanco river valleys. There they began designing a settlement, a 
community center, health center, school building, park, agricultural plots, and greenhouse 
projects. Houses in the Esquel resettlement would stand alone as single units and have 
only two bedrooms, but would also count on running water, sewage, and electricity. 
Of the three primary organizations constructing the resettlements, Samaritan’s 
Purse was the first to break ground in March 2007, while MIDUVI was still in the 
process of reviewing bids from contractors, and Esquel was in the process of purchasing 
the land for their resettlement. MIDUVI relied entirely on contract labor, although this 
did include the hiring of some local labor. Samaritan’s Purse and Esquel, however, made 
beneficiary labor a central part of their construction and beneficiary selection process. 
Both organizations explicitly sought to harness the perceived development potential of 
the beneficiary communities and to work with local units of social organization to 
construct the resettlements. One key objective was to organize traditional cooperative 
labor parties (mingas) in order to foster a sense of ownership and commitment among 
beneficiaries. Each beneficiary household in the Samaritan’s Purse community was 
required to work each day during the construction process without knowing which house 
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would be theirs. In addition to the housing construction, Samaritan’s Purse organized 
beneficiary mingas to build sidewalks, public bathrooms, and a park and playground. In 
the Esquel resettlement, more than a dozen beneficiary mingas were organized to clear 
brush and timber, build temporary structures, and dig trenches, while the houses 
themselves were built by hired contractors. As with Samaritan’s Purse, Esquel 
beneficiaries were also organized into mingas to build the central park of the new 
resettlement. 
On February 8, 2008, nearly nine years after the first devastating eruptions of Mt. 
Tungurahua, MIDUVI granted 185 homes to beneficiaries in Penipe in a ceremony 
presided over by President Rafael Correa. Two months later, construction on the nearby 
Fundacion Esquel resettlement was completed and representatives from Esquel and the 
Provincial Council of Chimborazo granted 45 homes and one hectare of land to each 
beneficiary household. Prior to the opening ceremony, beneficiaries had met to elect a 
village council (Directiva) to administer the affairs of the community. In their first 
official capacity, they named the new hilltop resettlement “La Victoria de Pusuca” 
(hereafter Pusuca) in the first formal act of the community on April 27, 2008 (El 
Comercio 4-27-08). Several months later, on August 9, Samaritan’s Purse granted the first 
56 of 100 homes to beneficiaries (El Comercio 8-11-08) and the remaining 44 were 
granted in November of 2008. 
The houses in the Penipe resettlement were nearly identical. Samaritan’s Purse 
and MIDUVI homes shared the same floor plan, but they were distinguished by three 
features. The most obvious is that, while MIDUVI homes were all painted an identical 
shade of yellow, Samaritan’s Purse homes were painted green, blue, rose, or orange. 
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Samaritan’s Purse homes also had main entrance doors flush with the outer walls of the 
homes, while the doors to MIDUVI homes were slightly recessed. Lastly, houses built by 
the two institutions were distinguished by the plaques posted next to the doors of each 
home, which bore the household address and the name of the donor institutions. It is also 
worth noting that, while the homes in the resettlement more or less resemble one another, 
they do not resemble any of the previously existing homes in Penipe Township. The 
brightly colored, one-story concrete duplexes with fiberglass roofs in the resettlement 
stand in stark contrast to the wood, stone, and plaster one and two-story single-unit 
homes with concrete or tile roofs in Penipe Township. In nearby Pusuca, all homes were 
painted either green or blue and were constructed of material similar to the homes in 
Penipe, though with a slightly different floor plan and with only two bedrooms.  
Together, the 185 homes built by MIDUVI and the 100 built by Samaritan’s Purse 
form one resettlement community at the southern edge of Penipe Township, while Pusuca 
stands apart several kilometers up the hill to the northeast, though still a part of the same 
central parroquia/parish. Resettlers in Pusuca primarily come from Parroquia Puela, 
though there is one household from Parroquia Bilbao and another from Parroquia El 
Altar. Among those from Parroquia Puela, more than half are from the village Pungal de 
Puela, five households are from Manzano, and another four are from other villages in 
Puela. The resettlement community in Penipe, however, is much more heterogeneous, 
with resettlers from all the villages from the three parroquias in the high risk zone of 
Chimborazo Province—Bilbao, Puela, and El Altar—and several households displaced 
from Tungurahua Province (see table 2). 
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Table 2. Households in Each Resettlement by Village of Origin 
Village (Parroquia) MIDUVI Samaritan's Purse Esquel - Pusuca 
Bilbao (Bilbao) 10 33 1 
Yuibug (Bilbao) 17 1 0 
Capil (El Altar) 10 0 0 
Ganzhi (El Altar) 6 0 1 
Palictahua (El Altar) 31 7 0 
Anaba (Puela) 11 10 3 
Choglontuz (Puela) 3 5 1 
El Tingo (Puela) 2 0 4 
Manzano (Puela) 16 17 7 
Puela (Puela) 8 7 0 
Pungal de Puela (Puela) 56 18 25 
Penipe Township 
(Penipe) 12 0 0 
The Penipe resettlement is laid out on an urban plan, with paved roads and each 
house separated by a small yard. Although the resettlement was outfitted with modern 
plumbing, water, and sewage, the main potable water network in Penipe was unable to 
service the resettlement and for more almost two years, potable water service was 
sporadic, at best, until the main system was repaired and ultimately replaced in 2011. In 
Pusuca, potable water and sewage were also installed using beneficiary mingas, although 
potable water service was sporadic as well until additional tanks were added to the 
system in late 2010. Both Pusuca and the Penipe resettlements have communal 
infrastructure in addition to the homes. In Penipe, Samaritan’s Purse designed and 
constructed a roughly 6000m2 park using beneficiary labor. The park includes two 
volleyball courts, a children’s playground, public restrooms, open space for vendors, and 
is enclosed by concrete bleacher-like seating for recreation and public assemblies. Pusuca 
likewise has community facilities. All of the houses were constructed on a square plan 
that left approximately 6000m2 of open space in the center of the plan. Here, residents 
and volunteers from several Ecuadorian charities built fences, benches, and small 
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playground equipment from eucalyptus cleared for construction. Also, in addition to the 
park, Esquel constructed three community buildings – a community meeting center, a 
school and computer facility, and a health center. Therefore, in Pusuca there are 
designated buildings to meet and organize community functions, whereas no such 
enclosed structure exists in the Penipe resettlement. 
Why I Chose Pusuca and Manzano as Study Sites 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, I lived in Penipe for ten months 
while conducting fieldwork in the disaster-affected communities and disaster-induced 
resettlements throughout Penipe canton as a graduate research assistant in 2009. When I 
arrived in Penipe in February 2009, people had been occupying their new homes in the 
Penipe and Pusuca resettlements for nearly a year. Mt. Tungurahua was calm for most of 
the year, occasionally registering small volcanic explosions that could be heard and felt 
as far away as Penipe, but there was no significant ashfall and no lahars or pyroclastic 
flows. Some households had begun new lives in the resettlements, moving into their new 
homes and some even created small stores and food stands. However, as mentioned 
above, there were no productive resources (land or animals) in Penipe, and in Pusuca—
where resettlers were granted small plots of land—production was starting out slowly 
since they lacked irrigation, and most of them had only just begun to clear brush and trees 
from their newly granted land. This lack of productive resources, combined with the 
relative calm of the volcano, led many resettlers to return to their lands in the high risk 
zone and tend to crops and animals there, as they had done for generations. As a result, 
the resettlement communities were like ghost towns during the day.  
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During this initial field experience, I observed a great deal of tension between 
countervailing forces, many of which appeared to be bound up in minga organization. In 
Pusuca, they would organize mingas every weekend, mostly to develop catchment 
systems to channel rainwater to their lands, in lieu of having a larger irrigation canal, 
which they spoke of working towards. The Esquel Foundation had the community 
establish a governing council, or Directiva, and insisted that they ratify mandatory 
“General Assembly” meetings to be held each month and mandatory mingas to be held 
each week. Resettlers there learned that demonstrating “community organization” was 
one critical way to attract development resources from the state and non-governmental 
organizations. They often spoke of proving themselves to organizations by organizing 
mingas. 
In Manzano, Cabildo leaders had been organizing mingas for similar purposes. 
People were now able to return to their lands and village and parish leaders were seeking 
to foster a revival of their displaced communities. Mingas were organized weekly to 
repair community buildings and roads and the leadership spoke constantly of attracting 
outside investment by demonstrating their capacity to organize. While in Pusuca, 
leadership would often complain that people were absent from mingas because they were 
off tending to their lands in the high risk zone, in Manzano they complained that their 
numbers were dwindling due to people spending too much time in the resettlements or in 
Riobamba. 
In 2009, I noted the countervailing tensions between development, minga 
organization, and political power in the resettlements and the original villages in the high 
risk zone. Resettlement and changing household economic strategies, such as seeking 
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wage employment in urban centers outside Penipe, were dividing peoples’ time and 
energy and undermining their ability to organize mingas. Mingas were also being 
organized to help facilitate economic recovery in both communities by not only building 
infrastructure that would support local production, but also by organizing in ways that 
would invite outside development funding that would help further recovery and 
productive capacities. But there were also decidedly political elements in minga 
organization. The political power of village and parish leaders in the high risk zone was 
diminished in the resettlements. It seemed like a fair amount of the community and 
economic revival efforts directed by these leaders in the high risk zone was also an 
attempt to maintain or reestablish diminished power. In the resettlements, resources were 
not necessarily channeled through the traditional leaders, as they were in their original 
villages. The revival of these communities would restore control of the flows of outside 
resources to the old leadership. In Pusuca, it seemed that mingas were part of strategies to 
establish power as well. Participation and non-participation helped to distinguish between 
“deserving” and “non-deserving” beneficiaries and politicized the distribution of 
resources in the community. Moreover, those who might fail to participate one or more 
times could find themselves marginalized in the ostensibly democratic decision-making 
processes. 
It was with these thoughts in mind that I returned to Penipe in 2011 to examine 
what I had earlier perceived as the multiple political economic tensions bound up in 
mingas and reciprocal exchanges in the resettlements. I chose to focus on the two 
communities of Manzano and Pusuca because they appeared to present distinct cases but 
still reasonably close together. Most of the residents of Manzano had been resettled into 
102 
 
the Samaritan’s Purse and government homes in Penipe, where there were no productive 
resources or employment opportunities. While three households in Pusuca had come from 
Manzano, most came from neighboring villages in Puela Parish, and they now had land 
on which to produce. Moreover, the institutions that created and administered these 
communities were very different, which might have important implications for 
community organization, reciprocal exchange, and political power. Based on my 
observations in 2009, I returned in 2011 to conduct research guided by the research 
questions outlined in chapter 1. 
Resettler Livelihoods 
 I first arrived in Canton Penipe to conduct fieldwork in February 2009 as part of a 
National Science Foundation supported study of social networks and disaster recovery in 
which I served as a fieldworker. It was just eleven months after the resettlements were 
inaugurated and what struck me the most was that both resettlement communities were 
virtual ghost towns in the daytime, and many homes appeared unoccupied. I soon learned 
that this was largely due to the fact that there were simply no productive resources in the 
resettlements, which meant that people had to travel elsewhere to make a living. The 
Penipe resettlement did not include any land for agricultural production, which was the 
primary economic strategy of the resettlers. Moreover, because Penipe Township is 
considered an “urban” parroquia, a municipal ordinance prohibits the keeping of 
livestock or minor species within the township. In contrast, resettlers in the separate 
Pusuca resettlement were granted one hectare each for agricultural production and were 
free to keep animals in several commonly-held locations as well. However, the lands 
granted were forested and highly uneven, so the process of colonization took some time 
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and a great deal of labor. Subsequently, although resettlers in Pusuca technically had 
access to productive resources in the resettlement, because the land was not in a 
productive state they, like resettlers in Penipe, had to look elsewhere to produce or earn 
their livelihoods, which no doubt contributed to further delays in their pioneer 
colonization. 
 Lacking productive resources in the resettlements, resettlers primarily engaged in 
one or more of three economic strategies. The first and least common strategy was the 
establishment of small, informal businesses in the resettlements. Most cases of this 
strategy were very part time, as some individuals set up roadside grills on the weekend to 
sell food (usually fried potatoes, grilled chicken, or pork fritada). But there were two 
households in each community that converted one room of their homes into convenience 
stores that sold basic household items, snack foods, beer, and cigarettes. One household 
in Penipe set up a pizzeria in 2009 that grew into a significant and popular business by 
2011. Another household in Penipe set up a pool hall and bar in 2009, but it was shut 
down by local authorities by the end of the year due to a prevalence of underage drinking 
and violence associated with the establishment. 
The second strategy was to seek out wage employment, which frequently entailed 
seasonal or semi-permanent migration. Employment opportunities in Penipe were very 
scarce, but a few individuals found employment in municipal offices, one of the few 
private enterprises in Penipe Township, or as day laborers for one of the wealthier 
households in the town. It was, however, more common to migrate in search of 
employment, which was a strategy that carried over from the evacuation and 
displacement period from 1999 to 2008, but also part of a broader Ecuadorian trend of 
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rural-to-urban labor migration that began in the 1990s. A majority of households in both 
communities had one or more members who either commuted daily to work in one of the 
nearby cities of Riobamba or Ambato, or else migrated seasonally or semi-permanently 
further to Quito, the coastal cities of Guayaquil or Esmeraldas, or into the small cities in 
the Amazon for employment.  
It is the third strategy—resettlers returning to their lands in the high risk zone to 
plant crops and raise animals—that requires an extended discussion to highlight several 
key issues in the resettlements. This strategy was employed by nearly every resettler 
household during my fieldwork in 2009 and 2011 and had important implications for the 
development of both resettlements. Although volcanic ash had resulted in severe soil 
degradation, desiccation of fruit trees, and the contamination of animal pasture, resettlers 
retained ownership of their land, homes, and animals that survived the eruptions and 
remained their most viable productive resources. As always, busses ran hourly from 
Penipe to the parroquias in the high risk zone in the north, so resettlers could commute 
there daily. One exception was the northernmost parroquia of Bilbao, which remained 
inaccessible until 2011 because the road and several bridges had been destroyed by lava 
and pyroclastic flows in 2006 and had yet to be prepared. As a result, resettlers from 
Bilbao would take the bus as far as Puela and walk another three hours to their lands in 
Bilbao. This strategy, more than the others, helps to explain why the resettlement 
communities were largely abandoned during the day, but absence from the resettlements 
also frequently extended for days, part of a somewhat complex phenomenon that soon 
became a source of tension in the resettlements. 
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Some residents began returning to plant in the northern parroquias in late 2007, 
but there were only a few pioneers at first, as planting remained a precarious endeavor 
due to the persistence of ashfall throughout 2007 and 2008. By 2009, however, volcanic 
activity was on the decline and there was a renewed movement to return to the abandoned 
northern parroquias. Largely as a result of economic insecurity and a lack of alternatives 
in the resettlements, people began returning to plant in Bilbao, Puela, and El Altar. Other 
factors influenced this trend as well, including several initiatives by village and parroquia 
leaders, especially in Puela. For the first time since the 1999 eruptions, many villages in 
the high risk zone in northern Chimborazo Province and southern Tungurahua Province 
celebrated their saints’ day festivals after planting in September and October. In Puela, 
local leaders advertised the local Fiesta de San Miguel as El Retorno a Puela (“The 
Return to Puela”) and invested significantly in glossy posters that were spread throughout 
the region, urging Pueleños not only to return for the fiestas, but to return for their 
livelihoods and their patrimonio (heritage). It was not only a call to come back to the 
fiestas, but a call to return to their homes and rebuild their communities.  
In the months before the 2009 fiestas, village and parroquia leaders had begun 
organizing mingas in Puela to repair buildings and infrastructure. The village of Manzano 
rebuilt the roof and outer wall of their community center and the rural medical clinic in 
May and June 2009. In July, authorities from Parroquia Puela organized mingas for 
residents of every village in the parroquia. The first was to remove cobblestones from 
roughly 1/3 kilometer stretch of the main Puela road to make way for paving. The second 
was to rebuild the Puela Elementary School. Another minga worked to repair the roofs of 
the Puela Catholic Church and yet another to repair the roof of the school. At the time, it 
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was unclear where the funding would come for paving the road or reopening the school, 
as the state had already expressed an unwillingness to invest in the high risk zone, and all 
of the students from the Puela Elementary School had been relocated to schools in Penipe 
Township, near the resettlement, where construction was beginning on a new school. 
Nonetheless, leaders throughout Parroquia Puela made numerous impassioned pleas to 
the people of the area to return and took many steps to organize the villages to begin 
rebuilding the area. Village commoners, for their part, seemed inspired by the rhetoric 
and the possibility to return to their homelands and perhaps regain what they had lost. 
The dozen or so mingas organized in Puela in mid-to-late-2009 were some of the largest 
witnessed in the area before or since. 
The increasing return of displaced agriculturalists to the northern parroquias in 
2009 soon began to have important consequences in the resettlements. All three 
resettlement agencies—MIDUVI, Samaritan’s Purse, and Esquel—had some basic 
requirements of their beneficiaries. One was that they could not rent or sell their homes 
for 25 years and the other was that they had to demonstrate residence by regularly 
occupying their homes in order to retain possession of them. It is not clear how explicit or 
well-understood the residency requirements were made to beneficiaries, nor is it clear 
that resettlers could have foreseen the potential complications and consequences when 
MIDUVI was still in the process of drafting their regulatory process in 2009. However, it 
is clear that many households had difficulty satisfying their residency requirements 
beginning in 2009. The problem was that it was often not feasible or reasonable to return 
to the resettlements because of the burden of the commute (especially for those from 
Bilbao, who had to walk a good distance each way) and also for the increasing prevalence 
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of theft in the communities in the high risk zone. Theft of animals, farm tools, and 
household items became a significant problem in 2009, as thieves began to prey on 
homes and communities they knew to be vacant in the evenings. And the thefts were 
often significant – thieves were known to make off with several animals at a time, 
hauling pigs and chickens to market in small trucks. Because primary production in the 
risk zone – however precarious – remained the most common and reliable economic 
strategy, the fear of theft became endemic among resettlers, as they felt vulnerable to 
losing all they had once (or more) again.  
While regulatory procedures for residency were not explicit for the three 
resettlement agencies from 2009-2011, certain de facto processes with each are worth 
noting. Samaritan’s Purse granted deeds to beneficiaries shortly after they granted the 
homes, while MIDUVI retained the deeds to all homes in the resettlement. Esquel 
initiated a post-hoc process of land surveying in late 2009 and began granting deeds in 
mid-2010 to select beneficiaries who had regularly met their contractual obligations to 
the community—regular residence, mandatory attendance and monthly General 
Assembly meetings and weekly mingas, and payment of monthly dues (more on dues 
below). However, in an interview with the Esquel Community Coordinator for Pusuca, 
Martha Santiago, she explained that all beneficiaries did in fact have legal ownership of 
their homes and property. Esquel had merely presented the documents to those 
beneficiaries in good standing, while telling others that they would receive deeds after 
prolonged trial period, but Martha said that any beneficiary could easily go to the Civil 
Registry office and obtain their own copy of the deed. But beneficiaries who had not been 
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in compliance were intentionally misinformed of their legal possession of deeds as a 
means to coerce them into compliance. 
Esquel representatives regularly visited Pusuca and attended almost all village 
meetings and mingas. With the exception of two ceremonial visits in 2009, where they 
brought former church volunteers from the United States who had worked on the 
construction of the resettlement, Samaritan’s Purse was no longer involved in the 
resettlement community and did not engage in any regulation of residency in the 
resettlement. MIDUVI, however, began conducting random visits to resettlement homes 
in the spring and summer of 2009 to confirm that homes were occupied. Several meetings 
of MIDUVI beneficiaries were called throughout 2009 and 2010 to inform them that they 
would be evicted if they did not occupy their homes. While some beneficiaries verbally 
protested these threats at the meetings, explaining the difficulty of living with no 
economic means in the resettlements, MIDUVI representatives responded by likening 
some beneficiary behaviors to defrauding the state. When I returned in 2011, MIDUVI 
representatives continued their random visits and threats of eviction. In a public meeting 
of all beneficiaries on September 2, MIDUVI representatives announced that residents 
had 90 days to establish residency and become eligible for deeds to their homes but, 
failing this, they would be evicted. On December 1, MIDUVI representatives again 
visited the resettlement and posted eviction notices on more than a dozen homes, 
informing them that they had 15 days to establish residency or face eviction.  
Governance and Projects 
 In order to place much of this study in context, it is necessary to describe some of 
the features of governance, mingas, and development in the two study sites and how this 
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relates to external institutions and the flow of resources from outside the villages. The 
governing bodies and institutions in each site are both similar and distinct in several key 
regards and they are tied in different ways to different state and non-governmental 
organizations. They also organize their communities in ways both similar and distinct. 
Governance, Mingas, and Development in Manzano 
 The people of Manzano are subject to the authority of several institutions and, for 
the purposes of description, it is useful to distinguish between the institutions operating in 
the resettlements (where most of them live at least part time) and those operating in 
Manzano itself. The primary political institution in Manzano is the cabildo, the village 
council that was established when Manzano formally incorporated as a comuna (village) 
in 1973. The cabildo consists of a president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, and a 
trustee (sindico). There are three other committees as well: potable water, irrigation, caja 
comunitaria (cooperative savings and loan), and seguro campesino (peasant healthcare 
cooperative). There is also the Junta Parroquial de Puela, a parish-wide governing 
council, which not only administers projects and affairs for all villages in the parroquia, 
but is also significantly involved in the internal affairs of each, especially Manzano. 
Finally, the Municipal Government (the mayor and county council or Consejo Cantonal), 
are also involved in budgetary issues in Manzano and villages throughout Canton Penipe.  
 The other institutions largely function through the Cabildo in Manzano. Cabildo 
officers are elected every year, but as of 2011, the same two individuals had been serving 
as president and vice president had been serving for twelve years (since the 1999 
eruptions) without change. The other positions also went largely unchanged during this 
time period, with most of these changes being due to the same individuals alternating 
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different posts (e.g., treasurer, trustee). The functions of a cabildo were captured by a 
survey of 131 villages in Chimborazo by Cadena and Mayorga (1988), who identified 
their primary functions as organizing mingas and village assemblies, searching for 
external institutional support and funding, and implementing community projects. 
Mingas evolved as key factors in governance and development in the post-disaster and 
resettlement contexts in Canton Penipe, but this was also part of a larger trend in 
participatory governance in Chimborazo Province and throughout Ecuador that began in 
the late 1980s (Cameron 2010; Colloredo-Mansfield and Phillips 2010).  
 
Figure 2. Scenes from Manzano. Top left, a 2009 minga to repair the Casa Comunal; 
Top right, a meeting of the Cabildo in front of the Casa Comunal; Bottom right, team of 
Manzano laborers working on a Puela Irrigation minga; Bottom left, two Manzano 
women take a break from an irrigation minga and rest in the shadow of Mt. Tungurahua. 
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The way that mingas factored into politics and development is relatively 
straightforward. The state—and particularly Chimborazo Province—has been expanding 
decentralized budget and governance strategies for two or three decades (cf. de Mattos 
1989), and participatory strategies have increased with the rise of the populist socialist 
President Rafael Correa and the charismatic indigenous leader, Mariano Curicama, who 
served as prefect of the newly-created Provincial Council of Chimborazo from 2009 
through 2012 (Cameron 2010). These strategies follow a participatory strategy (mostly 
public review) for the expansion of public works (potable water, irrigation, and roads) to 
reach rural regions throughout the country (Cameron 2010). However, in spite of 
dedicating a portion of state oil revenues to rural development since the 1970s 
(Colloredo-Mansfield and Phillips 2010), the state has been unable to keep pace with its 
infrastructure development goals with its limited budget alone. As a result, the Provincial 
Council of Chimborazo commits part of its annual participatory development funds to 
purchase raw materials and fund limited professional oversight for infrastructure 
development projects in which there is a contractual commitment from village 
beneficiaries that they will perform the project labor by organizing mingas. Non-
government organizations (NGOs) look to mingas in much the same ways as the state. 
NGOs have played a large role in facilitating the participatory projects of the state and in 
directly funding community-based micro-projects and they tend to and prefer to work 
primarily with large indigenous populations and villages that demonstrate high degrees of 
community organization (Cameron 2010; Bretón and Garcia 2003; Bretón 1997).  
According to local officials in Penipe, cabildo leaders in Manzano learned that 
demonstrating community organization can attract outside resources when they observed 
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the success of a nearby village in Parroquia El Altar, who had attracted the attention of 
the state and non-governmental organizations by organizing village-wide mingas after the 
2006 eruptions. As mentioned above, the Manzano Cabildo began organizing village-
wide mingas in 2009. The first several mingas were organized to repair the community 
center, the village healthcare facility, the village potable water system, and a small ball 
court in the village center. Around this time, several non-governmental organizations 
came to Manzano to fund several pilot micro-projects aimed at economic recovery in the 
area. By late 2010, Manzano secured state funding to repair and expand their potable 
water system, largely as a result of their demonstrated capacity to organize mingas. In 
2011, representatives from several government ministries, indigenous and peasant 
organizations, and non-governmental organizations began meeting with the people of 
Manzano to plan small development projects and made it explicit that they chose 
Manzano over other communities in the region because they were known to be organized. 
Early in 2011, the Junta Parroquial began organizing parroquia-wide mingas to repair the 
irrigation canal that spanned the entire parroquia. Manzano stood out as the most 
organized of the villages in the parroquia, as they frequently outnumbered minga workers 
from the other villages. As a result, when minga labor was concentrated on the eastern 
stretch of the canal for months, benefitting other less-organized villages, but never 
reaching Manzano, cabildo leaders in Manzano withdrew the participation of their village 
as a tactic to lobby the irrigation committee to move work to the western stretch of the 
canal, which would benefit Manzano. 
The sustained recruitment of participants for the production of common 
resources, as witnessed in Manzano, is the primary source of cabildo power. Cabildo 
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leaders continue to organize mingas for projects including irrigation, potable water, and 
village road maintenance. The minga has become a powerful symbol of community 
solidarity and an important tool in the competition for scarce development resources. 
Manzano uses mingas to attract outside aid and projects by proving that they are 
organized and therefore deserving of aid and project investment, often competing with 
other communities by claiming that they are more organized and therefore more 
deserving than others. 
Governance, Mingas, and Development in the Penipe Resettlements 
 The resettlement communities in Penipe and Pusuca established village councils 
similar to cabildos shortly after the resettlements were built. Known as directivas, these 
organizations also organized mingas and sought to attract support from outside 
organizations. However, these organizations and the mingas they facilitate worked 
somewhat differently than the cabildos. In the Penipe resettlement, where most of the 
Manzano community was relocated along with resettlers from many surrounding villages, 
the two different resettlement agencies—Samaritan’s Purse and MIDUVI—helped to 
establish two different directivas. There was a Samaritan’s Purse beneficiary directiva 
and a MIDUVI beneficiary directiva. In Pusuca, the Esquel Foundation also helped 
establish a directiva, but there are important differences between the directivas in Penipe 
and Pusuca that by comparison with each other and Manzano, serve to illustrate further 
how political power is produced and maintained through mingas.  
Neither of the directivas in the Penipe resettlements held regular meetings and 
neither of them successfully organized mingas in the resettlement between its founding in 
2008 and the time of the present study in 2011. As mentioned above, Samaritan’s Purse 
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had organized mandatory beneficiary mingas to construct homes in the resettlement, but 
mingas did not continue after construction was complete. The mingas organized by 
Samaritan’s Purse were unusual (though not unprecedented) in that they organized people 
from multiple villages, largely circumventing the traditional cabildos. One potential 
explanation for the absence of mingas in the resettlements lies in the fact that initial 
beneficiary mingas were based on institutional recruitment for personal benefit not 
collective action for community benefit. Local leaders point to an important precedent of 
this type of organizing and its effects. The Peace Corps carried out potable water and 
irrigation projects in Penipe from the mid-1960s through the 1980s, recruiting 
participants by providing them with food rations of canned meat, powdered milk, and 
grains. Cabildo members and minga leaders from this era say that these projects 
destroyed the culture of mingas, as they could no longer recruit participants without 
promising personal compensation. Cabildo leaders were not able to negotiate for their 
communities’ needs with outside institutions based on their ability to organize the 
community for project-related goals, nor could they mobilize their communities based on 
their unique abilities to secure resources from outside institutions. Likewise, the 
directivas in the Penipe resettlements were unable to mobilize their community or make 
demands of outside organizations. In 2011, the Samaritan’s Purse directiva attempted to 
organize a minga to improve the deteriorating park in the center of the resettlement 
community, but soon abandoned the project, as they lamented that people would not 
participate unless they provided them with incentives. They also worried that they would 
not be able to demand resources from the municipal government, the state, or NGOs if 
they could not organize the community.   
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Figure 3. Scenes from the Penipe Resettlement. Top left, a hilltop view of the Penipe 
resettlement at the southern edge of Penipe Township; Top right, a street of MIDUVI 
homes in the Penipe Resettlement; Bottom right and left, resettler meetings with 
MIDUVI representatives on the street in Penipe. 
 
The MIDUVI beneficiary directiva was never known to attempt to organize 
mingas. Their primary activity was to organize ad hoc beneficiary meetings with 
MIDUVI representatives. These began in 2008 when the resettlement was first opened 
and MIDUVI officials presented the homes in a ceremony co-organized with the directiva 
and other local authorities. By early 2009, MIDUVI representatives visited the 
resettlement on several occasions to explain evolving beneficiary policy issues and the 
enforcement of residency requirements. Although the representatives took questions, 
these were primarily one-way discussions, with MIDUVI personnel informing 
beneficiaries of policy and enforcement issues. Directiva members served to call 
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meetings to order, take attendance, and introduce the MIDUVI representatives. On the 
few occasions that MIDUVI representatives did not attend these meetings, directiva 
personnel merely read statements from MIDUVI to beneficiaries and attempted to clarify 
or interpret those statements for beneficiaries with questions. It is also important to note 
that all of these meetings took place on the street, as the Penipe resettlement did not 
include any public meeting facilities. 
 One particular instance serves to illustrate the effective absence of local political 
power in the MIDUVI resettlement. After MIDUVI representatives issued 15-day 
eviction warnings to several households in December 1, 2011 (described above), directiva 
leaders called an emergency meeting of all beneficiaries in order to organize a response. 
Nearly 100 beneficiaries—considerably less than the total of 185 beneficiary 
households—huddled under the awning of the pizzeria in the resettlement to escape the 
pouring rain as the directiva president and vice president read the eviction letter to the 
group. The leaders then voiced their indignation at the fact that MIDUVI was preying on 
the most vulnerable who were off tending to their crops and animals while MIDUVI 
representatives conducted their random visits. They exhorted the crowd to share their 
indignation and stand up for their neighbors. They said they would all be vulnerable if 
they allowed this to go on and called for a meeting the following week where they would 
“rise up” and confront MIDUVI and demand that they cease eviction proceedings and 
random visits and instead schedule formal meetings when they wanted to address the 
community. Somewhat surprisingly, even fewer beneficiaries turned out for this meeting 
the following week and it contained none of the resistance portended in the previous 
meeting at the pizzeria. Instead, as with prior MIDUVI meetings, a state representative 
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stood up and addressed the group, telling them that there was no way around the 
residency requirements and that failure to comply would result in eviction. Directiva 
leaders repeated the remarks of the state representative and thanked him for 
“clarification” before he took some questions and then left. 
Governance, Mingas, and Development in the Pusuca Resettlement 
The Esquel Foundation not only provided resettlers in Pusuca with one hectare of 
land per household, they also created a new village council, or directiva, whose officers 
are elected every two years. The directiva organizes weekly mingas for irrigation and 
potable water, which unlike housing construction, are collective benefits, not personal 
ones. Failure to participate is sanctioned by levying $10-$20 fines on households and, in 
the case of the irrigation canal being constructed, those who fail to participate or pay the 
fines are told they will be excluded from the project. The directiva is similar to cabildos 
in structure and mandate, but a representative from Esquel, Martha, serves as an advisor 
to the main directiva and the other committees. She attends all meetings and mingas and 
guides leaders through the decision-making process. Unlike her predecessor, who became 
entangled in the politics of the village and was subsequently removed, Martha helps to 
manage the tension between the egalitarian community goals and the unequal power 
relations that come to bear in the village. The first directiva president was a woman, 
Mariana, who was ousted after her first year by powerful, wealthy landowners from her 
own village. The most powerful, Manuel, succeeded her as president for two years. He 
and his allies successfully excluded Mariana and others from development projects in the 
community—most notably several large greenhouses that produced tomatoes for 
market—while offering privileged access to close allies. Since Martha’s arrival from 
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Esquel, the village has elected a new directiva and now Manuel and other powerful 
landowners spend less effort on the communal projects and pass most of their time on 
their sizeable plots of land in the high risk zone and away from Pusuca. 
In 2011, Leadership positions in the new directiva and the several village 
committees (irrigation, potable water, credit union) were held by many people who were 
formerly both economically and politically marginal. Women and individuals from land-
poor households were more represented on the Pusuca directiva and committees than in 
those same organizations in villages elsewhere in Penipe Canton. The president, Angel 
Turushina, was a young man who came from a relatively poor family who lived on a 
hacienda on the outskirts of Puela Parish. His influence and ultimate election was perhaps 
aided by the many kin he had in the resettlement, but he was generally perceived as an 
intelligent and just leader whose youth and new ideas were an ideal break from the 
entrenched political power of wealthy landlords that dominated politics before the 
resettlement and in its first years. Unlike the cabildos in Parroquia Puela, where women 
only occasionally had leadership roles, women were well represented on the Directiva 
and other committees in the village and played active roles in decision-making. 
Moreover, many of the women who increasingly assumed leadership roles were from 
economically marginal households. Judith was the secretary of the Irrigation Committee 
and often demonstrated more leadership and exerted more power than its president, yet 
Judith and her father, uncles, brothers, and cousins were among the poorest in Puela 
Parish, with very little land or livestock, and for generations a reliable pool of cheap peon 
labor for their better-off neighbors. In 2011, it was often Judith that dictated work 
responsibilities on mingas, keeping track of rayas (minga attendance credits), and calling 
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out people she perceived as shirking their responsibilities. She was also one of the most 
vocal contributors to all village meetings. 
Despite strong leadership by presidents or some committee heads, the process of 
decision-making in Pusuca was generally democratic, with little power truly vested in the 
elected leadership. This was partially because all decisions were voted on and partially 
because, ever since Pusuca’s founding in 2008, the meetings were monitored, guided, and 
arbitrated by an ever-present Esquel representative. Directiva meetings began at 7pm on 
the first Saturday of every month and often ran as late as midnight, as each item on the 
meeting’s typically modest agenda is met with lively debate. Unlike Manzano, where 
debate and gossip focused on the comparative legitimacy and eligibility of different 
villages around them, debate and gossip in Pusuca focused almost exclusively on the 
comparative legitimacy and eligibility of the different resettlers within the community. 
Agenda items often involved reporting on irrigation canal progress, potable water, minga 
schedules and opportunities for atrasados, status updates on basic services in the village, 
and often invitations to participate in micro-development projects, such as agricultural 
extension training and farm-to-table programs. However, each agenda item, no matter 
how big or small, was met with contentious debate over who is deserving or non-
deserving of project inclusion, who is atrasado (behind) or al dia (current) with dues and 
responsbilities, and how people should be sanctioned. When these items almost 
inevitably reached their boiling points or when village leaders brokered arguably pyrrhic 
compromises, as when they once voted to evict a man from the village for missing too 
many mingas because they doubted the veracity of a doctor’s note, the Esquel 
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representative eventually stepped in and brokered a peace that was always accepted, if 
not always welcomed. 
 
 
Figure 4. Scenes from Pusuca. Top left, the Pusuca resettlement; Top right, a monthly 
General Assembly meeting; Bottom right, a 2009 minga to build a water catchment 
system; Bottom left, digging trenches for a 2011 irrigation minga. 
The Pusuca Directiva organized two types of mingas—community mingas and 
irrigation mingas—on a weekly basis and attendance by one member of each household 
was mandatory. Both types of mingas might worked on the irrigation canal, but the 
operative differences were how work was conducted, how rayas (attendance points) were 
awarded, and the cost of multas (fines). Since the founding of the Pusuca resettlement in 
2008, the Esquel Foundation had made attendance in weekly mingas and monthly 
General Assembly meetings a condition of project inclusion. The elected Pusuca 
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Directiva ratified and enforced this, with the support of the community, soon after the 
first officers were elected in 2008.  
An irrigation minga involved work on the irrigation canal that was being 
constructed with funds from the World Bank and the Provincial Council of Chimborazo 
in coordination with the Esquel Foundation. The canal stretched approximately twelve 
kilometers from the highlands of La Candelaria Province in the southeast of Penipe 
Canton to Pusuca, nearer the center of the canton. Work involved the digging of long 
trenches for submerged tubes to channel the water to Pusuca lands, as well as hauling 
tubes, stone, sand, and cement to the many job sites along the canal, where teams of paid 
workers labored under the supervision of engineers from the World Bank and the 
Provincial Council. Labor on irrigation mingas was based on a system of tareas (tasks) 
assigned equally to each household. The first tarea I participated in was for each 
household to haul 50 shovelfuls of stone in nylon grain sacks filled with 5-10 shovelfuls 
at a time from a roadside deposit to a worksite that could be anywhere from 100 meters to 
almost a kilometer away. Another tarea the following week was to dig a trench ten meters 
in length, one meter deep, and a half meter wide. All of these tareas were performed at an 
altitude of 3000 meters, where most people got winded quickly.  Tareas were uniformly 
assigned to every household, regardless of age, gender, or physical ability and rayas were 
not awarded until the tarea was complete. Elderly workers and several women would 
have to return to work several days in order to complete their task, while many of the 
more able-bodied men were able to finish in one day. On one occasion, I observed a 
small-framed woman who was in poor health take more than three hours to carry her 50 
shovelfuls of stone a distance of 100 meters in sacks of only three shovelfuls at a time. 
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There was no prohibition against having multiple laborers on a tarea and there were 
several instances where a household brought more than one laborer or multiple 
households collaborated on each other’s tarea. This system had been suggested in early 
2011 by several men in the village who were concerned that households did not 
contribute equally to communal work and wanted a way to standardize labor 
requirements to eliminate what they saw as a form of free-riding. The tarea system was 
ratified by the community, though many found it a burden. The multa for non-
participation was $20, though rayas could be made up, but only through irrigation minga 
tareas, not community mingas. As a result, several elderly resettlers female-headed 
households would send peons to work irrigation mingas, as the peons only cost about $10 
per day. Finally, the sanction for failing to complete and pay all rayas and multas would 
be elimination from the irrigation system, though this was still highly contested at the end 
of my fieldwork. 
Community mingas in Pusuca had no tareas and multas were only $10. A 
community minga might work within the village, repairing community structures and the 
central park, clearing roads and paths, or on the irrigation canal, the latter being more 
common in late 2011. Instead of a tarea, work was for a designated period of time, 
usually from 8am to 4pm and no one kept track of anyone’s labor output. In these mingas, 
as with community mingas in Manzano, there was a more gendered division of labor. 
Women and men usually worked in separate groups. In one minga, where we were 
transporting sacks of stone and sand from the roadside down a steep cliff to a worksite 
below, seven women lowered stone sacks on a rope from the roadside above, where five 
men would receive the lightly-loaded sacks and trek them further through the hills to the 
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jobsite. At other times, men would carry multiple heavy PVC tubes over a kilometer 
distance or more in the hills, while project engineers or Esquel representative Martha 
shuttled women with their tubes in pickup trucks. 
Both the Pusuca Directiva and Esquel focused on community organization to 
attract funding and project support from outside donors. Community mingas formed a 
key part in the irrigation canal project funded by the World Bank and the Provincial 
Council of Chimborazo. Esquel played a central role in attracting outside agencies to the 
community and they successfully brought in funding from dozens of NGOs to support 
micro projects in Pusuca, ranging from park construction, to greenhouses, to potable 
water, to computer facilities. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
I lived in Penipe for ten months in 2009 while conducting fieldwork in the 
disaster-affected communities and disaster-induced resettlements throughout Canton 
Penipe as a graduate research assistant for a National Science Foundation-funded study of 
personal networks and disaster recovery from February-December 2009 (see chapter 1). 
It was during this initial fieldwork experience that I observed many of the practices of 
interest in this study—mingas, reciprocity, village council meetings, and development 
programs—and began to develop the ideas that informed the present study. I developed a 
proposal of my own, which received funding from two sources in 2011. The first was a 
Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF 
#1123962 – Doctoral Dissertation Research: Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Political 
Power in Post-Disaster Resettlements in Andean Ecuador; PI L. M. Whiteford, CoPI A.J. 
Faas). The second source of funding was a Fellowship in Hazards, Risk, and Disasters 
(PERISHIP), a joint program of The Natural Hazards Center at the University of 
Colorado and the Public Entity Risk Institute (PERI) with funding from the National 
Science Foundation. This study was approved by the University of South Florida’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB # Pro00004409), who determined that the study met the 
requirements for Federal Exemption criteria as outlined in federal regulations 
[45CFR46.101(b)]. 
I returned to Penipe in 2011 and rented two rooms from a family in the central 
township of Penipe, a location that provided ideal access to the nearby resettlements and 
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the disaster-affected villages in the north. My objective was to examine what I had earlier 
perceived as the multiple political economic tensions bound up in mingas and reciprocal 
exchanges in the resettlements. I chose to focus on the two communities of Manzano and 
Pusuca because they appeared to present distinct cases. Most of the residents of Manzano 
had been resettled into the Samaritan’s Purse and government homes in Penipe, where 
there were no productive resources or employment opportunities. While three households 
in Pusuca had come from Manzano, most came from neighboring villages in Puela 
Parish, and they now had productive land of their own in the resettlement. Moreover, the 
institutions that created and administered these communities were very different, which I 
thought might have important implications for community organization, reciprocal 
exchange, and political power. Based in my observations in 2009, I returned in 2011 to 
conduct research guided by the research questions and hypotheses outlined in the 
previous chapter. 
Research Design 
This study employed an iterative, mixed-method, 3-phase methodological strategy 
that involved the recursive discovery and corroboration of analytical domains and the 
evaluation of study hypotheses (Driscoll et al. 2007; LeCompte and Schensul 1999). 
Before beginning my research activities, I first secured lodging in Penipe, near the 
resettlement site, and reconnected with key informants and acquaintances in the study 
sites. Next, I began phase one of my data collection by conducting exploratory 
observation, key informant interviews, and archival searches to identify specific terms, 
practices, and events in order to design effective structured interview questions (Bernard 
2011:150), while also serving to build relationships, identify key informants, and locate 
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and enter settings most relevant to the study (Bestor 2002; Cromley 1999). Specific 
objectives of this phase were to identify village households, household members’ current 
place of residence, and to develop a thorough list of venues and times of group meetings 
and assemblies, specific items and services exchanged, and aid and development 
programs in each community. In the second phase, I administered structured interviews to 
obtain quantitative indicators of reciprocal exchanges between group members (Mayer 
2002, 1974; Schweizer 1997), minga participation, distribution of development benefits 
and collective resources (Mosse 2005, 1998; Salmen 2002, 1987), occupational and 
socioeconomic data (Pant 2007; Bebbington 1999), and perceived influence in village 
affairs and benefit distribution (Lubell et al. 2009; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004; Salmen 
2002, 1987). In the third phase, I conducted focused observation and documentation of 
participation and influence in decision-making, plus patterns of influence in public 
negotiations of development strategies and aid allocation (Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 
2005, 1998). Copies of all interview instruments are included in Appendix A. In the 
analysis phase, I compiled and coded both qualitative and quantitative data for 
descriptive analysis (Bernard 2011:300) and conducted correlations and regression 
analyses (Thompson 2006) to evaluate and test each of my study hypotheses.  
Sampling Strategy and Participant Recruitment 
I employed an iterative sampling strategy that took place in four phases. I 
identified the two study groups of Pusuca and former Manzano villagers in the Penipe 
resettlement during prior research based on my theoretical interest in collective labor 
organization (mingas), reciprocal exchange, and resettlement, which are not randomly 
distributed in the general population (Johnson 1990:27). In the second phase, I selected 
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key informants for brief interviews based on their knowledge of reciprocal exchange 
practices, collective action, and development programs (Bernard 2011:150; Johnson 
1990:65). The reliability of these exploratory data were supported by the degree of 
saturation, or the extent to which variation in each domain stabilizes, which is expected 
after six to eight interviews in each group (cf.,Guest et al. 2006).  
In the third phase, I administered a structured interview to one adult from each 
household in Pusuca (n=40) and Manzano (n=52) because the household is the primary 
unit of economic organization in Andean villages and rural resettlements (Mayer 2005; 
Cernea and McDowell 2000). Reliable measures of variation in reciprocity and collective 
action must include all households in the community as respondents to present each 
respondent with a list all households as potential exchange partners (Hanneman and 
Riddle 2005; Freeman 1979). A random sample of one adult from each household in each 
village could have controlled for demographic biases in study results but, as with a great 
deal of ethnographic research, I was concerned with selecting participants who were 
knowledgeable in the key domains of my study (Johnson 1990:65). Structured interviews 
were designed to address household exchanges with other households—a subject about 
which any randomly selected adult could report—and the practices and power relations in 
mingas and village councils—a subject about which only household members who 
attended mingas and council meetings could report. I settled on the strategy of developing 
lists of households with key informants in each community and asking them to tell me 
which members from each household were most likely to attend mingas and village 
council meetings. These were the individuals I selected to participate in the structured 
interviews. I did, however, encourage multiple adult members of the household to 
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respond to the survey and in more than half of the interviews, both husband and wife 
provided responses.  
The sample for the structured interviews in phase two included all 40 occupied 
homes in Pusuca and all 52 occupied homes in Manzano, though many homes in 
Manzano were occupied only occasionally since resettlement (see table 3 for sample and 
village populations). Many respondents in Manzano had to be tracked down in the 
resettlements, or else in the nearby cities of Riobamba, Baños, or Puyo. Sample attributes 
are reported in table 3, and in figures 5 and 6. While the structured interview sample 
obtained relative parity in respondent gender in Pusuca, respondents were 
overwhelmingly male in Manzano. Because the sample is based on who participates in 
mingas and village councils in each site, this is evidence of gender biases in participation 
in the two sites and not necessarily a sampling bias. Looking at respondent age in table 1, 
we see that the sample skews younger for Pusuca and older for Manzano. Though mean 
adult age in Manzano is six years older than mean age in Manzano, it is obvious from 
looking at figure 2 that younger age groups are overrepresented in the Pusuca sample and 
underrepresented in the Manzano sample. Similarly, it is also obvious that older age 
groups are overrepresented in Manzano and underrepresented in Pusuca. 
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Figure 5. Gender Representation in Population and Sample 
 
Table 3. Study Site Demographics 
  Mean Age Adult Pop Mean Age Sample Adult Pop Total Pop 
Pusuca 39 42 72 121 
Manzano 45 55 131 196 
To some extent, these figures represent attributes of the sites and not necessarily a 
bias in the sample. However, because there were obvious reasons to suspect that gender 
and age characteristics may bias variation in the data, I conducted t-tests and analysis of 
variance as part of exploratory data analysis of each hypothesis and subsequent analyses 
controlled for demographic variables as covariates in the model (Bernard 2011:174-176; 
Timm and Mieczkowski 1997:41).  
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Figure 6. Age Ranges in Population and Sample 
The final sampling and participant selection stage was for the purposes of 
participant observation. The objective was to focus on venues, days and times of mingas, 
meetings, assemblies and other forms of collective action (Mansergh et al. 2006). This 
information was collected from key informants and observations in both sites. This was 
easiest in Pusuca because they had regularly scheduled mingas and village council 
meetings each week and month, respectively, but did also call ad hoc meetings and 
mingas to deal with emergent issues. Minga days and times might be changed based on 
the availability of materials, as when sand and stone for concrete structures were dumped 
by the roadside and had to be hauled before the rain. I therefore had to remain in regular 
contact with key informants in Pusuca in order to remain aware of the changing schedules 
of mingas and meetings. In Manzano, however, meetings and mingas were always ad hoc 
and rarely scheduled in advance. Meetings and mingas that were scheduled weeks in 
advance were often canceled or rescheduled at the last minute. I had to remain extra 
attentive in staying abreast of minga and meeting schedules in Manzano. The Cabildo 
President, Bernardo, was very supportive of my work and we had each other’s cellphone 
numbers so that he could alert me when there were mingas, meetings, or other key events. 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
18-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61+
Pe
rc
en
t A
ge
 R
an
ge
Age Ranges
Pusuca Population
Pusuca Sample
Manzano Population
Manzano Sample
131 
 
Yet Bernardo was consistently busy with his leadership duties and his own farm, so it was 
not uncommon for him to forget to call me when an event of interest was taking place. 
Fortunately, I realized this early on and had several other relationships with people from 
Manzano who were always “in the loop” and whom I could rely upon to notify me at my 
home or whom I would visit regularly in the resettlement.  
Over the course of five months in the field in 2011, I worked on nine mingas in 
Manzano and twenty in Pusuca (see table 4). I attended eleven meetings of the Manzano 
Cabildo, eight meetings of the Junta Parroquial of Puela, approximately fifteen sessions 
of various sub-committees in Manzano and Puela (e.g. irrigation, potable water, fiesta 
planning, etc.), and seven meetings of the residents of the MIDUVI homes in the Penipe 
resettlement. In Pusuca, I attended all four monthly General Assembly meetings that took 
place during the time I was in the field. I also attended eighteen different meetings of sub-
committees in Pusuca (e.g. irrigation, potable water, ad hoc emergency sessions, etc.). 
Though I did occasionally miss meetings and mingas in both communities because I was 
unaware or unable to attend (mingas and meetings in the two sites would occasionally be 
simultaneous), I participated in and observed a number of instances and contexts that 
were representative of at least the time period of my research. Furthermore, as with my 
key informant interviews, I assessed the data I collected based on its saturation, or the 
extent to which the acquisition of new data in my study domains reached a point of 
diminishing returns. 
Table 4. Mingas and Meetings Attended During Fieldwork 
 Mingas 
Attended 
Village Council Meetings 
Attended 
Other Village Meetings 
Attended 
Manzano 9 11 30 
Pusuca 20 4 18 
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Phase One: Exploratory Fieldwork, Archival Data, and Key Informant Interviews 
In the first phase of data collection, my objective was to acquire data on four 
specific topics. First, as mentioned above, I needed to develop a schedule of mingas and 
meetings in each site and reliable sources of information for when meetings and mingas 
were scheduled in order to focus my participant observation on the contexts of interest to 
my study. Second, I needed to compile a list of households in each site and information 
on who participates from each household in order to draw a sample of participants in the 
structured interviews in phase two. Third, I needed information on different aid and 
development projects in the two sites, which would allow me to develop questions for my 
structured interview about whether or not households were included in each project. And 
finally, in order to develop a structured instrument to measure reciprocal exchanges 
between households, I needed to develop a reliable and representative list of common 
items exchanged in each community. 
Exploratory Fieldwork 
I began participating as a laborer in the weekly mingas and attending meetings 
and events in both sites almost immediately. My objectives were several. First, I wanted 
to document the venues, days, and times of collective action in order to develop an 
observation strategy (Cromley 1999:72) that I would later employ to document the 
decision-making power and the distribution of project benefits (Mosse 2005, 1998; 
Salmen 2002, 1987) and division of labor in mingas (Ortiz 1994). Second, I wanted to be 
able to draft sensible questions about the different forms and frequencies of participation 
in mingas and village meetings. Finally, I saw my participation as a sort of reciprocal 
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exchange with my study participants. I would contribute at least as many hours of labor 
as I asked of my participants. 
My first meeting with the Manzano community and leadership was the very next 
day after I arrived in Penipe. I had been informed that there was a meeting of the Junta 
Parroquial and that Bernardo, Manzano’s Cabildo President, and many other Manzano 
residents would be there. When I entered the room, Bernardo leapt to his feet and ran to 
hug me, welcoming me back to Penipe and Puela Parish. After I observed what was a 
very contentious meeting that served as a quick primer on current issues in Manzano and 
Puela Parish, Bernardo and I, along with several others from Manzano, met in a separate 
room in the Junta Parroquial building. I explained my study and objectives and asked for 
everyone’s permission to work in Manzano and was told that I would have everyone’s 
full support. I asked when and where they were doing mingas and meetings these days. 
They said that mingas were infrequent, due to funding issues and the politics of the 
irrigation canal, but they would organize one in two weeks, where I could get started with 
my study and present my project to the rest of the community. Two weeks later, I came to 
the minga, clearing brush on a hillside, and Bernardo called on everyone to sit in a circle 
and hear my research plans. I told everyone that I was interested in studying inter-
household exchanges and community organization and that I wanted their permission to 
attend community meetings and events, interview one adult from each household, and 
work on community mingas. I asked for a show of hands from those who were willing to 
participate and all raised their hands. 
I met with Angel, the Pusuca’s Directiva President, just after I returned from my 
first meeting with Bernardo at the Junta Parroquial. He told me that they were having 
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their monthly General Assembly meeting the following Saturday and, since attendance by 
each household was mandatory, it would be an excellent opportunity to present my study 
to the community. Angel put me on the agenda the following Saturday and, as in 
Manzano, I explained my intention to study inter-household exchanges and community 
organization. I then asked for permission to attend meetings and events, interview one 
adult from each household, and work on community mingas. The response, once I 
mentioned my interest in working on mingas each week, was a fierce round of applause 
that culminated in a standing ovation. Fieldwork started off far better than I could have 
hoped. 
Archival Data 
Minga organizers and village council leaders throughout the Andes are notorious 
list keepers (Colloredo-Mansfield 2009). Leaders or their delegates (usually council 
secretaries) are known for keeping meticulous lists of who does and does not attend each 
minga and cabildo meeting. I therefore began my fieldwork by visiting the cabildo 
presidents in each site and, after explaining my research goals and reasons for selecting 
each community and receiving their permission to proceed, I asked each of the two 
presidents to share their attendance lists with me so that I could draw a sample of 
participants. In both sites, I first sat with the presidents and their wives and made a list of 
each household and then asked them to indicate the primary residence of each household 
(i.e., do they primarily reside in Manzano/Pusuca or elsewhere?) and the best days, times, 
and locations to find them. I then made copies of the minga and council lists provided to 
me by each president and entered these into an Excel spreadsheet. These lists, I thought, 
would not only help me to draw a sample, but would also serve as an additional source of 
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data to complement my interview and observation data on household participation in 
mingas.  
As I entered the data, I immediately noticed two things about these lists that 
affected my ability to use them to draw a sample. First, lists in both sites tended to name 
only the head of each household, regardless of whether or not the head-of-household had 
actually attended; that is, although a wife, son, daughter, or peon might have attended the 
meeting, the lists credited the household for attendance without indicating who, 
specifically, had actually attended. Secondly, Pusuca leaders kept much more meticulous 
lists and records than leaders in Manzano. Pusuca, being a young resettlement community 
with a host of by-laws and formal procedures for participation requirements as well as 
record-keeping had much more reliable lists. I needed further information in order to 
draw my sample, so decided to add minga and meeting attendance to my key informant 
interview agenda. 
 
Key Informant Interviews 
Unstructured interviews with knowledgeable key informants form a critical part 
of the iterative data collection strategies of most ethnographic research (Bernard 
2011:213; Johnson 1990:24-29). In order to develop appropriate and reliable questions 
for structured interviews, it is first necessary to collect information on study domains that 
will ensure that structured interview questions will speak directly to respondents’ 
knowledge and experiences (Bernard 2011:202-203; Johnson 1990:29). My objectives 
were to obtain reliable data on who participates in mingas and meetings from each 
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household, what items were commonly exchanged in each site, and what development 
projects were carried out in each site. 
Although the attendance lists I collected in each site proved to be unreliable 
sources of the specific members of each household who typically attended mingas and 
meetings, it was relatively easy to collect these data by conducting two short key 
informant interviews in each site. Since cabildo presidents were frequently most likely to 
take stock of who does and does not attend, I returned to meet with each of them. In each 
case, the presidents and I reviewed the lists together and they indicated which member or 
members of each household typically attended mingas and meetings. While these 
interviews produced more reliable lists than I could have gleaned from the attendance 
lists, I was concerned that relying too heavily on one powerful gatekeeper in each site 
might introduce unwanted biases into my sample (Bernard 2011:152). I therefore elected 
to repeat this list-making exercise with additional informants in each site. I also decided 
that it would be best to speak with women after first obtaining information from the male 
presidents of each village. In Manzano, I met with the cabildo secretary and another 
woman I knew to be a regular participant in all Manzano events. In Pusuca, I also 
selected the female secretary of the irrigation committee and another woman I knew to be 
active in all community affairs. Somewhat unexpectedly, there was almost unanimous 
agreement between the presidents and the women in each site. In most cases, the women 
merely added more options for each household, often indicating that a husband and wife 
tend to alternate, or that while the father tended to attend meetings, his son would usually 
work on the mingas. I now had the data necessary to select the appropriate respondent 
from each household for my structured interview. Since men were overrepresented on the 
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lists in both sites, particularly in Manzano, where the lists indicated that both men and 
women attended from a given household, I selected the woman for participation. 
The next key informant interviews focused on finding out what development 
projects had been carried out in each site in the past two years. I first consulted with the 
presidents of each village. I then met with the head of the Municipal Development Office 
and then the National Comisario in Penipe. I further consulted with the Esquel 
Foundation’s delegate representative in Pusuca. I decided to focus only on projects that 
had already been carried out, since project inclusion would be less ambiguous. In 
contrast, it would have been more difficult to determine inclusion in the Pusuca irrigation 
canal, where construction was in progress. In all, I identified four project benefits or 
benefit categories for each site: 
 Manzano – food rations from the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion 
(MIES), animal feed rations from the Ministry of Agriculture, Farming, and Fisheries 
(MAGAP), subsidized tractor service from the Junta Parroquial of Puela, and 
inclusion in any agricultural extension projects carried out by different state and non-
government organizations. 
 Pusuca – food rations from MIES, animal feed rations from MAGAP, inclusion in 
any of several NGO-sponsored greenhouse projects, and inclusion in any agricultural 
extension projects carried out by different state non-government organizations. 
The final step was to interview people in both sites and to ask them what items 
and services they exchanged with others in their respective communities in order to 
develop a reliable set of exchange items and services for a structured interview 
(Schweizer 1997). Because I was concerned about a representative list of items and 
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services, I needed to be strategic in my selection of informants. Based on Guest et al. 
(2006), I decided to aim for “saturation,” which involves repeating interviews with a 
homogenous pool of informants until you reach a point where you are adding little or no 
new variation in your domains. In a homogenous sample (typically by gender and site or 
context), one should expect to achieve saturation after approximately 6-8 interviews (cf. 
Guest et al. 2006). I therefore began by interviewing men and women of different ages in 
each site and asking them to name the different items that they or their neighbors might 
exchange with one another. For the domain of inter-household exchange, I found that I 
achieved theme saturation in Manzano after six interviews and in Pusuca after five. In 
Manzano, I interviewed three women and three men of varying age and in Pusuca three 
woman and two men. The resulting exchange domains were identical for each 
community: a) meals, or prepared food; b) raw produce; c) moneylending; d) lending 
tools; e) randimpa, an Andean practice of reciprocal labor exchange; f) peon labor, or 
paid day laborers (see chapter 5); g) childcare. These became the exchange categories 
included in my structured interview and they are described in greater detail in the 
following chapter. I ultimately eliminated childcare because, unlike the other categories, 
not every household had an equal opportunity to engage in childcare exchanges (e.g., 
childless and elderly households). They yielded an ideal range of both material and 
service exchanges and would allow me to compare the giving and receiving of each. Each 
household would be asked if they had exchanged (given or received) any of these items 
with each household in their respective sites in the past year.  
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Phase Two: Structured Interviews 
Hiring a Field Assistant 
I knew it would be difficult to administer 40 structured interviews in Pusuca and 
52 in Manzano on my own, in addition to my participant observation objectives, so 
before entering the field I decided to hire a field assistant. I opted against hiring a local, 
since my interview questions involved perceptions of power and fairness that I feared my 
respondents would not answer candidly to a local. I therefore reached out to several 
universities and posted job announcements on several Ecuadorian blogs for travelers and 
volunteers. The universities offered no contacts and after interviewing, via Skype, several 
applicants from the blog posts, I settled on Roberta, a recent graduate of a Master’s 
program in Education from Philadelphia. Roberta was fluent in Spanish and had majored 
in international development as an undergrad and spent four months in highland Ecuador 
doing research for her senior thesis. She was now hoping to return to Ecuador for a year 
to travel and hopefully build professional experience. I offered her a monthly stipend for 
three months, which was part of my budget from my PERI Dissertation Fellowship, and 
free lodging in the house I was renting in Penipe in exchange for five days work per 
week, which entailed conducting at least three interviews per day and entering her 
interview data in Excel.  
Roberta arrived in early September and I gave her two weeks to get to know 
Penipe while I conducted my archival research and key informant interviews and drafted 
and field tested the structured interview. Roberta accompanied me as I field-tested the 
final interview with three participants outside of my sample. Then, as I began 
administering the tested and revised instrument, I gradually let Roberta take over the 
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administration of each part of the interview until I observed that she was capable of 
administering it on her own. Although Roberta would go on to administer a majority of 
the structured interviews, I continued to conduct many myself, as I wanted to be involved 
in each phase of the research. 
The Structured Interview 
The first part of the structured interview elicited information on reciprocal 
exchanges between each household, as these data were central to all four of my 
hypotheses. Observations alone could not necessarily establish such a definitive 
correlation between power and reciprocal exchange relations, as it would be virtually 
impossible to observe and record such a quantity and diversity of exchanges. Using the 
sample I derived in phase one, Roberta and I administered structured interviews to one 
adult from each household in Pusuca (n=40) and Manzano (n=52). The structured 
interview draws on specific examples derived from key informant interview data 
collected earlier. The interview addresses reciprocity using a social network analysis tool 
that presents respondents with a list of specific exchange items and asks them to indicate 
whether or not they have exchanged (given and/or received) particular items or categories 
(e.g., food, tools, etc.) with a list of each household in the group and to indicate the nature 
(e.g. kin, neighbor, friend, etc.) of their relationship with each (Mayer 2002, 1974; 
Schweizer 1997; Mitchell 1991). For reference, the exchange portion of the interview has 
been included in Appendix A. This portion of the interview generated the following 
individual level, interval-ratio variables developed for the analysis of exchange relations 
by Freeman (1979) calculated for each individual’s exchanges of material and labor 
separately (Mitchell 1991; Mayer 1974):  
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 in-degree centrality – the ratio of total number of services or material items 
received to the maximum possible number of opportunities to receive services or 
material items from the group through reciprocity and collective action  
 out-degree centrality – the ratio of total services or material items provided to 
the maximum possible number of opportunities to provide services or material 
items from the group through reciprocity and collective action 
 degree centrality – the ratio of respondents’ reported to maximum possible 
reciprocal relations of any kind with the group, which is essentially a measure of 
their overall exchange ties with the group in any given category, regardless of 
whether the item or service is given or received 
These centrality measures were calculated for each of the four items and two 
services referenced in the exchange portion of the structured interview. Since I am also 
interested in each household’s overall participation in all exchanges, I also calculated 
each of the three centrality measures for each household’s total exchanges. This allowed 
for a great deal of flexibility in examining the patterned flows of exchanges. I only 
included items and services confirmed by both parties to the exchange. That is, when 
only one household claims they gave an item to another household, it is only included if 
the other household reported receiving that item. This approach was chosen as a means to 
control for informant accuracy, which can often be problematic with exchange elicitation 
(Bernard et al. 1984). By relying on only those exchanges confirmed by both parties, I 
can be more confident in the reliability of the data. 
Because my third hypothesis (H3) concerns the extent to which powerful actors 
and their allies receive greater shares of development benefits than other members of the 
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study groups, I needed to find a systematic way to map allegiances in the group. The 
network exchange data allowed me to do this by calculating another kind of centrality 
measure, eigenvector centrality, which measures the extent to which actors in a network 
are connected to other highly-connected actors (Bonacich 2007; Hanneman and Riddle 
2005:157). 
The second part of the interview presented respondents with questions on various 
topics related to the study. First, because I wanted to complement official minga 
attendance records with respondent accounts, respondents were asked to report on the 
frequency of the participation and absence from mingas and to provide open-ended 
explanations for each (H1 and H2). Second, because I was interested in the extent to 
which certain actors were central in brokering access to development resources (H3), 
respondents were asked to name who in their communities they would consult in order to 
learn of opportunities with outside institutions. The number of times each household was 
named as a source of access to outside organizations was recorded as a brokerage score. 
Respondents were asked to indicate who in their village had the most influence in 
deciding village affairs, such as minga projects and who does what work in mingas, and 
development projects (H3a). Questions ask respondents for their perceptions of the 
degree to which group decisions reflect the respondent's interests or are dominated by 
other actors or groups of actors. They were also asked about the benefits of participating, 
if they felt that they benefitted from mingas, and who, if anyone, benefitted more or less 
(H3b). Respondents were then asked whether they received specific relief aid or were 
included in particular development projects (H3b) (Salmen 2002, 1987). Finally, the 
interview elicited basic household demographic and socioeconomic data based on an 
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asset inventory model used in rural development studies, including occupations of 
household members (H1) (Jones 2003), productive assets (land, animals, equipment, 
etc.), and general household items and amenities (Pant 2007; Bebbington 1999).  
Phase Three: Strategic Observation 
According to Bernard (2011:150), participant observation must always be 
strategic. Participant observation is often a necessary component of anthropological 
fieldwork because anthropology has long been concerned with investigating what people 
actually do in addition to what they say (Bernard 2011:145; Bourdieu 1990, 1977). This 
phase of data collection began with my exploratory participant observation in phase one 
and continued throughout the entire period of fieldwork. Upon first entering the field, 
most anthropological methods manuals stress the need to employ exploratory, or open-
ended, observation techniques in order to develop familiarity with the research site and 
begin to build relationships upon arriving (Bernard 2011; Schensul et al. 1999). A 
common recommendation is to begin by mapping the social and spatial environment or 
scene, observing and recording public behavior, and eliciting feedback and information 
from chance informants (Bernard 2011; Bestor 2002; Trotter 1999; Schensul et al.1999). 
It is often difficult to understand what is significant in the initial stages of participant 
observation, so it is common for research manuals to emphasize recording as much detail 
as possible and with minimal interpretation (Bernard 2011:181; Schensul et al.1999:96).  
The purpose of these exercises is to orient the researcher to his surroundings; to begin 
developing relationships and a framework for interpreting behavior, including the spatial 
distribution of property, institutions, activity, structural and infrastructural features of the 
research site, and; to elicit information that can be drawn upon at later stages of the 
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project (Bernard 2011:144; Schensul et al. 1999:102-113). As data accumulate, the 
ethnographer can begin to engage in a constant comparison of variables in order to 
inform each succeeding stage of the research process and develop increased proficiency 
in the interpretation of situations and relationships.  
The first strategic aspect of observation is to locate and enter the sites of the 
behavior the researcher is interested in. As mentioned in the sampling section above, I 
worked on nine mingas in Manzano and twenty in Pusuca. I attended eleven meetings of 
the Manzano Cabildo, eight meetings of the Junta Parroquial of Puela, approximately 
fifteen sessions of various sub-committees in Manzano and Puela (e.g. irrigation, potable 
water, fiesta planning, etc.), and seven meetings of the residents of the MIDUVI homes in 
the Penipe resettlement. In Pusuca, I attended all four monthly General Assembly 
meetings that took place during the time I was in the field. I also attended eighteen 
different meetings of sub-committees in Pusuca (e.g. irrigation, potable water, ad hoc 
emergency sessions, etc.). I participated in and observed a number of instances and 
contexts that were representative of at least the time period of my research. 
The second component of strategic observation is determining what to record and 
how to go about doing so (Bernard 2011:146). Because I was interested in who 
participates in mingas and I felt that village record keeping (especially in Manzano) was 
unreliable on its own, I took care to take attendance at each event I attended, often adding 
people as they trickled in after mingas or meetings had begun. I was also interested in 
how power was exercised in these contexts (H3).  
When researching development contexts, Lewis (2005) and Mosse (2005; Lewis 
and Mosse 2006) recommends examining the ways in which power is exercised in 
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negotiations by documenting the decision-making process. They advocate careful 
attention to who sets decision-making agendas, who participates and how, and whose 
contributions to the decision-making process triumph and whose are marginalized. There 
may also be degrees of control and domination at work in these contexts (Mosse 2007). 
Certain actors may include some in the distribution of resources while excluding others 
and more powerful actors may be able to command the behavior of others (Narotzky and 
Moreno 2002).  
In each minga and meeting I attended, I documented the actors, processes and 
sequences of interactions—focusing on suggestions, interests, values, problems, 
strategies of action presented, and which concepts, decisions and interests prevail (Long 
2001; Mosse 1998; Schweizer 1997). At the end of each day, I typed up my fieldnotes 
into detailed profiles of each event and day (Bernard 2011:365). My observations at 
meetings focused on patterns of political influence by noting who spoke, what positions 
were taken, and what positions prevailed in order to develop detailed portraits of power 
relations and decision-making processes. While participating in mingas, I noted these 
same factors, but also kept track of the division of labor, noting who assigned and 
performed different tasks and what volume of work was performed by each. During 
mingas, I also took note of who helped whom with their tasks and who shared food and 
tools in order to complement my interview data on reciprocal exchange. 
I also frequently visited with all of my informants and village leaders in both sites 
and often accompanied leaders and others as they recruited participants in mingas and 
meetings. I was therefore able to observe how minga labor and political participation 
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were organized and to discover things I had not anticipated, such as the role of outside 
organizations in the organization of mingas.  
As I typed up my fieldnotes into detailed profiles of each event, I recorded who 
was present, what was done, how things were done, and who spoke about what. I focused 
on who set agendas, whose asserted opinions in decision-making, and whose opinions 
prevailed (Mosse 2005). I also created detailed profiles of the minga recruitment process, 
which was often in the context of village meetings in Pusuca, but was more informal in 
Manzano, where the Cabildo President would go door-to-door recruiting participants in 
the resettlements. Using these detailed case descriptions, I was able to produce “a 
credible, rigorous, and authentic story” (Fetterman 2010:1) of exchange practices, 
political processes, and the organization of mingas in both sites.  
Data Coding Process 
After typing my fieldnotes into word processing software, I then imported them 
into MAXQDA, a software package for coding and analyzing qualitative data. I then 
developed an inductive content coding system based on the core domains of reciprocity 
and participation (Mayer 2002, 1974; Mitchell 1991), political influence (Mosse 1998; 
Schweizer 1997), benefit allocation (Lewis and Mosse 2006; Salmen 2002), and 
emergent themes (Altheide 1987) to generate searchable meta-categories for exploring 
connections between variable domains during fieldwork (cf. Lyon 2002; Fischer et 
al.1996). This approach to fieldnote management and coding was an invaluable aid in the 
discovery of themes in my data, which further enabled me to produce robust descriptive 
analyses and, where appropriate, derive qualitative and ordinal variables that measured 
variation in the core domains of interest. 
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I entered reciprocal exchange data from structured interviews into UCINET 6 
(Borgatti et al. 1999) software in order to generate interval-ratio measures of in-degree 
centrality, out-degree centrality, degree centrality, and eigenvector centrality for each 
individual respondent (Opsahl et al. 2010; Bonacich 2007; Freeman 1979). Centrality 
measures were generated for the categories of materials and labor, as well as for each 
specific exchange item or service elicited in the interview that was confirmed by both 
households. I then exported these variables to SPSS to test for differential and combined 
effects on dependent variables (Driscoll et al. 2007). Benefit distribution and perceived 
influence variables included binary indicators of the receipt of aid and project inclusion, 
and Likert-scale ratings of perceived benefits of collective action (Salmen 2002, 1987) 
and perceived influence on collective decisions (Lubell et al. 2009). Respondents’ site of 
primary residence was also collected in the structured interview and, using GoogleEarth, 
a desktop mapping tool, I was able to generate continuous distances between the research 
communities (where mingas took place) and each respondent’s primary residence. 
Sociodemographic data were measured by degree of household involvement in wage 
labor (Jones 2003) based on the number of employed adults, as well as primary 
production based on land, animals, and labor involved. Gender was included as a variable 
in all analytical procedures, and combined household employment and assets were used 
to control for wealth (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). 
In order to test hypothesis 3a, it was necessary to convert observations of 
influence in decision-making in the two study sites to ordinal quantitative variables 
amenable to statistical analysis. This is a common approach that arguably reduces the 
quality of qualitative data (Bernard 1996), but this quality is not lost when analyses are 
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complemented by ethnographic description, as I do in the ethnographic setting and 
discussion chapters. In order to measure influence, I developed three general categories 
of attendance, participation, and agenda-setting/decision-change. For each meeting I 
observed in each site, I recorded the presence or absence of each household in the village 
(attendance). I likewise noted who spoke or offered opinions on each topic discussed 
(participation). Finally, I noted when each individual’s (as representatives of their 
households) participation produced an agenda item for decision-making or else 
contributed to the taking or changing of a specific decision or course of action for the 
group (agenda-setting/decision change). Each of these factors was tallied by household in 
a roster for each meeting. I then converted these tallies to an ordinal scale that 
corresponded to the scales of influence elicited of respondents in the semi-structured 
interview: never/almost never (0), sometimes (1), and almost always (2). The first value 
of “never/almost never referred” to household scores of 10 percent or less in each 
category. The second value of “sometimes” referred to household scores greater than 10 
percent and less than or equal to 60 percent in each category. The third value of almost 
always referred to household scores greater than 60 percent in each category. The final 
influence score was a composite of all three sub-categories of attendance, participation, 
and agenda-setting/decision-change (0-6). While this measure was relied upon for 
analyzing the relationship between reciprocal exchange participation and political 
influence (H3a), it is important to note that this measure was not the only factor 
employed in interpreting political influence in the study sites. The ethnographic setting 
and discussion chapters rely heavily on fieldnotes and observations about the decision-
making process in each site that serve to contextualize and explain these dynamics. 
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Analyses 
Procedures for data coding and analysis were guided by my research questions 
and hypotheses and draw upon multiple sources of data strategically collected at each 
stage of data collection. All data were entered into SPSS and hypotheses were 
subsequently evaluated using two primary strategies. The first was descriptive and the 
second, statistical. In the first part of the results chapter, I draw on my extensive 
fieldnotes drawn from participant observation of mingas, reciprocal exchange practices, 
and political contexts to present ethnographic descriptions of each, against which I 
evaluate the assumptions of each hypothesis. The second, statistical strategy is an 
iterative approach to the exploration and confirmation or rejection of expected 
relationships between variables in each hypothesis. This begins with means comparisons 
using independent t-tests and analysis of variance to explore for significant associations 
between variables and to examine the extent to which the relationships are linear, curved, 
or parabolic (Thompson 2006), although relationships are expected to be linear.  
If means comparisons did not indicate a significant association between variables, 
no further analysis was performed and the statistical test of the hypothesis was rejected. 
Where significant associations were detected, I proceeded by conducting correlation and 
regression procedures to test the strength and direction of the variable correlations 
(Greenfield et al. 1998). Where appropriate, I employed non-parametric (Kruskall Wallis, 
ordinal regression) tests of significance, where data did not exhibit normal distribution 
(Thompson 2006). Where I observed non-linear relationships, I performed appropriate 
data transformations and selected alternative tests. For example, in some cases 
relationships appeared curvilinear because of extreme high and low values, but this 
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variation was compressed by converting the data into natural logs (Thompson 2006:405-
406), a very simple procedure in SPSS. Another alternative was to use Spearman’s R, a 
non-parametric correlation which tests only the ordinal association between variables 
(Thompson 2006:118-121). Each analysis is presented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: STUDY RESULTS 
 In this chapter, I present the results of the analyses conducted to test study 
hypotheses. After first presenting my hypotheses, the first portion of the chapter provides 
descriptive definitions of three key domains of analysis. Although they are described in 
the ethnographic setting chapter, I provide concise descriptions of mingas, reciprocal 
exchange practices, and the decision-making contexts that are examined as a part of the 
analytical procedures involved in testing study hypotheses. The next section of the 
chapter reports on the statistical tests of study hypotheses, which are complemented by 
qualitative data collected in the interview process.  
The presentation of analyses and findings follows the same pattern for each 
hypothesis. I begin with an explanation of the hypothesis, followed by a description of 
the variables employed in the evaluation of each hypothesis. Analyses are then presented 
in the order in which they were conducted, beginning with simple exploratory analyses of 
the relationships between the variables in the model and then proceeding to appropriate 
correlation and regression models where applicable. This is followed by interpretations of 
results and ethnographic descriptions of observed relationships of the key domains in 
each hypothesis. 
Three Domains of Analysis: Reciprocity, Mingas, and Decision-Making 
 In order to provide a clear understanding of the terms and concepts being 
examined in the hypotheses, I provide succinct descriptions of the three principal 
152 
 
domains involved in the analytical procedures that follow. These are reciprocity, mingas, 
and decision-making contexts. 
Forms of Reciprocity in Manzano and Pusuca 
 Exchange practices in Manzano and Pusuca have very much in common, such 
that it is possible to discuss them together in one section. Upon first arriving in Penipe in 
August 2011, I conducted key informant interviews to collect information on the items 
exchanged in each village. After conducting eleven interviews—six in Manzano and five 
in Pusuca—I had a redundant list of four materials and three services commonly 
exchanged in each community. These were meals or prepared food, raw produce, 
moneylending, lending tools, randimpa (“labor reciprocity”), peon labor, and childcare.  
The first material exchange was that of meals, or prepared food, which was cited 
by respondents in both sites as the most common exchange item. In both communities, it 
was common to offer plates of food to neighbors and kin or to invite them into one’s 
home for a sit-down meal. Frequently, folks in both sites would share la tonga (packed 
lunch) during mingas, where people would sit in circles and serve themselves from the 
small pots of food that others brought with them. These exchanges were of a more 
generalized type of reciprocity, ostensibly charitable gestures where no strict accounts of 
debt were kept and recipients were not expected to reciprocate within a given timeframe. 
However, habitual failure to reciprocate could result in gossip and the deterioration of 
relationships. Additionally, peons are provided 2-3 meals per day, in addition to their 
cash payments. 
The next material exchange was raw produce, which respondents in both sites 
reported sharing, typically at harvest time when produce was in abundance. There were 
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both generalized and balanced forms of produce exchange reciprocity. In the more 
generalized variety, people would simply share token quantities of a harvest as a gesture 
of friendship or goodwill, as with prepared food. At other times, people would contribute 
produce to festive occasions, donating food items to feed a band or distinguished guests 
at a fiesta or formal event. In the more balanced variety of produce exchange reciprocity, 
people might offer a portion of their yield to those who provide help in the harvest, or 
make typically short-term loans of animal feed to kin or neighbors experiencing a 
shortage. 
Moneylending was cited by all but one of the eleven respondents as something 
that might be exchanged by kin or neighbors, though it was more common among kin 
than non-kin. These small loans could be generalized or balanced, which usually 
depended on the amount of the loan. Several respondents pointed out that money was 
rarely lent in significant quantities. Instead, someone might lend a neighbor bus fare or 
enough for a small purchase at a local store, and these frequent small loans would take 
place between typically close relations who might spontaneously offer to pay each other’s 
bus fare or a beverage or treat at a local store. Sometimes “debts” would be repaid only 
when the original lender needed a loan from the original borrower; until then, they would 
remain open and unclaimed. In other cases, where relationships were less close or when 
the amount lent was more significant (e.g., >$20), people would keep better accounts of 
loans and debts, expecting them to be repaid within a given timeframe. I knew of several 
instances in each site where one household lent another several hundred dollars and 
established a fixed repayment schedule. However, there were also cases where people 
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would “loan” money to the poorest households in the village for foodstuffs and children’s 
clothing and not expect to be repaid. 
It was very common for people to loan herramientas de campo (“field tools”), 
such as hoes, picks, shovels, wheelbarrows, and hatchets, which were present in 
practically every household. This could be when a neighbor had recruited a work party 
(paid or volunteer) to tend to their fields and did not have enough tools of their own to 
supply their laborers. At other times, people lent less common tools, such as chainsaws 
and tractors. In all cases, these tools were lent merely for the day or perhaps for the 
duration of a task that might take several days. Though the tools were always expected to 
be returned in a given timeframe, these exchanges were typically part of a generalized 
reciprocal exchange repertoire, where the parties involved would also do favors for one 
another or periodically exchange food and raw produce. 
Randimpa is an Andean practice of reciprocal labor exchange that resembles what 
many people have described elsewhere as minga. Randimpa is a balanced form of 
reciprocity, in which one day of labor is expected to be repaid by one day of labor, 
though the intervals between exchanges might vary. A man may work on another man’s 
field for a day’s randimpa, but he may not call on his partner to labor on his field 
immediately after. Instead, he will wait until he has a need to call in his randimpa credit. 
However, the exchanges tend to be somewhat immediate, as most households experience 
the need for labor inputs beyond what they can sustain internally during the same periods 
(i.e. planting, plowing, and harvest). When I first inquired about randimpa in the villages, 
many people told me the practice was in decline as people could no longer spare the time 
to repay randimpa labor in the past. One informant told me that if he had twelve people 
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work his land one day, he would then be tied up working for twelve days for the others 
and could not attend to his own work. When I shared this with another informant, she 
laughed and said “what more do you have left to do this week once you’ve had twelve 
people work your land?” In my key informant interviews that preceded the structured 
interview on exchanges, I asked each of them to tell me the last time they engaged in 
randimpa and each said it was within the last two weeks or one month. However, as my 
participant observation continued, I noticed that those who tended not to engage in 
randimpa were those who were employed at least part time and could not balance one 
work obligation with the other. 
The next service exchange reported and observed in the study sites was peon 
labor. Peon is paid labor, but almost always based on personal relationships—often 
kinship. It is virtually unheard of to hire a stranger as a peon. Instead, these are 
relationships that typically span years, if not generations, with a given family consistently 
hiring peons from another specific family. The hiring family typically has landholdings 
and agricultural labor demands in excess of what they can provide within their own 
household and the peon family tends to not have enough land to sustain their household’s 
resource needs through market or subsistence production. Peons may be hired for 
agricultural work or any type of physical labor and, in Pusuca far more than in Manzano, 
they may be hired as surrogate minga labor. Men earn a range of $10 - $13 per day, plus 
two to three meals. Women will earn less, typically about $8 - $10 per day. The pay 
disparities are typically explained by common perception that men perform more work 
than women in the same time period. Also, women tended to be accompanied by their 
(often several) young children, who were also expected to be fed two to three meals. 
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Childcare was another service exchanged between households. Though not 
mentioned in Manzano, or by any of the men in Pusuca, three female informants in 
Pusuca out of the initial eleven interviewed in both sites mentioned childcare as a 
common form of exchange. Usually only among kin or close friends, childcare could 
include babysitting for a day or portion of a day or merely accompanying young children 
to and from school. Childcare was usually for infants or children younger than about six 
years old. It was not mentioned in Manzano, as the population was older and there were 
few children of this age range. In Pusuca, however, several women from female-headed 
households relied on one another to look after each other’s children or accompany them 
to and from school while they worked in the fields or on mingas. 
Mingas in Manzano and Pusuca 
There were two kinds of mingas organized in Manzano and Pusuca—irrigation 
mingas and what were referred to as community mingas—and both had certain distinct 
features in each community (see table 5). Both communities maintained a system of 
rayas (checks) to keep track of participation for both community and irrigation mingas, 
although the raya system was much more strict in irrigation mingas in both communities 
and in Pusuca overall. In both sites, community mingas were organized by the village 
councils (cabildo in Manzano and directiva in Pusuca). In Manzano, irrigation mingas 
were organized by the Irrigation Committee for Parroquia Puela, which organized all six 
villages in the parroquia by notifying the respective cabildos of minga days and times. 
Irrigation mingas in Pusuca were organized jointly by the Directiva and Pusuca’s own 
Irrigation Committee. However, it is important to point out that much of the decision 
making and organizing of Pusuca mingas also took place outside the community. At the 
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time of my field research, all mingas, including community mingas, took place on the 
irrigation canal. The canal was jointly funded by Esquel, the World Bank, and the 
Provincial Council of Chimborazo and they employed engineers who managed work and 
design. The Esquel Foundation also had a community coordinator, Martha, who 
maintained a regular presence in Pusuca and played a key role in administering village 
affairs. Martha and the irrigation engineers set the work schedules on the canal, based on 
the periodic delivery of materials and the progress of construction. Martha and the 
engineers would attend village meetings themselves to lay out schedules and work 
deadlines to the community directly, or else convey these messages through the Directiva 
President or the Irrigation Committee President. 
Table 5. Minga Characteristics in Research Sites 
 Manzano Pusuca 
Community Irrigation Community Irrigation 
Tarea No ¾ day work full day work 
specific task 
completion (e.g., 
10m ditch, haul 50 
sacks of stone) 
Multa No $20 $10 $20 
Frequency every 6-8 weeks 
every 2-4 
weeks weekly weekly 
Organized 
by 
Manzano 
Cabildo 
Parroquia 
Puela 
Irrigation 
Committee 
Directiva 
and/or Esquel 
Representative 
Directiva, Irrigation 
Committee, and/or 
Esquel 
Representative 
Irrigation mingas took place weekly in Pusuca and one or two times per month in 
Manzano. Manzano villagers would work alongside villagers from throughout Puela on 
irrigation mingas, although folks tended to work among others from their own village. 
Men and women generally worked alongside one another doing similar tasks, such as 
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hoeing weeds and growth from along the canal or clearing growth and debris within the 
canal. Cabildo presidents performed similar tasks, but often walked the canal directing 
work and conversing with other leaders. Minga workers would have to work from 8am 
until the work party was called by Irrigation Committee leaders, which was usually 
around 2 or 3pm, in order to earn a raya for the day. A household could earn an extra raya 
for each additional worker on the minga. In contrast, work on irrigation mingas was much 
more regulated in Pusuca. In order to earn a raya, a household had to complete an 
assigned tarea (task), which was usually determined by project engineers. This meant 
that every household had to perform an equal amount of work, not an equal amount of 
time, as in Manzano and Puela. One tarea I participated in involved digging a trench, ten 
meters in length, one meter deep, and a half meter wide. Some of the younger men were 
able to complete this task in half a day, while it took others several days. Other tareas 
were to carry 50 shovelfuls of sand and 50 shovelfuls of rock in grain sacks from 
roadside deposits to work sites 100-200 meters away. Men generally carried 10-12 
shovelfuls per sack, while women and older men would carry 3-6 shovelfuls per sack and 
therefore make two or three times as many trips as the men. In some cases, multiple 
members of the same household would work just to complete one tarea and earn just one 
raya for the job.  
In both sites, households could send peons (hired hands paid an average of $10 
plus two meals per day) as substitute laborers or as extra laborers to double their rayas. In 
both sites, the multa (fine) for non-participation in irrigation mingas was $20 per minga. 
However, households that were atrasados (behind in rayas) were frequently given 
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opportunities to make up for missed days by working extra days or sending multiple 
household members or peons to complete multiple tareas. 
Community mingas are generally more informal in both sites and take place once 
a week in Pusuca and are more ad hoc in Manzano, taking place approximately every 6-8 
weeks. For community mingas in both villages, rayas were assigned for working until the 
entire work party completed a task, not for tareas assigned to each household. In 2011, 
community mingas in Pusuca also worked on the irrigation canal, although I knew them 
to work on other projects in 2009, such as building a community park, or rain catchment 
systems. A community minga working on the irrigation canal in Pusuca would usually 
run from 8am to 4pm and typically involved clearing debris from newly dug trenches 
along the canal or carrying PVC pipes from roadside deposits to work sites deeper in the 
hills. Unlike the regimented irrigation mingas, men would usually take on most of the 
heavy lifting and perform more work than women in community mingas in Pusuca. In 
Manzano, the work day for community mingas was generally shorter than in Pusuca. 
They begin around 8am and generally ran until 1 or 2pm.  
During my time in the field in 2011, I participated in mingas to repair the casa 
comunal (village meeting house), to clear overgrowth from potable water tanks, to repair 
village roads and paths, and to cut and pile brush and timber for a village festival. As in 
community mingas in Pusuca, there was a more noticeable division of labor in Manzano 
community mingas than in irrigation mingas. Men generally worked with tools, while 
women generally worked with their hands. However, unlike in Pusuca, in community 
mingas in Manzano the greater labor burden was often on the women. For example, on 
two mingas to cut and pile brush and timber for village festivals, men worked high on a 
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steep hill with machetes and one or two chainsaws to fell trees and cut branches, while 
women and some children hauled huge bundles of long branches to piles at the bottom. 
The labor of hauling the branches and descending and ascending the hill was far more 
arduous than the work of cutting branches and many women and children sustained 
injuries from jagged stumps and branches in the process. Both villages kept track of rayas 
for community mingas, but only Pusuca had a multa, which at $10 was only half that of 
the irrigation mingas ($20). In Pusuca, people do send peons to work community mingas, 
but this is uncommon in Manzano, as there is no multa. Rayas are more a form of social 
capital in Manzano community mingas and, while there is a social capital facet to rayas in 
Pusuca, there is also a system of penalties for non-participation.  
Decision-Making in Manzano and Pusuca 
The primary source of data on decision making is direct observations of village 
council meetings. In Manzano, this is the Cabildo, whose meetings are ad hoc and take 
place every two to four weeks. In Pusuca, this is the Directiva, whose meetings take place 
on the first Saturday of every month. In addition to the cabildo, Manzano also has a 
Potable Water Committee, a Seguro Campesino Committee (Peasant Insurance), and a 
Caja Comunitaria (community savings and loan), but the affairs of these committees are 
addressed in cabildo meetings. Pusuca too has all of these organizations, except for the 
Seguro Campesino, and their meetings are held apart. Because Irrigation Committee 
meetings, which were held monthly, were attended by all of the community and were an 
important context for decision making at the time of my research, I include observations 
from these meetings as part of my analyses as well.  
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Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 tests the assumption that minga practice is disrupted by transition to 
wage labor and displacement. Specifically, the hypothesis expects that household 
participation in mingas will be negatively associated with wage employment and the 
distance between the study site (Manzano or Pusuca, where mingas took place) and the 
household’s primary residence (H1). Minga participation is measured using minga 
attendance records obtained from village leaders in both sites and minga attendance 
recorded during fieldwork to produce an interval-ratio measure of minga attendance for 
each site. Alternative measures of minga attendance were obtained through key informant 
interviews in each site, where village council secretaries ranked the reliability of each 
household’s minga participation, and from structured interviews, where each respondent 
ranked the reliability of their own household’s minga participation. 
Smallholder primary production accounts for the vast majority of economic 
activity in the study sites and in Penipe Canton overall (see chapter 3 and table 6 below). 
Most adults (69%) in Penipe Canton were primary producers of cultivars or animals 
(47% landholdings < 1ha, 71% < 2ha), and less than half (40%) engaged in wage laborer. 
A significant cohort (20%) was landless dependents of local landlords for access to 
productive land. Nearly half (47%) of households sent some share to market. It is 
possible that resettlement prompted increased market production, but I did not have 
sufficient data to test this. However, most (79%) reported crop sales prior to resettlement, 
although soil contamination from volcanic ash reduced production to meager fractions of 
prior levels.  
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At the time of research, only 8 percent of the population of Chimborazo province 
was employed in private enterprise (INEC 2010). This number jumped to 14 percent 
when public employees are included and to 17 percent when we include agricultural 
employees (e.g., jornaleros) (INEC 2010). Within the rural population of Chimborazo, 
only 3 percent of the rural population was employed in private enterprise, a number that 
increases to 4.5 percent when public employees are included and to 9.5 percent when 
agricultural employees are included (INEC 2010). As Table 6 shows, wage employment 
in Pusuca was proportionally nearly double that of Manzano. 
Table 6. Economic Activity in Research Sites and Canton Penipe in 2011 
  Manzano Pusuca Penipe Canton 
Primary Production (households) 99% 90% 65% 
Wage Employment (adults) 18% (n=25) 32% (n=23) na 
Wage employment data were collected in the structured interviews, in which 
respondents indicated the occupation of each adult member of the household. These data 
were then calculated into two measures. The first is the percent of wage employed adults 
in each household and the second is an ordinal measure of percent of wage employed 
adults. Residential distance data were calculated using GoogleEarth georeferencing 
software to calculate the distances along roads between each study site (where mingas 
took place) and each household’s primary place of residence, as indicated by respondents 
in the structured interviews. These distance measures were then converted to natural logs 
because the data were positively (right) skewed and a natural log helps to normalize the 
data in order to satisfy assumptions of normality required by analytical procedures. 
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Wage Labor and Minga Participation 
The first step in the analyzing the relationship between minga participation and 
wage labor was to conduct an independent t-test to see if mean minga attendance for 
households with no wage employees was significantly different from households with at 
least one wage employee. For Manzano, the t-test failed to reveal a statistically reliable 
difference between mean minga attendance for households with no wage laborers (x̅=2.7, 
s=3.1) and households with at least one wage laborer (x̅=2.4, s=3.7), [t(50) =.303, 
p=.763] in Manzano. I then performed an analysis of variance test for the association 
between mean household minga participation and an ordinal measure of household wage 
employment [(0) none; (1) < 50%; (2) 50% or more] and found no significant association.  
Table 7. Percent Wage Employed by Household 
  Manzano Pusuca 
No Wage Employed 38 20 
<50% Adults in HH Employed 6 4 
≥50% Adults in HH Employed 8 16 
Total 52 40 
In Pusuca, an independent t-test did reveal a statistically reliable difference 
between mean minga attendance for households with no wage laborers (x̅=9.9, s=1.2) and 
households with at least one wage laborer (x̅=7.6, s=2.9), [t(25.2) =3.21, p=.004]. Since 
the t-test revealed a significant difference in mean minga attendance in Pusuca (see figure 
7), I then converted percent of household wage laborers to an ordinal variable [(0) none; 
(1) less than 50%; (2) 50% or more] and conducted an analysis of variance. Again, the 
analysis of variance found a significant difference in mean participation for each of the 
three ordinal categories of wage employment per household [F(2,37)=6.78, p=.003]. 
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Figure 7. Pusuca Mean Minga Participation by Percent Household Employed 
Residential Distance and Minga Participation 
 The next step was to repeat these same exploratory analyses to examine the 
relationship between residential distance (i.e., the traveling distance between a 
respondent’s primary residence and the study sites where mingas took place) and minga 
participation. In Manzano, an independent t-test did not reveal a statistically reliable 
difference between mean minga attendance for households whose primary residence was 
in Manzano (x̅=3.87, s=3.4) and households whose primary residence was outside 
Manzano (x̅=2.2, s=3.1), [t(50) =1.76, p=.085]. An independent t-test of the Pusuca 
dataset revealed a statistically reliable difference between mean minga attendance for 
households whose primary residence was in Pusuca (x̅=10.14, s=1.03) and households 
whose primary residence was outside Pusuca (x̅=8, s=2.8), [t(35) =3.52, p=.001].  
I then recoded residential distance into three equal groups based on the natural log 
of residential distance for each site. The three categories were no distance (0), less than 
three (1), and three or greater (2). Analysis of variance found no significant difference in 
minga participation by ordinal category of residential distance from Manzano. Analysis 
of variance of the Pusuca dataset found a significant difference in mean participation for 
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each of the three ordinal categories of residential distance per household [F(2,37)=4.23, 
p=.022]. Looking at figure 8, we can see a clear pattern of minga participation decreasing 
in each of the two distances from Pusuca. 
 The exploratory analyses of the relationship between mean minga participation, 
household wage employment, and residential distance justifies further correlation 
analysis of the relationships between these variables in Pusuca. Although exploratory 
analyses did not find any significant association between these variables for Manzano, it 
is worth conducting a correlation analyses to test for linear associations that might have 
been missed by t-tests and analysis of variance. I subsequently conducted a Pearson’s r 
correlation to test the strength of the linear association between continuous variables of 
wage employment, residential distance, and minga participation in both sites. In 
Manzano, there was no significant correlation between percent household wage 
employment and minga participation, but there was a significant negative correlation 
between residential distance and minga participation (r= -.473, p<.000). In Pusuca, the 
results were a significant negative correlation with minga participation and percent of 
employed adults per household (r= -.496, p<.001) and a negative correlation with minga 
Figure 8. Pusuca Minga Attendance by Ordinal Distance of Primary Residence 
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participation and residential distance (r= -.518, p=.001). I then conducted a multiple 
linear regression analysis to test the relative weights of association of wage employment 
and residential distance with minga participation in Pusuca, where both independent 
variables were found to be significantly associated. The results of the multiple linear 
regression found that the combined variables of percent household wage employment and 
residential distance accounted for 36 percent of the variation in minga attendance in 
Pusuca. Percent household wage employment [b= -.401, t(39) = -2.77, p=.009] was more 
reliable than residential distance [b= -.33, t(39) = -2.28, p=.028] in predicting household 
minga participation. 
Wage Labor, Residential Distance, and Perceived Reliability of Minga Participation 
The next step was to explore the association of wage labor and residential 
distance with an alternative indicator of minga participation. In the structured interviews, 
each respondent was asked to indicate if they or someone from their household 
participated in mingas “never/almost never,” “sometimes,” or “always/almost always.” 
For the purposes of analysis, these variables were recoded into “reliable attendance” 
(always/almost always) and “unreliable attendance” (never/almost never and sometimes). 
I conducted a logistic regression analysis to predict respondent rankings of their 
own household minga participation using residential distance and household wage 
employment as predictors. Logistic regression is the appropriate procedure when testing 
the association between continuous independent variables (in this case, percent household 
wage employment and residential distance) and a binary dependent variable (in this case 
reliable or unreliable attendance) (Thompson 2006:393-394). A test of the full model 
against a constant only model was statistically significant in Manzano, indicating that the 
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predictors as a set reliably distinguished between self-reporting as reliable or non-reliable 
participants (χ²=11.9, p= .003, df=2). Nagelkerke’s R2 of .273 indicated a weak 
relationship between prediction and grouping. Prediction success overall was 75 percent 
(79% for unreliable and 71% for reliable). The Wald criterion demonstrated that only 
residential distance made a significant contribution (p=.006) to predicting who perceived 
their household as a reliable or non-reliable participant. The EXP(B) value indicates that 
when residential distance is raised by one unit, the odds ratio is .45 times as large and 
therefore householders are .45 more times less likely to report being reliable participants. 
Interestingly, a test of the full model against a constant only model was not statistically 
significant in Pusuca, indicating that the predictors as a set did not reliably distinguish 
between self-reporting as reliable and non-reliable participants (χ²= 1.2, p= .557, df=2).  
Respondent Explanations for Minga Absence 
The final step in analyzing hypothesis one was to explore respondent explanations 
for not participating in mingas. After reporting on their own household’s minga 
participation, interview respondents were asked to explain why they participated, as they 
said, “never/almost never,” “sometimes,” or “always/almost always.” These responses 
were inductively coded in MAXQDA based on observed patterns in the responses. 
Because respondents often cited more than one reason, I allowed for up to three codes for 
each response.  
In all, respondents in both sites indicated a total of six different factors that, at 
least periodically, affected their ability to participate in mingas (see table 8 and figure 9). 
Seven people in Manzano and four people in Pusuca explained that they were at least 
occasionally unable to participate in mingas because their wage employment. In 
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Manzano, thirteen people claimed they did not participate in mingas because they were 
not informed. This theme only emerged in Manzano, where minga recruitment was 
informal and through direct dyadic exchanges, unlike Pusuca, where minga recruitment is 
a formal process. Four people in Manzano and three in Pusuca explained that they were 
often unable to attend mingas because of the distance between their primary residence 
and their respective communities (residential distance). 
Table 8. Reasons for Minga Absence by Self-Reported Participation Rank 
Site  Participation Rank (n) Code (n) 
Manzano 
Never or hardly ever (11) 
Employment (4); Not Informed (4); 
Age/Health (3); Residential Distance 
(2); Farm Work (1) 
Sometimes (13) 
Not Informed (8); Farm Work (3); 
Employment (2); Childcare (2); Not 
Included in Resource (1); Residential 
Distance (1) 
Always or Almost Always (28) Not Informed (1); Employment (1); Residential Distance (1) 
Pusuca 
Never or hardly ever (1) Farm Work (1) 
Sometimes (8) Age/Health (2); Employment (2); Childcare (2); Residential Distance (2) 
Always or Almost Always (31) Employment (2); Residential Distance (1) 
 Some of the less common explanations in the two sites were age or health-related 
issues, the time demands of farm work, and childcare issues. Three respondents in 
Manzano and two in Pusuca cited age and health-related reasons for not being able to 
participate in mingas. Some said they weren’t able to work at all because of advanced age 
or health reasons, while others said that only prevented them from minga work on 
occasion. In Pusuca, where tareas could often be quite arduous, the two respondents who 
cited age and health reasons for not attending said it was only on those days when the 
169 
 
tareas were most grueling, such as ditch digging and carrying heavy materials. On these 
days, they said, they would send kin or peons in their stead. Farm work was mentioned 
four times in Manzano and once in Pusuca, where respondents indicated that they were 
unable to participate in mingas due to the labor demands on their own land, which could 
be with either their crops or their animals. Finally, two female respondents in each 
community stated that childcare responsibilities prevented them from participating in 
mingas at times. 
Figure 9. Frequency of Respondent Reasons for Minga Absence by Site 
 
Gender in Hypothesis One 
Several analyses were conducted to test the influence of gender on the variation of 
the variables in hypothesis one. Analyses tested the association between gender and wage 
employment at the individual level and several household-level variables, including 
residential distance, percent wage employment, and minga participation based on whether 
or not households were headed by males or females. Although there was a greater 
number of employed men (n=15) than women (n=10) in Manzano, a chi-square test of the 
goodness-of-fit of the model that expects men to have significantly greater wage 
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employment was not significant [X2(1, n=140) =0.51, p=.514]. In Pusuca, there was a 
greater difference between the number of employed men (n=17) than women (n=6), 
which was a significant in a chi-square goodness-of-fit test [X2(1, n=73) =7.25, p=.007]. 
Subsequent analyses tested the association of wage employment, residential 
distance, and minga participation based upon two independent variables: a) gender of 
primary respondent in semi-structured interview; b) gender of head of household. In 
order to test the association of these variables, I conducted both parametric (t-test) and 
non-parametric (Kruskall Wallis) tests of association. There was no significant difference 
in wage employment, residential distance, or minga participation by gender of respondent 
or head-of-household in either site. 
Summary of Findings for Hypothesis One 
As anticipated by the hypothesis, wage employment and residential distance were 
negatively associated with records of minga participation in Pusuca. In Manzano, 
however, wage employment was not significantly associated with records of minga 
participation, but there was a significant negative correlation between residential distance 
and minga participation. Interestingly, when testing the association of residential distance 
and household wage employment with self-reported minga participation, we find that 
household employment and residential distance are significantly negatively associated 
with respondent perceptions of their own minga attendance in Manzano, but not in 
Pusuca. The explanation (as will be discussed more fully in the next chapter) for the 
difference between the model relationships in the two sites perhaps lies in the reasons 
provided by the informants themselves. Not being informed of mingas was cited by 
thirteen respondents as their primary reason for not participating in mingas in Manzano, 
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which is consistent with ethnographic observations discussed in the following chapter. 
Interestingly, though they did not emerge as significant variables in statistical tests of 
records of minga participation in Manzano, wage employment is the second most 
commonly reported reason for not participating and residential distance is reported by 
another four respondents, suggesting that these are indeed factors that affect minga 
participation. In Pusuca, the primary reasons provided by respondents for not 
participating in mingas were wage employment and residential distance. Finally, although 
males exhibited a significantly higher rate of wage employment than females in Pusuca, 
there was no significant statistical difference between male and female rates of wage 
employment in Manzano. Furthermore, gender of respondent and head-of-household was 
not significantly associated with residential distance, percent of household wage 
employment, or minga participation in either site. 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 tests the assumption that mingas are forms of reciprocity (exchange 
labor) in which laborers are continuously recruited by leaders through conspicuous 
giving. This hypothesis will be tested by examining the extent to which household 
participation in mingas is positively associated with the degree of household exchange 
relations with group overall (H2).  
In designing this study, I expected exchange categories to be independent, which 
would enable me to measure differences in the flows of materials and services. However, 
I found that, with very few exceptions, exchange categories were strongly correlated, 
which prevents me from using multiple exchange variables as independent variables in 
analysis (see Appendix B for a correlation matrix). As a result, I only employ measures 
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of total exchanges (i.e., all material and services given and received) and cannot 
statistically evaluate the extent to which receiving material items through exchange 
contributes to minga participation any more or less than giving or receiving other forms 
of exchange. I do, however, examine the relationship between minga participation and 
exchange participation overall. 
The measure I employ of exchange participation is the total number of 
exchanges—given and received, service and material—confirmed by both parties to the 
exchange. That is, when only one household claims they gave an item to another 
household, it is only included if the other household reported receiving that item. This 
approach was chosen as a means to control for informant accuracy, which can often be 
problematic with social network methods (Bernard et al. 1984). By relying on only those 
exchanges confirmed by both parties, I can be more confident in the reliability of the 
data, although this does slightly reduce the total number of exchanges in the model 
because non-confirmed exchanges are eliminated. 
Exploratory Analysis of Variables 
In order to first explore the relationship between minga participation and 
exchange participation, I conducted an analysis of variance of minga participation by 
percentile group of total exchange participation. The results were significant for Manzano 
[F(4,47)=7.3, p<.001] (see figure 10), but not for Pusuca [F(4,35)=.283, p=.887].  
The next step was to conduct a Pearson r correlation to test the relationship 
between minga participation and total exchange participation. The results were 
significant for Manzano (r=.478, p<.0001), but not for Pusuca (r=.173, p=.284). 
Following this, I conducted a linear regression for Manzano and found that total 
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household exchange participation [b= .478, t(51) = 3.85, p< .001] was a reliable predictor 
of household minga participation and accounted for 21 percent of variation in minga 
attendance. Linear regression was not conducted for Pusuca because there was no linear 
correlation between minga participation and exchange participation. 
Figure 10. Manzano Minga Participation by Percentile Group of Total Exchange 
 
Exchange Participation and Perceived Reliability of Minga Participation 
The next step was to explore the association of exchange participation with the 
same alternative indicator of minga participation employed in hypothesis 1, using 
respondent-provided indicators of whether or not they reliably (always/almost always) or 
unreliably (never/almost never and sometimes). I then conducted a logistic regression 
analysis to predict respondent rankings of their own household minga participation using 
total exchange participation as a predictor. 
A test of the full model against a constant only model was only statistically 
significant in Manzano. Results indicated that the predictors as a set reliably 
distinguished between self-reporting as reliable or non-reliable participants (χ²=11.13, 
p=.001, df=1). Nagelkerke’s R2 of .257 indicated a weak relationship between prediction 
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and grouping. Prediction success overall was 63.5 percent (58% for unreliable and 68% 
for reliable). The EXP(B) value indicates that each additional exchange a household 
participates in increases the likelihood that they self-report regularly attending mingas by 
one.  
Respondent Explanations for Minga Participation 
The final step in analyzing hypothesis two was to explore respondent explanations 
for their minga participation. After reporting on their household’s minga participation, 
interview respondents were asked to explain why they participated, as they said, 
“never/almost never,” “sometimes,” or “always/almost always.” These responses were 
inductively coded in MAXQDA based on observed patterns in the responses. Because 
respondents often cited more than one reason, I allowed for up to three codes for each 
response.  
Table 9. Reasons for Minga Participation by Self-Reported Participation Rank 
Site Participation Rank (n) Code (n) 
Manzano 
Never or hardly ever (11) -- 
Sometimes (13) Obligation (1) 
Always or Almost Always (28)
Obligation (12); Communal Resource 
(11); Like to Participate (3); Penalty (3); 
Community Solidarity (2); Direct 
Benefit to HH (1) 
Pusuca 
Never or hardly ever (1) -- 
Sometimes (8) Obligation (1); Penalty (1); Communal Resource (1) 
Always or Almost Always (31)
Obligation (17); Communal Resource 
(8); Direct Benefit to Household (7); 
Penalty (4); Like to Participate (2); 
Community Solidarity (1) 
In all, respondents in both sites indicated a total of six different factors that, at 
least periodically, motivated their participation in mingas (see table 9 and figure 11). The 
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most common explanations were obligation, shared interest in a communal resource, 
direct benefit to households, and penalties for non-participation. Responses coded as 
obligation (Manzano, n=14; Pusuca, n=18) are instances where people say that minga 
work is the responsibility of every member of the community, often for the good of the 
community as a whole. It is possible that these statements are made in a somewhat 
different spirit in Manzano and Pusuca because the “obligation” to participate in 
Manzano, while often stated, is loosely monitored and informally enforced, whereas the 
“obligation” in Pusuca is strictly monitored and formally enforced. However, the 
“obligation” code does not cover enforcement of participation. Responses coded as 
penalty (Manzano, n=3; Pusuca, n=5) are specific instances where people make reference 
to having to pay multas, or fines levied on households for failure to participate in mingas. 
Although Manzano respondents refer to multas on three occasions, they were likely 
referring to irrigation canal mingas organized at the Parish level because there is no multa 
system in the communal mingas in Manzano, as there is with the irrigation mingas 
organized by the Puela Parish Irrigation Committee. 
Eleven respondents in Manzano and nine in Pusuca cited shared interest in a 
communal resource, such as irrigation, roads, and potable water—that accrue as a result 
of minga labor. Typical statements include “it’s for the good of everyone” and “For the 
betterment of the land because water is the soul of life and the earth so that our fields will 
be productive.” Following this, one response in Manzano and seven in Pusuca were 
coded as direct benefit to household, which refers to instances when respondents point 
out that, in addition to collective benefits, their households directly benefit from minga 
projects as well. One man from Pusuca said, “[I work in mingas] for potable water, to 
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have my home, to obtain the irrigation canal, in order to have rights.” Interestingly, while 
this came up seven times in Pusuca, it was only mentioned once in Manzano (see table 9). 
Figure 11. Frequency of Respondent Reasons for Minga Participation by Site 
There were three instances in Manzano and two in Pusuca where respondents like 
to participate, saying simply that they participate in mingas because “me gusta trabajar” 
(“I like to work”). Finally, there were two instances in Manzano and one in Pusuca where 
respondents cited community solidarity as their reason for participation, stating that they 
worked in mingas to be a part of the community. These statements were “to collaborate 
with the community,” “because we are related,” and “we like to collaborate and we like 
to be united with the community.” Outside of the interview context, this was perhaps the 
most cited reason for minga participation in everyday conversation and political contexts, 
especially in Manzano. 
Gender in Hypothesis Two 
 Statistical tests performed to evaluate the role of gender in minga participation in 
hypothesis one established that there was no significant association between the gender of 
respondents or head-of-household with minga participation. For hypothesis two, I tested 
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the association of respondent and head-of-household gender on overall exchange 
participation using both parametric (t-test) and non-parametric (Kruskall Wallis) 
procedures. There was no significant association between respondent or head-of-
household gender on total exchange participation in either site. 
Summary of Results for Hypothesis Two 
Several tests of the association between total household exchange participation 
and household minga attendance have found that the two are positively associated in 
Manzano, as expected in the hypothesis. There was, however, no statistical association 
between these variables in Pusuca. As with hypothesis one, the open-ended rationales 
provided by respondents provide some context to these findings. While only a quarter of 
Manzano respondents cited obligation as a reason for participating, this was cited by 
more than 50 percent of Pusuca residents. Statistical tests of the association between 
respondent and head-of-household gender in total exchange participation found no 
significant relationship between these variables in either site. The implications of these 
qualitative responses for the interpretation of the findings will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
Hypothesis 3 
The final analysis is to examine the hypothesis that political power is based on 
access and control over scarce development resources and it is maintained and exercised 
through exchange networks and unique ties to sources of aid and development resources 
(H3). Specifically, I evaluate the extent to which: (H3a) Influence over collective 
negotiations and benefit allocation will be positively associated with the extent of a 
household’s total exchange relations with other households in the community, and; (H3b) 
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More powerful actors and their allies will have a greater share of development benefits 
than others. 
For this analysis, total exchange is measured as it was for hypothesis two—the 
total of items and services given and received by each household and confirmed by each 
exchange partner. Influence over collective negotiations and benefit allocation is 
measured using two variables. The first is brokerage, which is the number of times each 
household was named as a source of information regarding opportunities with outside 
organizations. The second is a scale of household influence based on participation 
observation in decision-making contexts in both sites. In the second analysis, I employ 
eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 2007) to identify more powerful actors and their allies. 
Unlike the total exchange measure employed above, which measures a household’s direct 
connections, eigenvector centrality measures the total exchange connections of a 
household’s direct connections; that is, it measures how connected a household is to 
highly connected households. Benefit share is measured based on interview responses 
indicating whether each household was or was not included in a given aid or development 
project in their village, which is combined into a scale of all benefit inclusion. 
Brokerage Power and Exchange 
To measure the relationship between brokerage and exchange, I conducted an 
analysis of variance by quartile of household brokerage score and total strong exchange, 
which was not significant in Manzano [F(3,48)=2.5, p=.075], though it was in Pusuca 
[F(3,36)=4.5, p=.009]. However, by looking at the graph of mean exchange participation 
by percentile group of brokerage score (figure 12), we can see that there is a linear 
relationship in Manzano, but in Pusuca we can see that the linear pattern tapers off in the 
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highest category. Although the relationship is not significant at a 95 percent confidence 
level in Manzano, it is significant at a 90 percent confidence level and the graphs suggest 
a linear relationship worth exploring through further analysis. 
Figure 12. Mean Exchange Participation and Brokerage Score by Site 
A Pearson r correlation of exchange participation with brokerage scores was 
significant in both Manzano (r= 0.302, p=0.029) and Pusuca (r= 0.48, p=0.002). 
Regression analysis confirmed that total household exchange was a reliable predictor of 
brokerage score in both Manzano [b= .302, t(51) = 1.52, p= .029] and Pusuca [b= 
.484, t(39) = 1.34, p= .002]. 
Influence and Exchange 
To understand the distribution of development benefits, respondents in each 
community were asked if they were included in four different relief and development 
projects. The first three projects were the same in each site and each site had one project 
that was specific to only that site. The first was food rations that were distributed to 
disaster-affected households in the region by the Ministry of Economic and Social 
Inclusion (MIES). The second was animal feed distributed by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1 2 3 4
M
ea
n 
To
ta
l E
xc
ha
ng
e 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
Percentile Group of Brokerage Score
Manzano
Pusuca
180 
 
Farming, and Fisheries (MAGAP) to disaster-affected households in the region. The third 
was agricultural extension programs conducted by any of a number of organizations, 
including MAGAP and several other institutions. In Manzano, residents were asked if 
they had received service from a tractor that was purchased by the Junta Parroquial and 
whose service was subsidized by the Junta, meaning service cost about half of what a 
private tractor would cost. In Pusuca, residents were asked if they had been included in 
either of two greenhouse projects facilitated by Esquel and funded by smaller 
foundations. Inclusion in all of these programs was brokered by the Cabildo in Manzano 
or the Directiva in Pusuca, both of which organized the programs and invited the 
participants. 
For this analysis, I relied on influence scores based on observations of cabildo and 
directiva meetings in both sites. Each household was given a score in each of three 
categories (attendance, participation, and changing decisions) of influence over decision-
making (ranked 0, 1, or 2 for never/almost never, sometimes, or regularly). The combined 
score ranged from 0-6 and was recoded into a binary variable indicating whether 
respondents were consistently (4-6) or inconsistently (0-3) influential in community 
affairs. An independent t-test of the Manzano dataset revealed a statistically reliable 
difference between mean total exchanges for households with inconsistent influence 
(x̅=18, s=19) and households with consistent influence (x̅=32, s=17), [t(50) = 2.1, 
p=.038]. An independent t-test of the Pusuca dataset likewise revealed a statistically 
reliable difference between mean total exchanges for households with inconsistent 
influence (x̅=29, s=21.5) and households with consistent influence (x̅=52, s=21), [t(38) = 
3, p=.005].  
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Because the range of total household exchange and influence scores were so 
distinct from one another, non-parametric correlations were the more appropriate 
measure to further test the relationship between these two variables. Spearman’s rho 
treats dependents as ordinal, rather than scale measures and thus more accurately 
measures the relationship between total exchange and influence. The results were 
significant in both Manzano (r= 0.43, p<0.05) and Pusuca (r= 0.52, p≤0.001).  
Gender, Brokerage, and Influence 
In order to test for the association of gender with the key dependent variables in 
hypothesis 3a, I conducted both parametric (t-test) and non-parametric (Kruskal Wallis) 
tests of association. I found no significant difference between the brokerage or influence 
scores based on the gender of respondent or head-of-household in either site. A 
subsequent test of chi-square goodness-of-fit between gender of respondent or head-of-
household and a binary influence score (low-0-3; high 4-6) similarly found no significant 
association in either site. 
H3b Benefit Inclusion 
 An analysis of variance of mean eigenvector centrality and household benefit 
inclusion was significant in both Manzano [F(4,47)=3.5, p=.013] and Pusuca 
[F(4,35)=7.8, p<.001] (see figure 13). As with household influence scores, non-
parametric correlations are more appropriate than parametric correlations when the 
independent and dependent variables differ so greatly in scale. A Spearman’s rho analysis 
found a significant correlation between household eigenvector centrality and household 
benefit inclusion in both Manzano (r= 0.384, p=0.005) and Pusuca (r= 0.658, p<0.001).  
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Figure 13. Mean Eigenvector Centrality by Benefit Inclusion by Site 
In order to evaluate the extent to which eigenvector centrality (degree of ties to 
highly connected households) indicates that there are less connected households gaining 
access to relief and development resources through ties to highly connected households, I 
conducted a Pearson’s r correlation between eigenvector centrality and total exchange 
participation (i.e., total direct ties to the group). The results were high and significant 
correlations for both Manzano (r= 0.86, p=0.000) and Pusuca (r= 0.91, p=0.000). I then 
conducted a Spearman’s rho analysis between total direct ties to the group and benefit 
inclusion in both sites. The result was no significant correlation between direct exchange 
ties to the group in Manzano (r=.253, p=.071), but a significant correlation between 
direct exchange ties and benefit inclusion in Pusuca (r=.571, p=.000).  
Taken together with the results of the tests of eigenvector centrality and benefit 
inclusion in Manzano, this suggests that having ties to highly connected individuals 
(eigenvector centrality) yields greater access to aid and development resources than does 
having many direct ties yourself. Put another way, it is not enough to be highly connected 
to access aid and development resources, one must be connected to highly connected 
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households. In Pusuca, the results suggest that households that have greater direct 
connections to the group are significantly more associated with access to aid and 
development resources, but there is a higher correlation with being connected to highly 
connected households (eigenvector centrality). Since both factors—direct connections 
and connections to highly connected households—are significant in Pusuca, this would 
suggest that highly connected households tend to connect to other highly connected 
households and these are the households that more reliably access program benefits. This 
is to say that benefits tend to be distributed within the highly connected core group in 
Pusuca, while they are somewhat more dispersed through ties to less connected 
households in Manzano. 
Respondent Explanations for Non-Inclusion in Relief and Development Programs 
The final step in analyzing hypothesis three was to explore respondent 
explanations for not being included in relief and development programs. After reporting 
on their household’s inclusion in each program, respondents were asked to explain why 
they were or were not included in each. These responses were inductively coded in 
MAXQDA based on observed patterns in the responses. Because respondents often cited 
more than one reason, I allowed for up to three codes for each response, as with the same 
analyses for hypothesis 1, although most respondents to this question gave no more than 
two reasons. Because it is important to qualify why respondents were not included, I 
focus on those responses here. 
In all, respondents indicated a total of fourteen reasons for not being included in 
the four different relief and development programs in their respective sites (see table 10). 
For the food rations from the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion (MIES), 
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respondents indicated a total of seven reasons for non-inclusion. The code “absent” refers 
to instances where the respondents claim they simply were not present for the program. 
The code “No Information” applies to instances where respondents indicated that they 
were not informed of the program. “No Interest” was applied to responses where 
respondents stated that they were not interested in the program. I applied the code 
“Exclusion” to cases where respondents claimed that they were deliberately excluded 
from the program. There were also cases coded as “Not Eligible,” where the respondents 
indicated that they had no right to program benefits because of age or legal status. In 
cases where the respondents indicated that they were not eligible because they did not 
live full-time at the location, I applied the code “Residency.” And finally, where 
respondents stated that they were not present because of wage work obligations, I applied 
the code “wage work.” 
Figure 14. Reasons for Non-Inclusion in MIES Food Rations by Site 
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Table 10. Reasons for Non-Inclusion in Relief or Development Programs by Site  
Site Relief or Development Program Code (n) 
Manzano 
Food Rations from Ministry of 
Social and Economic Inclusion 
(MIES) 
Absent (2); No Information (3); No 
Interest (5); Exclusion (5); 
Residency (1) 
Animal Feed from Ministry of 
Agriculture, Farming, & Fisheries 
(MAGAP) 
Absent (1); No Animals (11); No 
Information (1); Exclusion (1); 
Residency (1) 
Tractor from Junta Parroquial 
Occupied (15); No Need (15); 
Refused (1); No Information (1); 
Absent (2) 
Extension (various agencies) 
Work/No Time/Absent (11); 
Exclusion (3); No Information (15); 
No Interest (1); Residency (1) 
Pusuca 
Food Rations from Ministry of 
Social and Economic Inclusion 
(MIES) 
Absent (3); No Information (5); No 
Interest (1); Exclusion (4); Not 
Eligible (3); Residency (3); Wage 
Work (1) 
Animal Feed from Ministry of 
Agriculture, Farming, and 
Fisheries (MAGAP) 
Absent (1); No Animals (13); No 
Information (1); No Need (1); 
Exclusion (1) 
Greenhouse (various agencies via 
Esquel) 
Absent (2); Exclusion (10); No 
Interest (10); No Funds (2); 
Health/Age (1); Problems (5); 
Residency (4) 
Extension (various agencies via 
Esquel) 
Work/No Time/Absent (7); 
Exclusion (1); No Information (5); 
Residency (4) 
 In Manzano, the most common reasons for non-inclusion in MIES food rations 
were “exclusion” (31%, n=5) and “no interest” (31%, n=5). This was followed by “no 
information” (19%, n=3), “absent” (12%, n=2), and “residency” (6%, n=2) (see figure 
14). In Pusuca, a majority claimed they had no information about the MIES program 
(29%, n=5), while the second largest group cited “exclusion” (29%, n=5) as their reason 
for not being included (see figure 14). This was followed by “residency” (18%, n=3), 
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“not eligible” (18%, n=3), “absent” (18%, n=3), “wage work” (6%, n=1), and “no 
interest” (6%, n=1). 
 When asked to provide explanations for non-inclusion in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Farming, and Fisheries (MAGAP) animal feed program, respondents gave 
explanations consistent with many of the codes applied to the MIES food rations 
program, plus two more. These were “no animals,” where respondents said they had no 
animals and therefore no need for the program, and “no need,” which was applied where 
respondents had animals, but indicated that they received the benefit from another source. 
Figure 15. Reasons for Non-Inclusion in MAGAP Animal Feed Program by Site 
In Manzano, the primary reason for non-inclusion in the MAGAP animal feed 
distribution program was simply that respondents did not have animals at the time (73%, 
n=11), which was followed by the “residency,” “exclusion,” “no information,” and 
“absent,” which were cited by just one resident each (see figure 15). In Pusuca, the 
pattern was nearly identical to Manzano, as can be seen in figure 15. The number one 
reason for non-inclusion in the MAGAP animal feed program was not having animals 
(76%, n=13). This was followed by “exclusion,” “no need,” “no information,” and 
“absent,” each of which were cited by just one respondent each. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Exclusion No
Information
Absent No Need No Animals Residency
Pe
rc
en
t o
f N
on
-I
nc
lu
de
d 
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
Reasons for Non-Inclusion
Manzano
Pusuca
187 
 
Figure 16. Reasons for Non-Inclusion in Agriculture Extension by Site 
 When asked about the agricultural extension programs in their respective sites, 
respondents provided reasons that were consistent with the codes provided for the other 
programs, with the added category of “work/no time/absent.” This refers to cases where 
respondents were absent due to a lack of time or work commitments, though not 
necessarily wage work commitments. In Manzano, the number one reason for non-
inclusion in agricultural extension programs was “no information” (50%, n=15) (see 
figure 16). This is followed by “work/no time/absent” (33%, n=11) and “exclusion” 
(10%, n=3), and then “residency” and “no interest,” which were cited as reasons by one 
household each. In Pusuca, the pattern of reasons provided for non-inclusion in 
agricultural extension is similar to Manzano (see figure 16). The top three reasons 
provided were “work/no time/absent” (41%, n=7), “no information” (29%, n=5), and 
“residency” (23%, n=4). “Exclusion” was cited by just one respondent in Pusuca. 
Manzano residents who indicated that they were not included in the subsidized 
tractor program of the Junta Parroquial of Puela provided several reasons for non-
inclusion that were consistent with codes applied to the other programs. There were also 
two new codes applied to explanations of non-inclusion in this program. They were 
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“occupied,” which refers to cases where respondents claimed that the tractor was 
constantly occupied on other peoples’ lands and never available for theirs, and “refused,” 
where the respondent indicated that they were denied service due to their uneven land 
(see figure 17). 
Figure 17. Manzano Reasons for Non-Inclusion in Parroquia Tractor Program 
 In Pusuca, respondents were asked to provide reasons why they were not included 
in one of several greenhouse projects. In addition to the response codes applied to non-
inclusion responses for other programs, respondents to questions about non-inclusion in 
the greenhouse projects provided explanations that called for the application of three 
additional codes. The first was “no funds,” which was applied where respondents 
indicated that they did not have the funds necessary to buy into the projects. The second 
was “problems,” which was applied when the respondent indicated that they declined to 
participate due to persistent problems between project beneficiaries. The third was 
“health/age,” where respondents indicated that they were unable to participate in the 
project due to poor health or advanced age.  
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The primary reasons provided for non-inclusion were “no interest” (29%, n=10) 
and “exclusion” (29%, n=10) (see figure 18). The next two most popular explanations 
were “problems” (15%, n=5) and residency (12%, n=4). This was followed by “no funds” 
and “absent,” which we cited by two respondents each, and “health/age,” which was cited 
by just one respondent. 
Figure 18. Pusuca Reasons for Non-Inclusion in Greenhouse Projects 
 
Gender and Benefit Inclusion 
 In order to test the relationship between gender and benefit inclusion, I conducted 
both parametric (t-test) and non-parametric (Kruskal Wallis) tests of the association 
between respondent and head-of-household gender and program inclusion. These tests 
found no significant association between gender and benefit inclusion in either site. 
Summary of Findings for Hypothesis Three 
 Statistical tests found that there was a significant positive relationship between 
exchange participation and brokerage and decision-making power in both sites, as 
anticipated by hypothesis 3a. This suggests one of the ways in which politically powerful 
individuals maintain and exercise their power is through exchange relationships. Those 
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with more exchange ties are more likely to be turned to for access to scarce development 
resources and to have their views and agendas supported. This finding is supported by 
ethnographic observations that will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 Statistical tests also found a significant positive association between the extent of 
exchange relations with powerful households and inclusion in disaster relief and 
development projects in both sites, as expected in hypothesis 3b. The conclusion is that it 
is not only the powerful who benefit from unique ties to outside resources, but also their 
less powerful allies within their communities. High degrees of direct ties were not 
significantly correlated with benefit inclusion in Manzano, though they were in Pusuca, 
although slightly less strongly than ties to highly connected households. Both of these 
findings support the initial hypothesis, while in Pusuca there is some evidence that 
benefits are concentrated in the highly connected core of the group. Statistical tests were 
also conducted to examine the association between gender of respondents and heads-of-
household and brokerage score, influence score, and benefit inclusion. Results found no 
significant association between gender and these dependent variables in either site. 
 Examining respondents’ stated reasons for non-inclusion in the four different 
programs they were asked about provided a more complete picture than statistical tests 
alone. It is evident that there were a significant number of cases where there were 
practical and self-imposed reasons for non-inclusion (e.g., lack of need or interest). 
However, outright exclusion and other soft forms of exclusion (e.g., not being informed) 
were cited by many respondents for non-inclusion in each of the programs in both sites. 
This too will be discussed further in the following chapter. 
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Summary of Findings 
The expectation of hypothesis 1 was that wage employment and residential 
distance would be negatively associated with minga participation. The results were mixed 
between the two sites. In Manzano, wage employment was not significantly associated 
with records of minga participation, but there was a significant negative correlation with 
residential distance and minga participation. In Pusuca, there were significant negative 
correlations with wage employment and residential distance with records of minga 
participation. When testing the association between residential distance and wage labor 
with self-reported minga participation, we find significant negative correlations with 
wage labor and residential distance in Manzano, but not in Pusuca. When asked to 
indicate why they did not participate in mingas, a majority of respondents from Manzano 
cited not being informed of mingas as their primary reason for non-participation, wage 
employment was the second most commonly reported, and another four respondents cited 
residential distance. In contrast, Pusuca respondents indicated wage employment and 
residential distance as their two primary reasons for not attending mingas. 
The expectation of hypothesis 2 was that household exchange participation would 
be positively associated with minga participation. Multiple tests of the association 
between household minga attendance and total household exchange participation found 
positive associations between these two variables in Manzano, but not in Pusuca. As with 
hypothesis 1, qualitative explanations from respondents provide some context to these 
findings. In Pusuca, more than 50 percent of respondents cited obligation as their reason 
for participating in mingas, whereas in Manzano only a quarter of respondents cited this 
rationale. 
192 
 
For hypothesis 3a, the expectation was that total household exchange participation 
would be positively associated with brokerage and decision-making power and statistical 
tests found a significant positive correlation between these variables in both sites. The 
implication is that one way that politically powerful individuals exercise and maintain 
their power is through forming reciprocal exchange ties. Those with more ties are more 
likely to act as brokers between their neighbors and scarce aid and development resources 
and more likely to have their views and agendas supported in local decision-making 
processes.  
Hypothesis 3b was designed to test the assumption that households connected 
through reciprocal exchange relations to highly connected households access a greater 
share of relief and development resources than others. Statistical tests indicated a 
significant positive association between being connected to highly connected households 
and project benefit inclusion in both sites. This suggests that it is not only the powerful 
that access these scarce extra-local resources, but also their less connected allies, which 
can be taken as evidence of privileged inclusion as a form of power in both sites. A 
further test of the correlation between being a highly connected households and being 
connected to highly connected households found that these two variables were highly 
correlated in both sites. However, in Manzano there was no significant correlation 
between the degree of direct household ties and benefit inclusion, whereas this 
correlation was significant in Pusuca, though slightly weaker than the correlation between 
benefit inclusion and ties to highly connected households. These findings support the 
assumptions of the hypothesis, while suggesting there is a greater concentration of benefit 
distribution within the highly connect core of the group. As with the first two hypotheses, 
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self-reported explanations for non-inclusion provide some context here as well. There 
was a considerable number of cases where there were practical or self-imposed reasons 
for non-inclusion in the programs named in the survey (e.g., no need or interest), outright 
exclusion and soft forms of exclusion (e.g., not being informed) were cited by many 
respondents in both sites as well.  
 Some of the results of this study were anticipated by the hypotheses, while others 
were not. Some of the findings that were not anticipated by the hypotheses were 
nonetheless consistent with ethnographic observations that provide necessary explanatory 
context to each finding. All of these findings will be discussed further in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION 
 This chapter is a discussion of the findings presented in the previous chapter. 
Some hypothesis tests were significant in one site and not the other, while others were 
significant, but not for the reasons anticipated and therefore want for explanation. These 
explanations oblige me to examine some of the key differences between the two sites and 
at times point to interpretations that are contrary to expectations. However, before doing 
so it is important to point out that the sample of sites (n=2) by no means justifies any 
generalization of these findings based on the site characteristics described, but 
nonetheless does point to opportunities for further research to be discussed in the 
conclusion chapter. At appropriate points in the discussion, I draw on literature—some 
anticipated in the literature review chapter, some not—in order to interpret study findings 
and place them in the context of relevant studies and theory. 
Hypothesis 1: Minga participation will be negatively associated with wage 
employment and residential distance 
 As anticipated in hypothesis 1, wage employment and residential distance were 
negatively associated with recorded minga participation in Pusuca. In Manzano, 
however, there was no significant association between wage employment and minga 
participation and there was a slight negative correlation between residential distance and 
minga participation. However, this inter-site pattern was reversed when wage 
employment and residential distance were tested for associations with self-reported 
minga attendance. In these latter tests, wage labor and residential distance were 
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negatively associated with self-reported minga participation in Manzano, but not in 
Pusuca. When asked to provide reasons for not participating in mingas, a majority of 
respondents from Manzano cited not being informed of mingas as their primary reason 
for non-participation. Wage employment was the second most commonly reported, and 
another four respondents cited residential distance as an explanation for missing mingas. 
In Pusuca, however, wage employment and residential distance were the two primary 
reasons provided by respondents for not attending mingas, which was consistent with 
statistical tests of recorded minga participation. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that wage employment and residential distance are more reliable negative predictors of 
minga participation in Pusuca than in Manzano; however, wage employment and 
residential distance do negatively affect self-reported minga participation in Manzano, 
suggesting that these variables contribute to some variation in participation, while other 
factors not included in the hypothesis likely account for more. 
In order to interpret these findings, it is important to briefly revisit the origins of 
the hypothesis, which is based on the assumption that residential distance between 
community members and household participation in wage labor constitute risks to minga 
practice. The first risk was identified by Cernea (1996a), who found evidence that 
resettlement schemes destabilize social support networks by breaking up social groups 
into different resettlements. The second risk factor that might affect the continuity of 
reciprocity and cooperation in rural resettlements is a transition in the mode of production 
from primary production to wage labor. This justified the hypothesis that distance of 
primary residence from either Manzano or Pusuca and participation in wage labor would 
be negatively associated with minga participation in either site. While study results found 
196 
 
that these factors were negatively associated with recorded minga participation in 
Pusuca, there was no statistical association in Manzano, although qualitative responses do 
indicate that wage labor and residential distance do factor into minga participation. These 
results are potentially explained by some of the unique features of the organization of the 
two sites. 
Minga Participation in Manzano 
Looking first at Manzano, there are two broad themes that emerged from 
interviews and ethnographic observation that might help explain variation in minga 
participation, where residential distance and wage employment cannot. The first is simply 
lack of interest in participating by some households; specifically, there were four 
households that had never lived full-time in Manzano. These were wealthier landowners 
who had purchased land in Manzano in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but had always 
resided in the nearby city of Riobamba. Household members would tend to their land on 
weekends and employ peons for labor intensive work, such as planting and harvesting. 
They never participated in mingas and likely had little interest in doing so, as their land 
and production were self-sustained and they had little to gain from participation. Still, 
their residential distance from Manzano and wage employment in all of these households, 
regardless of whether or not it was the result of the eruptions, would nevertheless be 
consistent with the model, so this does not explain the failure of the model to accurately 
predict outcomes in this site. 
The second, more likely explanation for variation in minga participation in 
Manzano—given that the hypothetical explanations of residential distance and wage 
labor failed—is that, although Manzano had the reputation of being the most organized 
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village in Canton Penipe, this organization did not include the whole roster of pre-
eruption households. This became evident in the course of fieldwork in 2009 and 2011. In 
2009, Bernardo Huerta, who became president of Manzano’s cabildo just after the first 
eruptions in 2000 and remained president in 2011, began organizing mingas in earnest. 
According to Marcos, the head of the Penipe Municipal Development Office, Bernardo 
had observed that the leaders of Palictahua, another displaced village in the neighboring 
high risk parish of El Altar, had successfully attracted aid and development resources by 
demonstrating through community organizing for mingas. Bernardo began to emulate this 
strategy in Manzano and they gradually became recognized as the most organized village 
in Puela Parish. Bernardo says that before the eruptions, minga practice had declined in 
Manzano and Puela, but was revived afterwards at the encouragement of aid and 
development agencies and under the guidance of local leaders who wanted to organize 
the revival of their villages. Thus, in 2009, Bernardo began organizing mingas to repair 
the casa comunal, the central meeting place for Manzano. This was followed by projects 
to clear roads of volcanic debris, repairing the roofs and structures of other community 
buildings, and building a volleyball court in front of the casa comunal.  
Bernardo and the village of Manzano continued to organize mingas in 2011, 
during the time of fieldwork for this project, although less frequently than in 2009 and 
with participation reduced by roughly 25 percent. This decline in participation can be 
largely attributed to different forms of exclusion practiced in Manzano, which can be 
roughly grouped into two domains. The first is a soft form of exclusion, characterized by 
a neglect to inform all community members of mingas (and other events as well). Not 
being informed of mingas was the number one reason (nearly 25%) provided by 
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respondents for non-participation and I observed this dynamic on a number of occasions. 
On one occasion, I sat with Bernardo and other Manzano villagers discussing village 
affairs. While we were discussing attendance at community mingas, a young man who 
was sitting nearby listening to our conversation, said that he would like to work on the 
community mingas, but no one ever lets him know when they are. He tells Bernardo that 
he should let him know when they are organizing mingas, but Bernardo did not respond. 
On several occasions, I rode with Bernardo in his pickup truck through the resettlement 
as he visited resettlers from Manzano to invite them to mingas or to meetings with a 
development organization. As we drove past certain homes I knew to be from Manzano 
without stopping, I would ask Bernardo why we did not stop to invite these people and he 
told me that some people just could not be counted on to participate.  
Pedro Cordova, an elderly man whose household is one of the wealthier ones in 
Manzano, offered an explanation for the gradual exclusion of some people from mingas 
and community affairs in Manzano, expounding a common topic of conversation in the 
Penipe resettlements. He told me that people used to participate more in mingas and 
community affairs, but after the eruptions people no longer wanted to work for benefits. 
Instead, they had grown accustomed to receiving handouts from the state and NGOs in 
the Penipe resettlements and no longer wanted to work for the common good without 
personal incentives. What was evident from these and other observations and discussions 
with key informants was that the community of Manzano had grown more disparate in 
many ways since the resettlement, which presented definite challenges for those, like 
Bernardo and other community leaders, who wanted to revive and organize the traditional 
communities. Bernardo and other leaders in Manzano had simply stopped trying with 
199 
 
some people, many of whom had found new opportunities, responsibilities, or concerns 
in the resettlements and could not or would not commit their time and energy to 
community affairs in Manzano. 
It is important to also recognize more explicit forms of exclusion at work in 
Manzano, which likely contribute to variation in minga participation; that is, certain 
social and political divisions emerged or were exacerbated in Manzano since the 
eruptions and these have taken the form of more overt exclusion over time. Although 
Bernardo had explained to me that he did not recruit certain households in the 
resettlement for minga participation because they could not be counted upon to 
participate, there were other occasions where he told me he was not inviting someone 
because “no, she’s never on my side. I can’t have her in the project.” One woman he had 
excluded was effectively ostracized by Bernardo after she ran and lost for parish office on 
a ticket opposing candidates backed by Bernardo in 2009. More than a dozen residents 
from Manzano offered anecdotes of exclusion and corrupt practices by Bernardo and 
other village leaders.  
When I first entered the field in 2009, Blanca was an active member of the 
Manzano community, although she had resettled to Pusuca. She explained that she 
stopped participating in mingas in Manzano because she and many others were no longer 
invited. When I asked her why, she claimed that it was because Manzano leaders keep 
their groups small so they can hoard more benefits for themselves. Alberto Martinez 
recounted a similar story, saying that the leaders and the small group around them keep 
program benefits to themselves and simply do not invite others to participate. Segundo 
Villacres, a 33 year old man living in Riobamba and working as a driver, told me that 
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leaders claimed aid and project benefits for themselves, while excluding many of the 
more deserving villagers. He said that his household did not work for the community in 
mingas because they were told by village leaders that they were not eligible for program 
inclusion because they did not live full-time in the village. Marlena Hernandez, a fifty-
seven year old teacher who lived primarily in Riobamba said that she and her sisters 
ceased to participate in community mingas in Manzano because they were never included 
in project benefits or aid programs. She claimed that she was no longer invited to 
participate and therefore made no effort to do so. Her two adult sisters, Carlota and 
Nancy, live in the Penipe resettlement and say they stopped participating in Manzano 
community mingas in 2009 because they felt they were consistently excluded from aid 
and project benefits. It is important to note that I was unable to obtain any independent 
confirmation of these claims, and rumors of political corruption and benefit hoarding 
were common throughout the resettlements and communities in the risk zone.  
However, the head of the Penipe Municipal Development office, while unable to 
substantiate specific claims, did state that leaders in Manzano and neighboring villages 
had consistently benefitted more than others in the aid and development programs that 
had come since the eruptions. Moreover, regardless of the veracity of all of these claims, 
they point to the existence of social and political divisions within Manzano that 
contributed to the exclusion of some households from mingas and community affairs. 
Minga Participation in Pusuca 
In Pusuca, regular minga participation was a condition of inclusion in the 
community, as outlined in the community charter. The charter established mingas as the 
primary means for carrying out projects for community benefit and endowed the 
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Directiva with the power to organize and schedule mingas. Failure to attend community 
mingas resulted in a multa (fine) of $10 and, as of 2011, failure to attend irrigation 
mingas resulted in a $20 fine. Moreover, the charter explicitly states that failure to attend 
four mingas would result in the forfeit of the rights and privileges of community 
membership. An informal practice evolved over time, which allowed households to make 
up missed mingas by sending multiple household members or peons to work mingas 
and/or to complete multiple minga tareas (assigned tasks). The result was a well-
regimented system of minga organization which mandated the inclusion and participation 
of all village households.  
However, in 2011 there was a total of nine Pusuca households that had migrated 
to nearby cities such as Riobamba, Baños, and Puyo, and another two that had migrated 
further, one to the highland town of Latacunga and another to the coastal city of 
Esmeraldas. There were another twelve households that, although living primarily in 
Pusuca, nonetheless had at least some members engaged in wage labor in Penipe or 
Riobamba. Many of these households had turned from primary reliance on agricultural 
production prior to the eruptions and resettlement to partial or total reliance on wage 
labor since the eruptions and resettlement. Many of these transitions took place gradually 
during the nearly ten years that evacuees had languished in shelters, rented homes, and 
with family members outside Penipe Canton. Lacking the land they had once counted on 
to sustain their livelihoods, they had progressively turned to other alternatives. Others 
found the process of colonization of the overgrown lands they were granted in the 
resettlement to be too time-consuming with initial yields that were insufficient and 
202 
 
unlikely to improve without irrigation. As a result, they turned increasingly to wage 
employment to subsidize or wholly supplant their agricultural production. 
In 2009, mingas were primarily held on weekends in Pusuca. These were 
challenging to attend for those who were working and living outside of Pusuca, but not 
impossible. Many were able to return for a day or the entire weekend to participate in 
these mingas. Some were frequently unable to attend because their unskilled and low-pay 
jobs did not offer regular hours and often required them to work weekends, and they 
therefore had to use their meager earnings to pay kin or peons to work in their stead. 
However, when the irrigation project began, the Provincial Council of Chimborazo and 
the World Bank hired engineers and paid laborers to design and manage work and 
therefore shifted mingas to weekdays, as the engineers could not be expected to work 
weekends. This made it even more challenging for migrants and wage laborers to fulfill 
their minga duties. Most still made it to the mandatory monthly General Assembly 
meetings of the Directiva, which took place on the evening of the first Saturday of every 
month, but weekday mingas were impossible for almost all of them. Some still sent 
family members, but were unable to afford to pay peons or multas with their paltry 
earnings. The result was that many fell increasingly behind in their obligations and were 
threatened with sanctions. Some returned periodically for a week or two and attempted to 
catch up by working almost daily on minga responsibilities, but this rarely resulted in 
fully catching up all rayas in arrears.  
The findings for hypothesis one are somewhat counterintuitive in that the 
traditional village mingas were not significantly destabilized by residential distance and 
wage labor incorporation, whereas these factors did significantly inhibit minga practice in 
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the resettlement based on newly-established institutions. In Manzano, it is clear that 
minga participation was primarily disarticulated by the exclusionary practices of 
traditional leadership structures. At the same time, similar to the crise revelatrice (Sahlins 
1972) or the structuring idiom (Henry 2005) of disasters, many from Manzano also 
exhibited a greater awareness of unequal power relations and the asymmetric distribution 
of resources in the villages in the wake of the eruptions, displacement, and resettlement. 
Some of this was brought on by increased scarcity of access to resources for both patrons 
and clients (cf. Scott 1976; Downing and Garcia-Downing 2009). The effect was 
increased tension which fomented exclusionary practices and the abandonment of the 
community by several households. 
Mingas were once characterized as being predicated on dyadic contracts and 
lacking ritual or legal basis (Whitten 1969), which remains largely true for community 
mingas in Manzano. However, this was not the case in Pusuca, where the legal charter of 
the community established mingas as a mandatory obligation of beneficiaries and granted 
the Directiva the rights to organize mingas and sanction non-participants. In this context 
in Pusuca, the relationship between wage labor and minga participation is perhaps more 
complex than anticipated in the study hypothesis. The literature on political economy 
emphasizes that social organization is predicated on the mode of production and that 
transition from one (e.g., primary production) to another (e.g., capitalist wage labor) will 
produce significant change in social organization (Jones 2003; Wolf 1982; Mintz 1974) 
and this has been a primary concern of Andean researchers as well (Martínez Novo 2008; 
Seligman 2008; Chiriboga 1988). Jones (2003) provides one potential explanation for my 
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findings in Pusuca by saying that participation in wage labor makes it more difficult to 
maintain social ties across class lines, but he does not elaborate on why this is so.  
Findings in Pusuca suggest that it has a great deal to do with the structuring of 
time and the unequal power to do so. More specifically, wage labor employment is 
temporally structured and inflexible, where workers do not have the power to adapt their 
work routines based on emerging conditions in their lives outside the job. In contrast, 
primary production, while routinized to some extent, may be structured and modified by 
the producers and laborers, based on emerging conditions. It is in this latter context that 
mingas were historically developed. Thus, there is a certain tension and incompatibility 
between the temporal structures of wage labor and the collective action routines of 
primary production. But this does not tell the whole story of Pusuca.  
Initially, when mingas began in 2009, they were organized on the weekends and 
most households were able to participate (occasionally sending surrogates or peons), even 
though there were several that were employed in cities near and far. The tension of 
temporal structures was then further compounded when the state and several NGOs 
funded the irrigation canal and began organizing mingas on weekdays based on their 
temporal regimens, which were based on capitalist structures and thus completely and 
consistently in tension with the routines to which resettler wage laborers were subjected. 
The power to structure the times and spaces of minga participation was no longer 
centered in the community, as it was in places like Manzano, but instead concentrated in 
external institutions, in the resettlement agency and the state and non-governmental 
organizations that funded development programs in the community 
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Hypothesis 2: Minga participation will be positively associated with total household 
reciprocal exchange relations 
Hypothesis 2 tests the assumption that mingas are forms of reciprocity (exchange 
labor) in which laborers are continuously recruited by leaders through conspicuous 
giving. Several tests of the association between total household exchange participation 
and household minga attendance found that the two are positively associated in Manzano, 
as expected in the hypothesis. There was, however, no statistical association between 
these variables in Pusuca. As with hypothesis one, one explanation for the disparity 
between the two sites likely lies in the open-ended rationales provided by respondents. 
While only a quarter of Manzano respondents cited obligation as a reason for 
participating, this was cited by more than 50 percent of Pusuca residents. Moreover, 
through ethnographic fieldwork I learned that there were strict rules enforcing minga 
participation and sanctioning failure to participate in Pusuca. Thus, while minga 
participation may be significantly sustained by reciprocal exchange relations in Manzano, 
there was a system of rules and sanctions that largely maintains participation in Pusuca. 
However, although Pusuca exhibited a higher frequency of exchange relations than 
Manzano overall, it is possible that the types of exchange relations that existed in 
Manzano had not yet developed in the new resettlement community of Pusuca. 
Minga Participation in Manzano 
Minga participation in Manzano was significantly associated with the density of a 
household’s reciprocal exchange relations with the group. That is, the more reciprocal 
exchange relations a household had, the more likely it was to participate in mingas. Here, 
what we see is more consistent with the model of minga as dyadic contract (Whitten 
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1969), where people’s participation is largely based on their reciprocal exchanges with 
others. We do not find this same relationship in Pusuca because participation was 
mandatory for all households, regardless of their ties to others in the group. However, as 
mentioned above, Pusuca was a very new community at the time of research (just 2 years 
old) and, although more than half of the resettlers were from the same village origin, the 
types of reciprocity that existed in Manzano had not yet developed in Pusuca. Here it 
makes sense to draw on Sahlins’ (1974) typology of reciprocal exchange relations, which 
he distinguished as generalized, balanced, and negative. Negative reciprocity is basically 
trade, which may be engaged in by strangers and involves the attempt to receive greater 
value than one contributes to the exchange. Balanced reciprocity is a form of giving 
where reciprocation of equal value (i.e., balanced) is expected within a usually 
indeterminate timeframe—not immediately, as this would undermine the value of the 
gift, and hence the relation by diminishing the display of trust, but delay beyond 
commonly accepted timeframes would likewise undermine the relation and perhaps result 
in social sanctions. Balanced reciprocity usually takes place among members of the same 
community and gift giving is frequently done in public, thus establishing a record of the 
exchange and enabling social sanctions for failure to reciprocate, which tend to take the 
form of gossip and public shaming. Finally generalized reciprocity is an ostensibly 
altruistic form of reciprocity that takes place primarily between kin. This is usually a 
form of giving without overtly expecting a return, although returns help sustain the 
relationship over time, when possible and necessary. This is generally what is meant by 
“social support,” which includes food sharing and childcare. However, an often 
overlooked aspect of generalized reciprocity, emphasized in Sahlins’ (1974) appendix, is 
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that generalized reciprocity usually begins in a crisis situation with a demand from the 
recipient, which often cannot be denied. In Manzano, kin and households that have been 
neighbors for generations engage in all forms of reciprocity, but are more likely to 
engage in generalized reciprocity than resettlers in Pusuca, where the relationships 
necessary for sustaining these types of reciprocity have yet to take root. 
Minga Participation in Pusuca 
In Pusuca, it is important to consider the role of the resettlement agency and 
newly created directiva institution in sustaining minga participation. Under the influence 
of the Esquel Foundation, minga participation was routinized and enforced through 
specific sanctions. What is clear from statistical tests of interview and archival data and 
from ethnographic observations is that mingas in Manzano were based largely on 
personal relationships that involve reciprocal exchange relations, while mingas in Pusuca 
were based instead on institutional parameters. In Pusuca, there were clearly stated rules 
regarding participation. As mentioned earlier, the village charter made minga 
participation mandatory and levied fines on community members for non-participation. 
There were other sanctions as well. Households that failed to meet their irrigation minga 
obligations and did not pay their fines were told they would not have access to irrigation 
once the canal was completed. In Manzano, there were no fines for community mingas, 
which were organized by the cabildo. Irrigation mingas, which were organized by the 
parroquia-wide Irrigation Committee, did include fines for non-participation and, as in 
Pusuca, those who did not participate or pay their fines would forfeit access to irrigation. 
These latter mingas had a higher rate of attendance for Manzano than the community 
mingas, suggesting that this institutional strategy was more effective for the immediate 
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goal of generating minga participation. However, this strategy did little to build 
consensus between the communities or trust in the irrigation committee, which was 
constantly the object of criticism in Manzano and in the other villages in Puela. In 
contrast, while community mingas in Manzano did not have the same degree of 
participation as the irrigation mingas, community minga participants tended to convey a 
sense of unity and trust in one another. In community mingas, gossip focused on other 
communities, not on others from within Manzano 
Hypothesis 3a: Decision-making influence and brokerage power will be positively 
associated with total reciprocal exchange relations with the group 
 Statistical tests found that there was a significant positive relationship between 
exchange participation and brokerage and decision-making power in both sites, as 
anticipated by hypothesis 3a. This suggests one of the ways in which politically powerful 
individuals maintain and exercise their power is through exchange relationships. Those 
with more exchange ties are more likely to be turned to for access to scarce development 
resources and to have their views and agendas supported. This finding is supported by 
ethnographic observations that will be discussed in the concluding chapter. 
Political Power in Manzano 
Bernardo Huerta was the decision maker in Manzano. In 2011, he had been 
serving as Cabildo President for twelve years, ever since the first eruptions of Mt. 
Tungurahua. One of the wealthiest landowners in the village, he also served as president 
of the Caja Comunitaria (cooperative savings and loan) and treasurer of the Manzano 
Potable Water Committee. In the 1990s, Bernardo secured the backing of Padre Tomas 
Puerres, the powerful head priest of Penipe Canton and the head of an influential non-
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profit foundation and medical center in Penipe. Through Bernardo, Padre Tomas 
provided financial backing for the Caja Comunitaria, which many saw as the catalyst for 
Bernardo’s rise to power. Bernardo also served on the regional Community Emergency 
Operations Committee, which was the citizen leadership board of disaster emergency 
management that coordinated emergency response and risk management with municipal, 
state, and federal authorities. In addition, Bernardo served as a special advisor to the 
Junta Parroquial of Puela, as a result of his close political alliance with the Junta 
President. As Cabildo President, Bernardo was also the main liaison to the Provincial 
Council and several non-government organizations operating in the region.  
Other leadership positions in Manzano changed little between 1999 and the 2011 
and were primarily held by Bernardo’s two main deputies, Victor Ramirez and Mateo 
Barragan, also wealthy landowners who alternated between key leadership positions, 
including president of the Potable Water Committee, Vice President of Cabildo, and 
President or Vice President of Seguro Campesino (peasant healthcare cooperative). 
Meetings were generally ad hoc and almost exclusively presided over by Bernardo, 
although he occasionally delegated the responsibility of convening meetings to either 
Victor or Mateo when he was out of town. It was rare for others besides Bernardo to 
speak in meetings, except to ask a question or to report on an issue Bernardo had 
requested. This was in many ways a natural extension of the Ecuadorian system of 
clientelist politics—outside organizations approach village leaders to deliver their 
constituents to a given project or cause. As a result, all information on potential and 
ongoing funding, aid, development, and disaster-related projects came to Manzano 
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almost exclusively through Bernardo and he had almost unfettered influence over who 
was included. 
Political Power in Pusuca 
Research on Ecuadorian cooperatives suggests that leadership by the poor can 
help to reduce the tensions produced by economic inequalities in the group without 
actually changing the economic disparities (Jones 2004). In Pusuca, decision making was 
far more inclusive of community members than in Manzano, but as can be seen in the 
study results, the process was not all-inclusive. Unlike Manzano, there was little 
redundancy in leadership of the various committees. Directiva President Angel Turushina 
was also President of the Caja Comunitaria and had formerly served as Secretary of the 
Directiva, but that was the extent of redundancy at the time of research. There was 
nothing in Pusuca that resembled the tight-knit circle of leadership that prevailed in 
Manzano. In fact, while wealthier landowners had held leadership positions (see chapter 
three and below), many of the leadership positions on the various committees (Directiva, 
Caja Comunitaria, Irrigation, Potable Water) were held by formerly poor and politically 
marginal individuals. Directiva President, Angel, was a young man who came from a 
relatively poor family who lived on a hacienda on the outskirts of Puela Parish. His 
influence and ultimate election was perhaps aided by the many kin he had in the 
resettlement, but he was generally perceived as an intelligent and just leader whose youth 
and new ideas were an ideal break from the entrenched political power of wealthy 
landowners that dominated politics before the resettlement and in its first years. Unlike 
the cabildos in Puela, where women only occasionally had leadership roles, women were 
well represented on the directiva and other committees in the village and played active 
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roles in decision-making. Moreover, many of the women who increasingly assumed 
leadership roles were from economically marginal households. The process of decision-
making in Pusuca was generally based on popular vote, with little power truly vested in 
the elected leadership. This is partially because all decisions were voted on by a raise of 
hands and partially because, ever since Pusuca’s founding in 2008, the meetings have 
been monitored, guided, and arbitrated by an ever-present Esquel representative.  
In general, there was a greater amount of reciprocal exchange relations between 
households that spent the better part of their time in Manzano or Pusuca. This was 
generally part of goodwill between neighbors and often based on a neighbor’s perception 
of another’s need. Indeed, members of several households in both sites told me of gifting 
food, money, and clothing to neighbors in need and I observed this on several occasions. 
Of course, just as those who were most often present engaged in more exchanges, those 
who were most often present were more likely to hold leadership positions and 
participate in decision making. 
 Even in Pusuca, where attendance at monthly General Assembly meetings was 
mandatory for every household and decision making was generally inclusive of most 
attendees, resettlers living full-time in the village clearly exerted greater influence than 
those who did not. Resettlers who lived part-time or more outside Pusuca were not 
explicitly marginalized, but they tended not to participate as much and, when they did, 
they did not typically find much support from others in the group of full-time residents. 
When I discussed this with informants who lived full-time in Pusuca and others who 
lived part-time away, they tended to give similar explanations of the implicit 
marginalization of part-time residents, which took shape in two ways. First, all residents 
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were required to attend monthly General Assembly meetings of the Directiva and could 
be sanctioned for not doing so. They could (and often did) send another family member 
or representative in their stead when they could not attend for work or travel reasons. 
Sending a surrogate avoided the sanction for non-attendance, but no one besides the 
named beneficiary had voting privileges; that is, if a woman was the named beneficiary 
of the house in Pusuca, her husband had no voting rights in her absence and vice versa. 
Secondly, informants generally agreed that part-time residents tended to make 
suggestions and argue points that were out of sync with the priorities of the full-time 
residents. In my observations of meetings, these suggestions tended to be for alternative 
schedules for mingas and meetings to enable part-time residents to attend and participate 
and for relaxing rules for benefit inclusion to accommodate part-time residents. 
Political Strategies in Manzano and Pusuca 
During fieldwork I observed that there was some connection between gifting and 
the maintenance of power in both communities. This was mostly in the form of small-
scale feasting, a practice that has been noted elsewhere in Ecuador (Colloredo-Mansfeld 
2009) and other Andean contexts (Mayer 2002; Deere 1990). Village leaders in both sites 
would periodically make a show of gifts to people in the village, which could take 
multiple forms, but were usually in the form of food or alcohol. In Manzano, Bernardo 
would occasionally be absent for all or part of a minga, but afterward he would arrive 
with sweet cakes and cola for the workers. He would also regularly pay some of the 
women to purchase snacks and cola for village meetings as well. In the weeks leading up 
to the village fiesta of San Miguel, Bernardo spoke several times about how his 
household alone would bear the special responsibility of feeding the large band that 
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would come play for the village, each time emphasizing that he was not wealthy, but 
would make this special expense for benefit of the group. Prior to 2011, it was common 
for village leaders to bring substantial quantities of puro (homemade cane liquor) to 
mingas and dole it out during work, but a nationwide outbreak of deaths and injuries from 
puro in early 2011 resulted in the outlawing of the drink, which significantly reduced its 
circulation in mingas. Nonetheless, Bernardo and his inner circle would still occasionally 
provide puro for minga workers. On other occasions, he would purchase one or two cases 
of 22 ounce beer bottles that would be poured into cups and gifted to workers and 
meeting attendees. Often, after the first case was consumed, one or more of the lesser 
leaders would send out for another case at their own expense. During village fiestas, 
villagers often purchased one or two bottles of beer or a small bottle of liquor to share 
with others and this would be reciprocated until village leaders, usually Bernardo or 
Mateo, arrived and purchased a case or more of beer and ceremoniously doled it out to 
the group. 
Leaders in Pusuca often made similar displays of generosity to the group. Village 
president Angel, who had very successful yields of strawberries and other fruits on his 
land in Pusuca, would frequently share the bounty of his twice weekly harvest with others 
in the village. He would also make a show of this when outside visitors, usually 
representatives of Esquel, but also of other state and non-governmental organizations, 
came to visit Pusuca. His wife, who ran a small convenience store in their home, 
frequently loaned goods to other villagers. As in Manzano, alcohol was commonly 
distributed by leaders to others in the village. In 2009, then-President Manuel Reyes 
frequently distributed puro to minga workers, but the outlawing reduced its currency in 
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Pusuca as it had in Manzano. Beer and whiskey became common substitutes. It was 
common for the inner circle of Pusuca leaders and their closest friends and allies to 
gather in front of Angel’s house prior to village meetings and Angel would hand out 
glasses of beer to the men and other leaders would often reciprocate. After meetings, the 
men would gather and Angel and other leaders would take turns purchasing beer and 
whiskey for the group. Manuel Reyes, who in 2011 served as Vice President, had 
distanced himself from other leaders and tended to assemble his own factions near his 
house, where he would share from his private stash of puro as he had in the mingas in 
2009. 
 These forms of exchange helped build and maintain trust between disaster-
affected people and resettlers just as they had prior to the disasters and resettlements. 
They also serve to build and maintain power in several ways. Gift giving and other forms 
of reciprocity helped to build trust and solidarity, as the people who engaged in these 
practices came to rely upon one another in the process. People who engaged in more 
exchanges were more likely to rise to power in both communities based upon the strong 
relationships they built and maintained, which made them more likely to be elected to 
leadership positions and more likely to speak up in decision-making contexts and to be 
supported when they did so.   
Hypothesis 3b: More powerful actors and their allies will have a greater share of 
development benefits than others 
 Statistical tests also found a significant positive association between the extent of 
exchange relations with powerful households and inclusion in disaster relief and 
development projects, as expected in hypothesis 3b. The conclusion is that it is not only 
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the powerful who benefit from unique ties to outside resources, but also their less 
powerful allies within their communities. Examining respondents’ stated reasons for non-
inclusion in the four different programs I asked them about provided a more complete 
picture than statistical tests alone. It is evident that there was a substantial number of 
cases where there were practical and self-imposed reasons for non-inclusion (e.g., lack of 
need or interest). However, outright exclusion and other soft forms of exclusion (e.g., not 
being informed) were cited by many respondents for non-inclusion in each of the 
programs in both sites. 
In order to interpret these findings, it is important to add some context for each 
site. As described in the previous chapter, the test of this hypothesis was based on 
inclusion in food rations from the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion (MIES), 
animal feed rations from the Ministry of Agriculture, Farming, and Fisheries (MAGAP), 
agricultural extension projects from various organizations, tractor services from the Junta 
Parroquial of Puela (Manzano only), and greenhouse projects (Pusuca only). While three 
of the four programs in each site were common to both sites (MIES, MAGAP, and 
extension), I learned in the course of fieldwork that they were not organized in the same 
way for both sites. It is important to discuss the different ways in which these programs 
were organized for the residents of each site in order to interpret the significance of the 
research findings. Although the hypothesis test was positive in both sites, it was 
significant in each site for different reasons. 
The MIES and MAGAP programs were organized through the Junta Parroquial of 
Puela and the various constituent cabildos, including Manzano. Whenever these programs 
were organized, locals would complain that people from outside the region came to 
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receive rations, but I never observed this. Instead, I observed the same cadre of 
Manzano’s inner circle assembled either at the Manzano casa comunal or the building of 
the Junta Parroquial in Puela to receive rations. Bernardo and the other cabildo presidents 
would be notified of a given program by the Junta Parroquial and tasked with assembling 
their constituents on a given day and time. Bernardo, like the other presidents, favored his 
core groups and did not generally extend invitations to all households in their villages. 
This is not to say that those outside the core groups were roundly excluded; often others 
would be notified by kin or other ties in the resettlements or neighboring villages and 
subsequently arrive on time for the programs and cabildo presidents did not overtly act to 
exclude them in any way. Agricultural extension programs in Parroquia Puela were often 
organized by MAGAP and various non-governmental organizations directly through the 
individual cabildos and were therefore more subject to the exclusionary practices of the 
cabildos. However, cabildo presidents were often under pressure to deliver high turnouts 
of participants, which led Manzano Cabildo President Bernardo to go beyond his normal 
cohorts and recruit a greater number of participants. In male headed households, there 
was a tendency to first recruit the males, but Bernardo tended to recruit household 
participation through whoever was the most convenient to locate and there were 
numerous instances where the women of the household were easier to locate than the 
men. There was no explicit preference for males outside of the core leaders (mainly 
Vicente and Mateo). Bernardo would also sometimes recruit some other Manzano 
constituents not typically invited, but also invite allies from neighboring villages, 
although the latter was at times discouraged by program agencies.  
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The tractor program was organized by the Junta Parroquial of Puela and anyone 
was eligible for its services. This was an important service because, although plowing 
was important under pre-volcanic conditions, the presence of new volcanic ash in the soil 
made it all the more so. The tractor was purchased by the Junta in early 2011 and was 
contracted out to interested parties, with a dedicated operator hired by the Junta, at a 
subsidized rate of $7 per hour (compared to the market rate of $12 per hour). Complaints 
began almost immediately. Countless individuals signed up for the tractor, many of them 
multiple times and, even after paying in advance, never saw the tractor come to their 
lands. While people were able to recover these funds, it was difficult to make up for time 
lost without plowing in order to plant crops. One problem was that one tractor was simply 
insufficient to meet the needs of the entire parroquia (roughly 300 households) and 
scheduled plowings were rarely completed on time, meaning that the next in line was 
frequently bumped off the list for a given day. The other problem was that the tractor 
tended to more reliably make it to the lands of politically connected households than 
others. 
Unlike Pusuca, where the intervention of a non-governmental resettlement 
organization helped build new political institutions and a system of bylaws for 
participation and project inclusion, political power in Manzano was based on the 
traditionally male-dominated patron-client political networks that have characterized the 
region for more than a century. Although most of its people have resettled to Penipe, 
Pusuca, or Riobamba, Manzano itself has not been displaced as a community, as a set of 
institutions; its traditions of leadership and the leaders themselves have been in place for 
a long time. It is therefore not surprising that local leaders, serving as patrons and brokers 
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to a client community, tend to accumulate greater shares of aid and development 
resources and to facilitate the inclusion of their allies. The inequity of access and control 
of these scarce external resources is frequently no secret at all. Indeed, one need only 
stroll across Cabildo President Bernardo’s land to see evidence of this. Here several goat 
barns and a half dozen plastic greenhouses bear development organization and project 
placards that you will not see on any of his neighbors’ properties.  
Outside of Manzano, in the hills overlooking the resettlement, Bernardo and 19 of 
his closest allies from Manzano secured 1 hectare of land each for themselves, to 
transport their cattle out of the risk zone and to grow crops. Among those in the group of 
beneficiaries are some of the more land wealthy residents of Manzano, but not 
necessarily the most likely to participate in mingas. Instead, these individuals are 
rewarded because they are loyal supporters of Bernardo and his projects. This sort of 
participation often substituted for minga participation and, subsequently, benefit and 
project inclusion.  
Asymmetries in the distribution of political power and resources are neither new 
nor surprising in Manzano, although tensions could and did arise in the contexts of 
disaster, relief, displacement, resettlement, and development where these asymmetries 
were more pronounced as a result of resource scarcity and demand for resources that now 
came from outside and were channeled through local hierarchies. Scott (1979) says as 
much about the unequal power of patron-client relations being tolerated so long as they 
remain mutually beneficial, but points out that resistance emerges as a result of increased 
scarcity or extraction. In disaster research, Henry (2005) states that a disaster may serve 
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as a “structuring idiom” that illuminates for political actors their own political power or 
marginality relative to the state and other political actors and precipitates resistance. 
Privileged inclusion in project benefits is not exclusive to Manzano, but it was far 
less extensive in Pusuca. Although statistical tests found that there was a significant 
association between reciprocal exchange ties and program inclusion in Pusuca, I learned 
in the course of fieldwork that there were several mitigating factors, few of which were 
tantamount to exclusionary (or privileged inclusion) practices within the Pusuca 
resettlement itself. Two of the programs (MIES and MAGAP rations) were not directly 
administered in Pusuca, but instead in the parroquias in the risk zone where many, but not 
all, Pusuca resettlers were still farming and even living part-time. Many Pusuca resettlers 
were either not informed of these programs in their parroquias of origin (although all 
were technically eligible) or they were not interested, as they were no longer cultivating 
crops or keeping animals in the risk zone. In most cases, Pusuca resettlers who were also 
among the wealthier landowners in the risk zone were more likely to be included because 
they still had substantial crops and animals in the risk zone and therefore had more of a 
presence in the risk zone than did others. Thus, although these resources tended to go to 
the wealthier and more connected, it was not necessarily a direct result of exclusion or 
privileged inclusion within the Pusuca resettlement per se. 
There was, however, marked exclusion in the initial greenhouse projects in 
Pusuca, which began in 2009. As mentioned in chapter three, Pusuca’s second president, 
Manuel, was for some time able to exclude beneficiaries from greenhouse projects for the 
market production of tomatoes and include his closest political allies. This exclusion did 
particularly target three women—the first president, Mariana, her daughter, who had a 
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house of her own in the resettlement, and their close friend and ally, Blanca. It did not 
appear that this exclusion was particularly targeted at these women because they were 
women per se, but as a result of a long-standing feud between Manuel and Mariana and 
her kin that predated the resettlement. This sort of exclusion was largely neutralized by 
Esquel’s representative in the community and the initial greenhouse project had failed as 
a result of community in-fighting by early 2011. Later that same year, however, Esquel 
secured funding for a new greenhouse project, but this project was limited to only four 
households and many others claimed they simply were not interested because of the 
problems faced in the earlier project. However, it is important to note that, as with 
countless development initiatives worldwide, many, such as the greenhouses in Pusuca, 
begin as pilot initiatives to be evaluated, revised, and expanded where feasible and 
desirable, so this project should not be evaluated on narrow criteria of inclusion alone. 
There were several agricultural extension projects facilitated by Esquel and 
funded by outside NGOs. These included crop diversification, greenhouse horticulture, 
and farmer-to-table programs and other agricultural market strategies. As with minga 
organization, these programs were not organized to accommodate resettlers with jobs or 
part-time residences outside Pusuca. Events were often hastily organized or scheduled on 
days and times that made it difficult for resettlers who did not maintain a full-time 
presence in Pusuca or else had routinized work schedules that were difficult or 
impossible to change in order to participate in extension programs. The arrival of 
representatives of outside organizations to assess the interest in and feasibility of new 
initiatives and to recruit participants might be announced only a day or two ahead of time 
at lesser committee meetings (i.e., not always in the monthly mandatory General 
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Assembly meetings) or posted on a whiteboard outside the president’s house. This short 
notice at times made it difficult for people to attend. As a result, several households that 
engaged in multiple economic strategies (i.e., wage employment and agricultural 
production) and therefore found the process of forested land colonization most 
challenging were unable to access institutional support that might have facilitated this 
process and enabled them to more fully focus their livelihood strategies in the 
resettlement. 
Gender in Minga Practice and Village Politics in Disasters and Resettlement 
Although gender did not really register with study hypotheses, it has factored into 
minga practice and political power in the study sites in several ways worth discussing. 
While gendered dynamics have been mentioned in several contexts of the discussion so 
far, because of the importance of gender in Andean culture (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009, 
1998; Jennings and Bowser 2008; Weismantel 2001, 1989), reciprocity (Komter 1996; 
Strathern 1990), disasters (Enarson 2001, 1998; Enarson and Morrow 1998), and 
resettlement (Koenig 2001; Colson 1999), it is important to consider the role of gender in 
the present research context more thoroughly. 
Gendered Division of Labor 
 In this study, gender was significantly associated with wage employment in 
Pusuca, where men were more likely to engage in wage employment than women. There 
was a greater number of employed men than women in Manzano as well, but statistical 
tests of the association between these variables were not significant. This is unsurprising 
and consistent with national trends where men consistently outnumber women in the 
labor force, although the difference has narrowed in recent years (World Bank 2012). 
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There was likewise no significant difference between the residential distance of male- 
and female-headed households in either site, which suggests that displacement and 
resettlement did not result in a gendered differential in the disarticulation of community 
networks. And, as wage employment was expected to be negatively associated with 
minga participation, since there were less employed women than men, it is similarly 
unsurprising that there was no significant association between gender and minga 
participation. This points to a potential constraint on women’s economic strategies in a 
post-disaster and resettlement context, but it also points to a gendered division of labor in 
mingas. 
The division of labor is arguably the most salient gendered form of difference in 
minga practice. In his study of mingas in the indigenous communities of Otavalo, 
Ecuador, Colloredo-Mansfeld (1998:199) observed women carrying children on their 
backs while they attended to domestic chores, worked in the fields, and labored on 
mingas. He interprets this as weaving maternal and political responsibilities together, but 
does not explicitly recognize the added burden and the fact that women do not so much 
appear to be “weaving together” responsibilities so much as they are doubling up on 
them. Although hypotheses for the present study did not consider division of labor in 
mingas, I did observe decidedly gendered patterns in the division of labor similar to that 
observed by Colloredo-Mansfeld, which were discussed in chapter 3, but are worth 
revisiting here.  
The gendered division of labor depended on the type of minga and on the site and 
generally took one of the following four forms. First, in the community mingas of 
Manzano, men tended to work with tools, while women performed more generalized 
223 
 
tasks that were frequently more labor intensive than those performed by men, although 
the division was not perceived as such. One example provided in chapter 3 was a 
community minga to cut chamisa (eucalyptus branches for ceremonial parades). Here, the 
men worked with saws, machetes, and hatchets to cut branches, saplings, and fell trees at 
the top of a 100 meter slope, while the women and children hauled large bundles of the 
branches to piles alongside a path at the base of the slope. While the men thanked women 
and children for “helping” them, the work performed by the women in constantly 
descending and ascending the slope with the weight of large bundles of branches clearly 
demanded appreciably more energy than that spent by the men hacking branches at the 
top of the slope.  
Second, the irrigation mingas on Pusuca developed standardized tareas (tasks) for 
each minga. These were initially proposed by men in the group and later ratified by the 
directiva in order to make sure that every household made equal contributions to 
irrigation minga labor. The men who proposed this made no explicit mention of gender in 
building their case for tareas and it is unclear if this was a salient factor in their 
consideration. The proposal of tareas was explicitly made because many in the village felt 
that the greater share of the labor had been performed by a few, while others only showed 
up for allotted minga times and performed little work. The outcomes of the tarea sytem 
were manifold in terms of the division of labor. The most common tareas were to dig 
trenches ten meters in length and one meter deep or to haul 100 shovelfuls of sand and 
stone for roughly 80 meters over uneven terrain at high altitudes (~3,000 meters). 
Women, the elderly, and some of the smaller men had a much more difficult time 
completing their tareas than the more able-bodied males. Able-bodied men hauled 100 
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shovelfuls of sand and stone in sacks carrying 10-12 shovelfuls per load, completing their 
tarea in 8-10 trips, while women and the elderly carried sacks of 3-6 shovelfuls and 
completed their tareas in more than 20 trips. This was even more pronounced when the 
tarea involved trench digging. Some men completed their trenches by midday, while 
some women and the elderly had to work several days to complete their trenches. Several 
women and elderly residents complained of injuries and over-exertion in these mingas. 
As a result, several female-headed and elderly households would pay peons to work in 
their stead on tarea mingas, which resulted in an uneven cost burden. The fine (multa) for 
failing to attend an irrigation minga (or complete the tarea) was $20, while it cost $10-
$12, plus three meals, to pay a peon to work for a day. However, peons, like several 
members of the community, often had to work two or more days to complete a tarea, 
which could quickly run the costs of the tarea up and deplete limited household cash 
reserves. 
Third, in irrigation mingas in Manzano (organized by the Puela Irrigation 
Committee) and the community mingas of Pusuca, men and women work side-by-side 
with little evidence of a gendered division of labor, although subtle differences do 
emerge. In these mingas there are no tareas and rayas (attendance credits) are granted to 
those who work until the minga is over (typically 8am until 2-4pm). In these projects, 
men and women work alongside one another, completing tasks as a unit. A common task 
in these mingas in both sites is the clearing of ash, soil, overgrowth, and other debris 
from irrigation canals, potable water systems, and roads. In the process, men and women 
work in mixed-gender groups that leapfrog one another as they clear each section of the 
way. Some men do break off from the groups and walk ahead with machetes, clearing 
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larger overgrowth from the way. This is more common in Manzano and Puela than it is in 
Pusuca, and is more a product of the gendered division of leadership in the old villages. 
The men who wander ahead with machetes are often cabildo or committee leaders who 
are, to some extent, directing the work parties and for whom wandering ahead with 
machetes is also an opportunity to survey work progress and upcoming tasks along the 
way. 
Fourth and finally, as cited by Colloredo-Mansfeld above, childcare 
responsibilities frequently are an added burden for women in their participation in minga 
labor (to say nothing of elsewhere). In irrigation and community mingas in both sites, 
women were frequently accompanied by their young children. This was less common in 
Manzano, where the population was significantly older than Pusuca and there were 
therefore less young children overall. Still, women working mingas frequently had to 
attend to childcare responsibilities at the same time. Alternatives were limited, as males 
rarely assumed the duties of childcare in these communities and there were few other 
options. In Pusuca, the Esquel Community Coordinator, Martha, helped start a daycare 
facility in an unoccupied house in early 2011 with funding from the National Institute of 
Children and Family (Instituto Nacional del Niño y Familia, INNFA). This was intended 
as a small employment opportunity for women in the village and to help support 
women’s work in agriculture, pastoralism, employment, and mingas. Some women, 
however, did not take advantage of the daycare and continued to rely on kin and 
neighbors for childcare support (more on this below), or else continue laboring with their 
children on their backs or tucked in the shade while they worked. Some women cited 
conflicts with the other women operating the daycare as a reason for not utilizing the 
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services and, by the end of 2011, the daycare lost funding because of underutilization, in 
spite of last ditch efforts by Martha to save the daycare by attempting to partner with a 
neighboring village. 
Gender and Reciprocity 
Gender factors into reciprocal exchange practices in complex ways. In the West 
and cross-culturally, women have been found to both give and receive more gifts than 
males (Yan 2005:248; Komter 1996; Susser 1982; Lomnitz 1977; Stack 1973), a 
tendency that may be tied to traditional gender roles (Cheal 1988). In the present study, 
gender was not significantly associated with participation in reciprocity overall, although 
the study is limited to considering only binary participation in reciprocal exchange 
categories (see chapter 7). With that said, ethnographic observations suggest important 
gendered differences in three primary domains of reciprocal exchange practices in the 
study sites. The first was alluded to above and concerns the related issues of childcare 
and division of labor. Simply put, women not only have the added responsibility of caring 
for children in addition to economic, household, and communal (i.e., minga) 
responsibilities, balancing these responsibilities can increase their obligation to engage in 
some exchange relations (i.e., give gifts or services), while reducing the returns they 
might receive from these exchanges. For example, lacking viable daycare options, 
women in both sites tended to rely on kin and other close ties to share childcare 
responsibilities. Being able to leave her child with a neighbor for a day might enable a 
woman to tend to her fields or work in a minga, but she then has an added obligation to 
her neighbor. This might take the form of sharing meals (more on this below), alternating 
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days for childcare responsibility, or loaning tools or money. All three of these options 
decrease a woman’s scarce economic reserves while increasing her obligations to others.  
Importantly, childcare responsibilities factor significantly into the returns a 
woman earns for working as a peon. While men will earn an average of $10-$13 per day, 
plus two or three meals, women earn an average of $8-$10 per day. The most commonly 
cited reasons for this difference in compensation are that women perform less work than 
men in the same amount of time and they often bring children to work who must also be 
fed. These practices and perceptions not only mean that women will earn less than men as 
peons, but also that women are generally less desired than men for most peon labor. 
 Secondly, as mentioned above, alcohol was an item commonly exchanged in 
mingas, village council meetings, and fiestas, and this was a common reciprocal 
exchange practice throughout the Andes (Jennings and Bowser 2008; Colloredo-
Mansfeld 2009). Although both men and women drank alcohol, their relationships to the 
practice of alcohol consumption and reciprocity were different in important ways 
(Jennings and Bowser 2008:10). The practices of serving, consuming, and exchanging 
alcohol were gendered in important ways. Men would consume alcohol in a variety of 
contexts, while women tended only to consume alcohol in fiestas or when it was directly 
offered to them in mingas and (rarely) in village council meetings. In Pusuca and 
Manzano, it was almost exclusively men who gave alcohol in all contexts, although 
younger women sometimes purchased and shared alcohol with other men and women at 
fiestas. In mingas, village council meetings, and most fiestas, however, it was the men 
who purchased and exchanged alcohol and, as Jennings and Bowser (2008:10) observe, 
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although both sexes drink, in these contexts “a man’s relationship with other men is 
affirmed through drinking.”  
In the communal activity of drinking in Manzano, Pusuca, and the wider Andean 
region, a group exchanging and consuming alcohol does so with just one cup, which was 
filled and served to each individual in the group. The server was rarely the same person 
who purchased the alcohol for the group. Instead, another member of the group would be 
assigned the task of serving and, when there were women present, the server would 
almost always be a woman who would pour out the drink for each man in the group. 
Women, typically the server, would be invited or encouraged to take a drink (or several) 
as well, but this was more often part of the novelty of seeing a woman drink, especially 
when consuming the hard cane liquor, puro, produced in the region. Importantly, men 
built relationships and allegiances through the exchange of alcohol in ways that women 
did not and their participation in the exchange and consumption of alcohol was largely 
regarded as a novelty.  
Conversely, there may be limited apertures for women’s exercise of power in the 
consumption and exchange of alcohol. In their pan-Andean study of the role of alcohol 
consumption and exchange, Jennings and Bowser (2008:2) observed that a woman 
serving beer to her husband might reinforce traditional gender roles, but the act may be 
infused with a woman’s exercise (however limited) of power by alternately spilling, 
withholding, or over-serving beer to punish her husband without necessarily departing 
from social norms (see also Weismantel 2001; Bowser 2004). In Bolivia, Harris 
(1996:251) found that women who control household budgets resist converting household 
assets (livestock) into cash unless there is an immediate need for a purchase, which can 
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protect against the negative effects of inflation, but also prevent men from excessive 
spending on alcohol consumption. 
The third and final domain of gendered difference observed in reciprocal 
exchange practices is that of the gifting of meals and prepared foods. The present study 
formally considered only exchanges between households in semi-structured interviews 
and thus did not capture sufficient nuance in gendered differences in types of exchange 
through these data (see chapter 7 for an explanation). However, as above, I observed 
gendered trends in some forms of exchange. One of the most common was the exchange 
of meals or prepared foods which, unlike every other form of exchange observed in the 
study sites, was almost exclusively practiced by women as the giver or preparer. Even in 
instances where male household members offered food or a meal, it was always prepared 
by the women of the house. In one respect, men could develop relationships by offering 
meals that the women prepared, an exchange that clearly appears to reflect the gender 
dominance of men in the community. However, as documented by studies of the 
reciprocal exchanges of the urban poor (Gonzalez de la Rocha 2001; Susser 1982; 
Lomnitz 1977; Stack 1973), women build important economic and political alliances 
through the exchange of food and everyday items with their neighbors, but it is men who 
primarily occupy roles of political leadership. In both Manzano and Pusuca, this was 
evident, as married and single women often cooked for single men and in the process 
built relationships of solidarity that would manifest in help with minga tareas and 
household chores as well as vocal support in village council meetings. 
In Aafke Komter’s (1996:124-125) excellent review of women, gift-giving, and 
power, she outlines four possible gender models of power to interpret women’s greater 
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participation in reciprocity: (1) men benefit more than women; (2) women and men 
benefit equally; (3) women benefit more than men, and; (4) “a condition of alternating 
asymmetry, in which men and women profit alternatively from the dominant and 
gendered patterns of gift giving.” After reviewing each, Komter comes to favor the fourth 
model based on Strathern’s (1990:328) discussion of gender in Melanesian reciprocity, 
where she posits that “it is agents, not structures, who act.” This is to say that gender 
inequality, as expressed through reciprocal exchange practices, may coexist with acts of 
genuine parity, and the exercise of power might alternatively benefit men or women in 
the context of otherwise gendered hierarchies (Komter 1996; Strathern 1990). Women 
might gain access to scarce material and political resources through relationships 
brokered through reciprocal exchanges, while simultaneously being implicated in the 
reification of stratified gender roles (e.g., woman as caregiver or domestic servant). What 
matters, then, as with most anthropological endeavors, are the particulars of the contexts 
in which these exchanges are performed and relationships built. 
Gender, Political Power, and the Distribution of Resources 
Gender is a central variable in the distribution of political power and resources at 
the village and broader regional levels throughout the Andes (Colloredo-Mansfeld 2009; 
de la Torre 2006; Deere and León 2001). Decision-making authority is primarily 
accorded to men in rural village politics (de la Torre 2006:252). There were three specific 
gendered trends in the distribution of political power and development resources I 
observed in both sites that are worth mentioning. First, it is important to consider the 
difference in the gendered composition of leadership in the two sites. In Manzano, the 
only leadership positions held by women from 1999-2011 were as secretaries for the 
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cabildo and the Seguro Campesino. In Pusuca, women held a variety of leadership 
positions since the community’s inception in late 2008. The first president of the 
community was a woman and women served in several capacities on all village 
committees (Directiva, Caja Comunitaria, Irrigation, Potable Water). Men still outnumber 
women in leadership roles in Pusuca, but the difference is marginal (11-9 in 2011). The 
difference in Pusuca can largely be attributed to the influence of the Esquel Foundation, 
which was noted above and need not be elaborated upon here. It is also possible that in 
the liminal and socially heterogeneous context of resettlement, previously or traditionally 
marginalized or excluded actors, like women, moved into the vacuum created in the new 
situation (Linda Whiteford, personal communication). 
The second gendered issue worth discussing in this context is the comparison 
between the leadership positions and the leadership practices of men and women in 
Manzano and Pusuca. In his study of village politics in Otavalo, Ecuador, Colloredo-
Mansfeld (2009) observed a trend of village councils being dominated by males who 
often had to contend with vocal female dissenters. In spite of the difference in the gender 
composition of the village leadership in the two sites, the gendered differences of 
leadership were surprisingly similar. Although there were some exceptions, men tended 
to set agendas and lead the decision-making process, while women tended to constitute a 
sort of loyal opposition, frequently challenging decisions and offering alternative courses 
of action to those posed by the leadership. In Manzano in 2011, this generally took the 
form of sarcasm, joking, and vocal asides between the women, which would often be 
considered by the village president, Bernardo. For example, in an instance where 
Bernardo proposed a minga on a certain day, some of the women would joke out loud 
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“Yeah, good luck getting everyone to show up on a Sunday!” and Bernardo might 
reconsider his plans and choose another day. At other times, women’s dissent could result 
in tension and this was more common in 2009, when there was a larger group of women 
participating in Manzano. For example, on several occasions women directly challenged 
Bernardo’s legitimacy as a leader because he went along with the work plans of the Puela 
Irrigation Committee in spite of the fact that these projects did not directly benefit 
Manzano. After several tense exchanges with women in his own community, Bernardo 
began to directly confront the leadership of the Irrigation Committee and went so far as to 
boycott irrigation mingas for several months, while encouraging the women of Manzano 
to voice their dissent in parish-wide meetings of the Irrigation Committee and the Junta 
Parroquial. Finally, in Pusuca the trend was similar, although the dissenting voices of 
women were often more directly confrontational than in Manzano (especially during 
2009, when ex-president Mariana and her allies were engaged in a prolonged battle with 
then-president Manuel). Dissenting opinions might be couched in humor and joking, but 
often women simply presented alternative courses of action directly or else voiced 
vigorous opposition to decisions and particular practices. Thus, women influenced 
decision-making in both communities in ways that were socially acceptable, albeit from 
the marginal position of opposition. 
In Andean contexts and in disasters and resettlement, gender has been found to 
contribute to differential access to economic and development resources (Wisner et al. 
2006:11; Shepler 2002; Sommers 2001; Anderson and Woodrow 1998; Ferguson and 
Byrne 1994; Weismantel 1989). However, statistical tests of the relationship between 
gender and the distribution of aid and development resources did not find any significant 
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relationship between these variables in either site. In Manzano, there were nonetheless 
several women who claimed in interviews that they were denied inclusion in aid and 
development resources. In Pusuca, the Esquel Foundation placed an emphasis on 
including women in development programs and, though there was tension between 
certain men and women in the community over inclusion in the greenhouse projects, men 
and women were generally equally included in village development programs. 
Significance of Findings for Disaster and Resettlement Research 
The findings for hypothesis one call into question certain theoretical models of 
resettlement, while confirming others. Downing and Garcia-Downing (2009) suggest that 
resettlement is a process of transition from routine culture to dissonant culture to a new 
routine culture. These routine cultures are defined by “roughly the same people, or 
groups, repeatedly reoccupying the same places at the same times” (Downing and Garcia-
Downing 2009:228, italics in original). In this model, the antecedent routine culture is 
replaced by a dissonant culture that temporarily reorders space, time, and relationships 
before emerging into a new routine culture. This model is problematic because it 
presumes a sort of pre- and post-resettlement stasis, brackets out potentially perennial 
tensions of routine cultures, and allows for a return to a presumed “normal.” I say 
problematic because it largely ignores the tensions and inequities that exist in 
communities prior to resettlement and which might affect recovery and the political and 
economic sustainability of resettlements. This same problem is present in the Scudder 
and Colson (1982) model, which is likewise based on a transition from self-sustainability 
to crisis and back to self-sustainability and the “handing over” of resettlement affairs 
from outside institutions to the resettlers themselves without allowing for the 
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perpetuation of domination and dependence between and within agencies and resettler 
communities.  
In a broad sense, competing models more closely capture the complexity of 
resettlement (de Wet 2006b). Cernea’s (2003, 2000, 1997) impoverishment risks and 
resettlement model better points to the complex interaction of institutions, social groups, 
and economic factors that have both proximal and distal consequences for risks of 
impoverishment in resettlement. However, Cernea’s model lacks an attention to power 
relations and the complexity of resettler social organization. Whiteford and Tobin’s 
(2009) model emphasizes the “cascading” of impacts of disasters and resettlement, 
specifically calling attention to their complexity and capacity to perpetuate the 
vulnerability of resettlers and disaster-affected peoples. This model, like Cernea’s, 
provides an outline of domains to be attended to in disaster research, but it could be 
improved by greater specificity or schematics hypothesizing the ways in which these 
domains might interact and under what conditions and furthermore including attention to 
power relations in each domain. To wit, in order to advance anthropological theories of 
social organization in disasters and resettlement, we need to go beyond both formulaic 
reductions of stasis—crisis—stasis and vaguely defined models of complexity. 
This study focused on forms of reciprocity and power relations in order to explore 
the ways in which these factors might affect disaster recovery and resettlement. 
Reflecting on these findings, it is worth asking why the community minga strategy was 
less effective and inclusive in Manzano than in Pusuca. One possible explanation is 
simply that traditional community organization was strained by displacement and 
resettlement. As discussed above and in chapter two, there is a significant body of 
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evidence that volunteerism from core networks is frequently followed by a decrease in 
availability of support and an increase in conflict and weakened social networks (Ritchie 
2012; Henry 2005; Norris et al. 2004; Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 2002; Bolin et al. 1998; 
Palinkas et al. 1993). Manzano organization had long been based on patron-client 
relations, which, as others have pointed out (e.g., Scott 1976), are inherently unequal, but 
endure so long as both parties benefit. The period of prolonged displacement followed by 
resettlement was a time during which people would seek assistance from kin and 
neighbors who were themselves seeking assistance and therefore often unable to give or 
reciprocate. The tension is this context continued to build as some members of the 
Manzano community took notice of the fact that some accessed forms of support that 
others did not. The disasters and ensuing displacement thus revealed some of the 
inequities in the community and people grew more vocal in questioning and challenging 
these inequities. 
In 2009, when Manzano first began organizing mingas again after the 
resettlements had been operating for nearly a year, I observed a significantly higher rate 
of participation than I did when I returned in 2011. In 2009, I also observed some 
community members questioning and challenging village leadership. Those who I 
observed doing so were no longer participating in village affairs in 2011 and I spoke with 
several people who made it clear that this was because they had been denied access to 
disaster relief and development projects, while others had privileged access. There may 
have always been inequities in the distribution of resources in Manzano, but the relative 
scarcity that came after the disaster made it difficult to maintain relationships in in spite 
of them. The result was that those who dissented were increasingly excluded, while 
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others who had been relatively quiet about their marginalization gradually retreated from 
participating in the community. 
The differences between Manzano community mingas and Pusuca mingas were 
evident in the gossip I consistently noted during mingas in each community in 2011. In 
Manzano, where dissenting voices were excluded or silenced, there was constant 
discussion about how much more organized they were than other communities. During 
every minga in which I participated in 2011, there was talk of how other villages in the 
parroquia were less organized and how Manzano was so much more deserving because 
they were organized. In contrast, during the same period in Pusuca, there was a constant 
din of gossip about other community members. At any given moment during the mingas 
and meeting in Pusuca, discussions focused on who participated, who did not, who 
showed up but did not do their share, and who had poor excuses for their absences, etc. 
While the people of Manzano basically never criticized the participation of their own 
people, the people of Pusuca did so relentlessly. The ability of Manzano to attract scarce 
relief and development resources was based largely on their ability to organize, and their 
organization was built on relationships that the remaining village participants were 
unwilling to offend. In Pusuca, the ability to attract scarce development resources was 
similarly based on their ability to organize mingas, but there was a codified institutional 
regime, not merely personal relationships that had to be maintained. 
Elsewhere, social homogeneity has been found to be a key factor in collective 
action in development programs, while heterogeneity was found to be a deterrent 
(Krishna and Uphoff 2002:97). In a cross-cultural study of resettlements, Scudder 
(1985:129) found cooperation was greatest in group-based and homogeneous 
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resettlements, where resettlers were associated with the same kinship networks, villages, 
castes, religions, and ethnicities. Furthermore, studies of resettlements in Israel found that 
impoverishment was greater where resettlements broke up old social groupings and 
recovery was greater in group-based resettlements that kept these social groupings intact 
(Sebenius et al. 2005).  
Others have formulated an alternative hypothesis to explain the development of 
collective action based on heterogeneity (Jones 2004; Ruttan 2006, 2008). As mentioned 
in chapter two, in his study of the cooperatives of small-scale agriculturalists in coastal 
Ecuador, Jones (2004:13) found that cooperatives that exhibited greater socioeconomic 
heterogeneity were more successful getting started out than more homogeneous 
cooperatives. He found that individuals with little experience in cooperatives were more 
likely to trust those they perceived as wealthy and that they often used wealth as a means 
of deciding whom to trust when a cooperative was starting up. Jones did not in that 
manuscript, however, examine other forms of social composition, such as kin and 
neighbors.  
It is worth elaborating for a moment on the finding that community mingas in the 
traditional community of Manzano are less inclusive and effective than those in the 
resettlement in Pusuca. What is interesting about this finding is that it contradicts, in 
many ways, the findings and recommendations of other resettlement and development 
researchers that homogenous groups with high levels of trust are more likely to cooperate 
and form reciprocal ties. Although the sample of sites (n=2) is far too small for the 
generalization of findings based on site characteristics, it is apparent that the more 
heterogeneous site of Pusuca was more effectively and inclusively organized than the 
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homogeneous site of Manzano. Both sites had comparable distributions of wealth (as 
measured by total land owned). Manzano was comprised of people who had been 
neighbors for generations (with the exception of four households) and there were many 
kin ties between them. By contrast, the population of Pusuca was much more 
heterogeneous, as resettlers there were drawn from seven different villages, although the 
majority (25 of 42 households) was from one village, Pungal de Puela.  
To a certain extent, we might characterize this difference as being one of “old 
village” vs. “new village” behavior. The creation of a new village will entail the 
formation of new social ties and the dissolution of old ones, but these ties may not be as 
strong and deep as those in the old village, which might have more pronounced 
consequences. In the old village, where a sort of social homogeneity prevails and there 
are traditional and informal processes for dealing with dissent, gossip might tend to be 
focused outward on other communities, as it was in Manzano. In contrast, gossip in 
Pusuca was trained inward and focused on the behavior of other community members in 
ways that were not observed—at least not openly—in Manzano. In light of the finding 
that Pusuca mingas are more inclusive and effective than those in Manzano, this is 
important because it suggests that there is something effective about social heterogeneity 
in facilitating cooperation. Resettlement and development researchers have found that 
cooperation is best facilitated by high levels of trust (Krishna and Uphoff 2002; Isham 
and Kahkonen 2002) and keeping homogenous groups together (Cernea 2000, Scudder 
1985), but the findings of this study suggest that it is worth exploring the alternatives. 
Although trust was not a variable considered in this study, in Pusuca, the more socially 
heterogeneous of the two communities, there was also a marked prevalence of gossip 
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about the participation of other resettlers, which evinces a low level of trust between 
neighbors in the community. Heterogeneity, of course, has been considered by other 
researchers as facilitating cooperation (Ruttan 2008, 2006; Jones 2004), but it is also 
possible that distrust may have some positive influence on cooperation. Boyd et al. 
(2010) found that the punishment of dissenters helps sustain cooperation and that this is 
most effective when the costs of exercising punishment are low. Gossip, they point out, is 
one of the most common and low-cost forms of punishment in social groups, but it is not 
generally practiced unless it is accepted by other group members (Boyd et al. 2010:617). 
Jones (2004) found that economic heterogeneity in Ecuadorian cooperatives was actually 
positively associated with trust (in the wealthy), but it is possible that social heterogeneity 
may be negatively associated with trust, thus creating the aperture for gossip that 
facilitates cooperation by punishing dissenters. 
Of course, the effectiveness and inclusiveness of minga organizing in Pusuca was 
largely dependent on the mitigating influence of the Esquel Foundation. Pusuca had been 
stewarded by Esquel and had largely prevented internal power relations from dominating 
and they structured and formalized minga organization. However, this has important 
implications and consequences as well. My interest in forming this hypothesis was to 
explore the presence of unequal power in reciprocal exchange relations, not to test the 
degree to which heterogeneity affected cooperation. However, in this context the two 
appear to be more closely related than anticipated. Mingas organized by cabildos such as 
Manzano play key roles in attracting resources from outside organizations and compete 
with other communities for these scarce resources. They also engage in exclusion and the 
brokers that connect the community to these outside institutions accumulate appreciably 
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more resources than do other group members. Their position also enables a fair amount 
of exclusion that is often invisible to outside organizations who perceive the community 
as tightly-knit and organized. With that said, there are historical factors worth 
considering, specifically the extent to which the sustained recruitment of participants for 
the production of common resources is the source of cabildo power.  
Historically, in the clientelist political system of Ecuador, cabildo and minga 
leaders were uniquely capable of securing outside resources for their communities and 
this was largely underwritten by their ability to organize their communities, which was 
recursively facilitated by their ability to secure outside resources. By requiring minga 
participation as a prerequisite for benefit inclusion, external organizations like Esquel 
inserted personal benefit into the political economy of the minga, largely usurping 
cabildo power. Thus, minga participation became predicated not on perpetual communal 
obligation, but on personal benefit and institutional mandates. Brokers were essentially 
eliminated from the equation, which not only marginalized the powerful, but inhibited 
resettlers’ ability to organize and negotiate with outside organizations on their own (albeit 
clientelist) terms. Finally, where institutions like the Esquel Foundation promoted the 
poor and marginal to positions of leadership, their efforts unfortunately left wider social 
structures unchanged. Formerly marginal individuals and households acquired productive 
resources and political influence in the resettlement and the brokerage model that 
emerged therefore appears, at least structurally, to be the most inclusive. However, 
although the creation of new institutions in Pusuca largely avoided the reification of 
power relations, as Esquel steps back and recalls their community liaison, it is hard not to 
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get the impression that these unequal power relations will return to the forefront and have 
important consequences for future distributions of resources in the resettlement.  
Perspectives on Power and Reciprocity among Disaster-Affected Resettlers 
The objective of this study was to identify the dynamics of power at work in 
reciprocal exchange relations in a disaster-affected community and a disaster-induced 
resettlement in the Andean highlands of Ecuador. Absent a critical eye to the tension 
between practices of cooperation for mutual aid and unequal power relations that inhere 
in reciprocal exchange relations and cooperative labor groups like mingas, we are often 
left with aseptic concepts of “social support” or “social capital” as well as a latent yet 
dogged perception of disaster-affected peoples and resettlers as passive, powerless 
victims (Beazley 2009). The findings of this study, however, suggest that a significant 
degree of variation in power and resource access within these communities can be 
explained by the relationship between reciprocal exchange relations and political power. 
We encounter this power as a relational property inherent in social interaction and 
derived from the ability to access and allocate relatively scarce resources (Kurtz 2001; 
Wolf 1990; Roseberry 1988; Bourdieu 1977), the unequal distribution of risks (Hornborg 
2001:1), the ability to make decisions that affect others’ livelihoods (Narotzky 2005:81-
82), and broker the relations between communities and outside institutions (Mosse and 
Lewis 2006; Salmen 1987).   
In first seeking to identify ways in which reciprocal exchange practices are 
endangered in disaster-induced resettlement, we find a dialectic tension between modes 
of production (Jones 2010; Watts 2000) in the dynamic between capitalist control of 
laborers and their time and the demands of social organization in an agricultural 
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community. We also observe a tension between the power of state and non-government 
institutions along with the community to organize the community around scarce 
development resources. In Manzano, we find an increased awareness of the inequalities 
in power and access to resources since resettlement and this resulted in the partial 
polarization and fragmentation of the community. This is consistent with the strategies of 
actors in unequal power relations to gain “increasingly direct power over local 
sociopolitical resources, and use such power to gain indirect control over economic 
activities” (Whitten 1969:234). 
There is some evidence that Manzano mingas are forms of reciprocity based on a 
process of perpetual labor recruitment via repeated practices of conspicuous giving to 
laborer households, with reciprocity serving as redistribution by periodically facilitating 
the flow of accumulated wealth and goods from elites to commoners (cf. Whitten 1969). 
This is consistent with Sahlins’ (1979:276-286) theory of concentric redistribution 
through reciprocity, where powerful brokers amassed resources from group members and 
then engaged in public displays of generosity in which they would conspicuously 
distribute these surpluses in order to gain power, wealth, and prestige. In Manzano, the 
cabildo president and his allies appealed to shared interests and ideology to organize the 
group and to legitimize their agendas, thereby transforming their power to control the 
scarce development resources of the group into an act of generosity (see also Jones 2010; 
Blanton et al. 1996; Sahlins 1972). In Pusuca, this power is exercised largely by the 
resettlement agency, the Esquel Foundation. However, in both cases forms of gossip and 
discourse of communities reinforce the power and the distribution, as these were often 
based on calls to organize based on shared obligations and needs, a common ideology. 
243 
 
Mosse and Lewis (2006) called attention to the roles of powerful individuals in 
leadership positions within communities and institutions that set the agendas for decision-
making contexts, often translating the needs of one group to the other. Power may have 
its origins in access to and distribution of scarce resources, but brokerage power in this 
context was derived from relationships with the state and non-governmental 
organizations, which we find clearly monopolized by a core group in both sites. In both 
Manzano and Pusuca, there are key individuals and households who broker ties between 
groups and institutions and these same people exercise greater influence in decision-
making and they and their closest allies do access a greater share of relief and 
development resources. One key institution, Esquel, has a greater capacity to control 
access to scarce resources in Pusuca. However, this has the potential to lead to prolonged 
tension between community and institution over the power to organize and administer the 
community or the retiring of Esquel and the re-emergence of traditional brokerage roles 
for powerful landowners. We therefore find that the study of power according to a “state 
versus community” perspective in resettlement is inadequate (see also Beazley 2009).  
The power of the state and non-governmental organizations over communities 
remains significant in both research sites, but this alone is not sufficient to explain the 
distribution of resources and political power in the two communities. Instead, results 
show that mid-level connections between local groups and the state and NGOs have 
important implications for the production of power and the distribution of scarce 
development resources, which is consistent with study findings in other development 
contexts (Knauft 2006; Merry 2006; Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2005; Elyachar 
2002).  
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Because political negotiation has been likened to a form of reciprocal exchange, 
underwritten by exclusion and privileged inclusion of actors in exchange relations 
(Mayer 2002; Spedding 1998; Schweizer 1997), I anticipated that those individuals who 
exercise power through reciprocal exchange and mingas are more likely than others to 
serve as brokers and access and control a greater degree of relief and development 
resources. Study results confirmed this assumption, which goes to question the logic of 
ostensibly participatory development projects that tend to, however inadvertently, favor 
the interests of the powerful (Cooke and Kothari 2001:8) and reify existing inequalities 
(Knauft 2006:415), a topic to be discussed further in the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
This study identified several interesting dynamics in the practices of reciprocity, 
minga cooperation, political power, and resource access and distribution in disaster-
affected and resettled communities in highland Ecuador. First, we saw that the practices 
of reciprocity and minga cooperation were negatively affected by wage labor 
participation and the residential distance between community members, which was an 
outcome of the disaster, displacement, and resettlement processes. There were, however, 
mitigating factors, such as village politics and social divisions and the influence of 
outside institutions that were associated with variation in these practices as well. Second, 
we found that minga participation was tightly bound up with participation in reciprocal 
exchange relations in the traditional community of Manzano, but that minga participation 
was more strongly associated with institutional strategies and a codified set of community 
obligations in the resettlement site of Pusuca. Third, we found that political power—
specifically, brokerage roles and the ability to influence decision-making—was also 
strongly associated with participation in reciprocal exchange relations. And finally, we 
found that the networks of actors most closely related to powerful brokers through 
reciprocal exchange relations accessed a greater share of aid and development resources 
in both communities, although there were mitigating factors in each. This study was 
limited in several key respects, while simultaneously pointing to potentially fruitful 
opportunities for further research and application. In what follows, I review each of the 
246 
 
limitations of the study, followed by suggestions for further research, and conclude with 
some recommendations for application that can be derived from this study. 
Limitations of the Current Study 
There were several methodological limitations to this study, which can be 
generally grouped into three broad categories: research design flaws, intentional 
limitations of framework, and generalizability. Each of these limitations has its own set 
of implications for interpreting the results of the current study and for suggesting further 
research.  
Research Design Flaws 
The design flaws were already discussed briefly in the methodology, results, and 
discussion chapters, but are worth summarizing here for the purposes of working toward 
a more robust and reliable framework for the study of reciprocity in disaster-affected 
communities and resettlement. The first and perhaps most glaring limitation is the lack of 
data on exchange frequency; that is, data on how often study participants gave or 
received the items or services in the reciprocity interview. Asking respondents to indicate 
how often (or how many times in a given time period) they gave or received each item or 
service in the checklist would have made it possible to analyze the flows of different 
items and services in different directions in the network. In the dataset compiled from my 
interviews, I could only analyze the volume (or density) of total exchanges and it is 
virtually impossible to examine the directional flows of different types of exchanges, as 
intended, because every exchange category covaries with each other exchange category 
(see Appendix B). As a result, I was not able to test hypothesis 2 (people who receive 
more material items than they give are more likely to participate in mingas) or hypothesis 
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3a (people who give more material items than they receive are more likely to have 
political power) as originally intended and I could only test the association of 
participation (H2) and political power (H3a) with total exchange participation. By only 
asking respondents whether or not they gave or received each item, I was left with a very 
limited dataset on reciprocal exchange that did not tell me nearly as much as data on 
frequency might have. 
What is perhaps most frustrating about this lack of data on exchange frequency is 
that I made a conscious decision not to collect it because I felt it would result in excessive 
respondent burden and present challenges to completing the study. Although shorter 
alternatives are sometimes feasible (cf. Jones 2003), network interviews tend to be time-
consuming and repetitive and result in a fair amount of burden on respondents who are 
asked the same questions hundreds of times about nearly every individual in their lives 
(McCarty et al. 2007). Moreover, the interview did not merely consist of network 
questions; the second part elicited data on minga participation, inclusion/exclusion, and 
political power.  
Having previously administered interviews similar to the ones I employed in this 
study in the same study sites two years earlier, I knew that the maximum threshold of 
time I could require respondents to sit for an interview was roughly 90 minutes. After this 
point, respondents tended to lose focus or, worse, decline to respond further. Moreover, I 
knew from experience that fieldworkers easily burn out administering more than two or 
three of these types of interviews per day. With this in mind, I field tested my interview 
with six respondents and found the initial interviews took roughly two hours without 
exchange frequency. I subsequently reduced many of the items in the second part of the 
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interview to reduce the interview to 90 minutes. I then introduced questions about 
exchange frequency and tested this with my field assistant and found that the interviews 
took more than two and a half hours to complete. Because my initial field tests appeared 
to show sufficient variation in types of exchange, I decided I could eliminate exchange 
frequency from the interview and expected variation in exchange types to be sufficient. 
However, the results were not as expected. 
Future research eliciting reciprocal exchange data on whole village networks 
would have to address the issue of exchange frequency and respondent burden because 
alternative methods of ethnographic observations and key informant interviews are not 
likely to capture sufficient variation in exchange practices either. Several options are 
worth considering. Addressing the issue of respondent burden in personal network 
surveys, McCarty et al. (2007) found that a reliable alternative to eliciting data on all ties 
in a network was to randomly select a smaller sample of ties from the larger network for 
each interview. However, this is not likely to yield reliable results in a whole network 
study because there would be too many gaps in the dataset and random sampling might 
eliminate key actors from the dataset. Another alternative would be to use response 
cards—commonly employed in survey research—that list options for respondents to 
choose from when responding to a repetitive battery of questions (Bernard 2011:244-249; 
Grosh and Glewwe 2000:125). In this approach, respondents could be given a card that 
lists the options for frequency of exchange in a given timeframe (e.g., 0, 1, 2-5, 6-10, 
>10) and instructed to indicate one of these options each time an exchange item was read 
by the interviewer for each individual in the network. This would greatly reduce the 
number of times the interviewer would have to present options to respondents and 
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subsequently reduce the time consumed by the interview. However, even with a simple 
set of options, this approach might be less effective with respondents with low levels of 
literacy, as was the case with the current study. Yet another alternative might be to 
conduct two separate interviews with each respondent at separate times, with one 
addressing the network exchange questions (including frequency) and the other 
addressing the other topics of interest (in this study, minga participation, political power, 
and inclusion/exclusion). This strategy presents challenges of its own, including 
participant attrition between interviews and the added time spent by researchers locating 
respondents for multiple interviews, although the latter issue could be at least partially 
resolved by employing a larger team of researchers to share the burden. 
 The second flaw in the design of this study was that it failed to capture a 
representative list of aid and development programs in both sites, although this should be 
far less challenging to resolve than the reciprocal exchange data issue described above. 
The problem, as discussed in the previous chapter, was that while I did obtain a relatively 
reliable set of aid and development programs administered in Manzano, two of the 
programs listed on the Pusuca interview were not actually administered in Pusuca and 
were therefore not reliable indicators of program inclusion/exclusion in Pusuca. This was 
perhaps less of a flaw in design than an error committed in the data collection process. I 
relied on key informant interviews with villagers in each site and local officials to 
compile the lists for each community, but field tests were conducted with respondents in 
neighboring villages and therefore did not initially reveal the problems with the list of 
programs included in the survey. One simple solution would be to confirm the selection 
of programs listed with a sub-sample of each study site during the exploratory fieldwork 
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phase. Another would be to first collect reliable documentation, when available, on each 
program in order to confirm the sites and means of its implementation as well as its 
eligibility criteria. Finally, especially in the context of the two research sites in this study 
(as well as the many similar neighboring sites not included) where there are many aid and 
development programs underway at any given time, a better strategy would be to include 
a greater number of program options. Thankfully, the strategy of participant observation 
and immersion in community affairs over the course of five months made me aware of 
the error in the list of options provided in Pusuca and yielded a reliable base of 
ethnographic data to contextualize and explain the findings in both sites.  
Limitations of the Study Framework 
 This study deliberately focused on a narrow set of issues—the vulnerability of 
traditional practices and the relationship between reciprocity, cooperation, and political 
power—and left out a wider range of issues that are critical for a holistic analysis of the 
recovery from disaster and adaptation to resettlement. This was done for several reasons. 
First, the core objective of the study was to focus greater critical attention to the power 
dynamics of reciprocity in disaster and resettlement contexts. My review of the literature 
on disasters and resettlement found that the topic tended to be uncritically examined in 
the often value-free and apolitical terms of “social support” and “social capital” and thus 
warranted further critical attention. Furthermore, this was a doctoral dissertation study 
conducted with limited time and resources, which inhibited my ability to be more 
comprehensive in my design. However, future research on this topic should at least 
collect data on respondent and/or household wellbeing in order to analyze the relationship 
between reciprocity and livelihoods or recovery. Although I think the present study 
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successfully captured data on the roles of reciprocity in the politics and distribution of 
resources in the disaster-affected and resettled sites in the study and this has the potential 
to inform future studies, I did not capture enough data on how this relates to wellbeing 
and recovery.  
Future studies of reciprocity, power, and resource distribution in disaster-affected 
and resettled communities should at least include the added factors of wellbeing, though a 
more holistic approach might go beyond this. There are several ways in which this might 
be undertaken while maintaining reciprocity as a central variable. One option would be to 
work with Cernea’s (2000) impoverishment risks and resettlement model, which 
examines resettlement as the near-simultaneous confluence of eight core risks: 
landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased 
morbidity, loss of access to common property resources, and social disarticulation. This 
last factor could be operationalized as reciprocity and mutual aid and examined in 
relation to individual or household access to the resources spelled out in the other eight 
risks, but others have pointed out the limitations of such a model and the findings of the 
present study support these critiques. The Cernea model examines resettlement in terms 
of risks and these risks are produced by a lack of inadequate inputs in the policy and 
planning phase of resettlement (de Wet 2006b:181). The main thrust of this model is that 
risks can be controlled through the implementation of responsible humanitarian policy 
measures. But, as de Wet (2006b) points out, all but one of the Cernea risks operate at the 
individual or household level, with the exception being “social disarticulation,” which 
obtains instead at the community level. Environmental and wider political economic 
factors are nowhere to be found in the Cernea model and institutional factors are 
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curiously bracketed out of the analytical domain as if external and independent of 
context. The results of the present study and other studies suggest instead that 
institutional factors, environment, and political economy should be central and not 
peripheral to analytical models of disasters and resettlement, while taking seriously the 
risks identified by Cernea and others (cf. Koenig 2001). 
As discussed in chapter two, anthropological models of disaster tend to take a 
broader view of disaster and resettlement processes and to account for the complexities of 
processes and impacts. Studying the ways in which local forms of reciprocity and 
political process articulate with the “cascading” economic, health, and environmental 
antecedents and impacts of disaster and resettlement (pace Whiteford and Tobin 2009) 
would be a positive step in the direction of accounting for complexity (see also de Wet 
2006b). Jones (2010) effectively identifies and operationalizes many of these factors, 
including environmental vulnerability, political economic responses to environmental 
change, household livelihood strategies, event qualities, and natural resource dependence 
and the roles of local and extra-local resources.  
The current study highlights how these models have to be integrated with mid-
level articulations between local and extra-local processes by examining the modalities of 
resource exchange, distribution, and control and how these are negotiated by local and 
extra-local actors and institutions (see also Lewis and Mosse 2006; de Wet 2006b). 
Resettlement “speeds up the process of local communities’ increased involvement with, 
and often dependence upon” broader political and economic settings (de Wet 2006b:184). 
Wider political and administrative structures exercise more direct control over 
livelihoods, while local institutions and households exercise less (Koenig 2001:17). This 
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is a primary source of the risk of dependency and impoverishment and often the reason 
why resettlements fail to achieve sustainability (Gonzalez-Parra and Simon 2008; Cernea 
1997, 2003; Goodland 1997; Scudder 1997; Oliver-Smith 1992). Resettlement therefore 
needs to be studied as an institutional process, involving participation, exclusion, 
negotiation, resistance, coercion, and cooptation (de Wet 2006b:192-193; Oliver-Smith 
2010). 
Generalizability 
Finally, while taking stock of the limitations of the current study, it is important to 
acknowledge the fact that study results are very specific to the two study sites and their 
unique characteristics, which therefore make it very difficult to generalize study findings. 
The present study included only two sites in order to examine the local factors of 
reciprocity, livelihood strategy, and political processes affecting the distribution of power 
and resources. The roles of local and extra-local institutions are incorporated as 
contextual explanatory factors, but the sample of sites (n=2) is not sufficient for external 
validity. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to note that several key theoretical assumptions of 
existing models were not supported by the findings of the present study, which suggests 
the need for further research because the inconsistencies with existing models were based 
on noteworthy differences between the two study sites. 
Further Study 
Having already noted the ways in which the design of the present study could be 
improved both methodologically and conceptually, what remains is to identify more 
specific agendas for further research. To this end, three particular courses of further 
study—related and complementary—are particularly relevant for at least brief discussion. 
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Before proceeding, it is important to recap some of the more salient findings in 
the current study. First, the study found a complex relationship between the continuity of 
the traditional practice of mingas and participation in wage labor. Somewhat counter-
intuitively, wage labor participation was not a significant factor affecting participation in 
traditional minga practice in Manzano, but was negatively associated with minga practice 
in Pusuca, where new institutions were formed to reduce exclusion and increase 
inclusionary development strategies. Second, while participation in dyadic forms of 
reciprocity was significantly associated with minga participation in Manzano, it was not a 
significant factor in Pusuca, which was governed by new institutions. Third, participation 
in dyadic forms of reciprocity was significantly associated with political power and the 
distribution of aid and development resources in both sites. And finally, the more 
heterogeneous of the two sites (Pusuca) had exhibited had greater levels of participation 
in mingas and dyadic reciprocity and a generally more inclusive distribution of aid and 
development resources.  
Each of the findings summarized above adds an element of complexity to research 
on Andean forms of reciprocity and research on reciprocity and cooperation in other 
disaster and resettlement contexts and suggests that much could be learned from a 
comparative study of a larger sample of sites. First, it appears that minga practice in 
Ecuador is evolving in many ways and being attached to new state and non-governmental 
organization strategies and are not reliably consistent with models of mingas as patron-
client relations (Whitten 1969), nor are they egalitarian models of social movements (cf. 
Poole 2009). Furthermore, the novel strategies of incorporating (or coopting) community 
mingas into state and non-governmental organization strategies have not resulted in 
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sustainable or consistently equitable distributions of political power and development 
resources in the study sites either.  
This suggests that a comparative study of mingas in larger sample sites (>20 for 
most statistical purposes) could teach us a great deal about the factors affecting and 
affected by the variation in their practice. Studying a larger sample of communities and 
mingas throughout Ecuador could teach us a great deal about how the practice is evolving 
in different ecological, political economic, and institutional settings. Variable site 
characteristics could include: indigenous vs. mestizo, highland vs. coastal vs. Amazonian, 
resettlement vs. non-resettlement, disaster-affected vs. non-disaster, development 
intervention vs. non-intervention. Such as study could improve understanding about how 
minga practice varies across a variety of contexts and how it evolves in emerging 
conditions. Some questions worth exploring include: 
 How is minga practice affected by the intervention of different institutions? 
 What roles to mingas play in the design and administration of resettlement and 
development programs? 
 Does gender shape the development of mingas differently in administrated 
communities? 
 How are mingas affected by wage labor employment and residential distance? 
What other factors affect variation in minga participation in different sites and 
contexts? 
 To what extent do they operate as forms of reciprocity or forms of cooperation? 
 What are the conditions that promote, enable, or inhibit exclusion in minga 
practice? 
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 How are different forms of participation in mingas related to political power in 
different groups and contexts? 
 How is minga participation related to the distribution of access and control of 
scarce resources? 
 How is minga participation related to the variation in household wellbeing? 
A comparative multi-site study of mingas has the potential to contribute to 
anthropological knowledge of minga practice in multiple contexts, but would be limited 
to Andean countries where mingas are practiced (Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Bolivia). 
Much could also be learned by including disaster-affected and resettlement sites in the 
sample and comparing them to sites not affected by these events and changes. There is 
also potentially much to be learned from a comparative study of different forms of 
reciprocity and cooperation in disaster and resettlement contexts in different cultures. For 
instance, throughout Mexico, there are practices quite similar to mingas, known as tequio 
(Mixtec), cuatequitl (Nahuatl), fagina (Maya), zhinloawe (Zapotec) (Stephen 2007:57; 
Orellana Salinas 1973:272), that would make interesting complements to the study of 
mingas in disaster and resettlement contexts. Similar cross-cultural studies of cooperation 
have been undertaken in recent years by a group of scholars loosely organized by Samuel 
Bowles, Herb Gintis, and Robert Boyd (Bowles and Gintis 2011; Boyd and Richerson 
2009; Henrich and Henrich 2007). These studies test models derived from dual 
inheritance theory (the notion that human behavior is explained by the co-evolution of 
genes and culture) and employ mixed-method strategies including ethnographic 
observation, surveys, experimental games, and archival research. 
257 
 
The comparative study of reciprocity and cooperation I envision would 
necessarily require considerable time and resources because survey and interview data 
alone do not tell us enough about these practices. Here, ethnographic study is invaluable 
because we need to go beyond interlocutors’ versions of events and practices and to 
ground data and observations in culturally-specific contexts, not merely survey practices 
deemed a priori to be “social support” and “mutual aid.” The extent to which individuals 
and households give and receive social support or mutual aid in reciprocal exchange and 
cooperation must remain an open question and these practices need to be studied in 
relation to their implication in the distribution of scarce resources and political power. 
However, it would be difficult to meet all study objectives with ethnographic data and 
observations alone, since, as discussed above, it would be difficult to obtain a systematic 
record of reciprocal exchange practices without survey and interview data. It would 
therefore be fruitful to continue with a mixed-method design similar to the present study. 
Recommendations for Application 
How, then do we deal with situations where 'local culture' is oppressive to 
certain people, where appeals to 'tradition' run contrary to the 
modernizing impulses of development projects?....... Are we not in danger 
of swinging from one untenable position (we know best) to an equally 
untenable and damaging one (they know best)? Cleaver (2001:47) 
As much as reciprocity and cooperation have been found to factor into the 
dynamics of disaster-affected and resettled communities, it is surprisingly difficult to 
envision an uncomplicated course of application of the findings of this study. It is a 
relatively uncomplicated endeavor to privilege the perspectives and vulnerabilities of 
marginal groups and actors in the course of ethnographic study, but it is something else 
entirely to identify practical courses of action to resolve these matters. Identifying 
opportunities and means for the application of anthropological research has always been a 
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somewhat complicated endeavor, fraught with ethical, theoretical, and practical 
challenges that have been reviewed extensively elsewhere and need not be reviewed here 
(Mosse and Lewis 2006; Rylko-Bauer et al. 2006; Kedia and Van Willigen 2005; Olivier 
de Sardan 2005; Nagengast and Vélez- Ibañez 2004; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Hill and 
Baba 1999; Hastrup and Elsass 1990). While frequently engaged in policy debates and 
critiques, anthropologists have been understandably cautious about being implicated in 
the policies and practices of development institutions whose interpretations and 
applications of their work are beyond their control. While the American Anthropological 
Association’s Statements on Ethics clearly states that anthropologists’ primary 
responsibility is to the people they study, it leaves the matter of conflicting interests 
among those they study largely unresolved. We are often therefore left to wrestle with the 
dueling imperatives of speaking for the poor and disempowered (Nagengast and Vélez- 
Ibañez 2004) and representing the diversity of interests and perspectives encountered in 
fieldwork (Hastrup and Elsass 1990).  
Due in large part to the influence of anthropologists and activists over several 
decades, culture was increasingly recognized in development policies at state, regional, 
and global levels in the late 1980s (Knighton 2003:92; Cernea 1996b; Fernandes and 
Ganguli-Thukral 1989; Partridge 1993; Nayak 1989; Mougeot 1998:57). By the 1990s, 
this trend began to take the form of participatory development planning policies and 
practices (Olivier de Sardan 2005; Cooke and Kothari 2001). Olivier de Sardan (2005) 
characterized these approaches as a form of ideological populism, an uncritical 
valorization of local knowledge and tradition, which he distinguished from the core 
anthropological project of methodological populism, the critical analysis of local 
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practices in search of explanation. This is to say that culture, once considered a bounded 
and perennial tradition hostile to change and development (Knighton 2003:91), came to 
be reified as a tool of development. However, development and culture, like tradition and 
modernity, are not diametrically opposed. As Hastrup and Elsass (1990:306) point out, 
change is implied in modern anthropological concepts of culture, and development is 
based on a theory of the world. Yet in spite of the prevalence of fluid and diachronic 
notions of culture, especially in the resettlement and development contexts, there remains 
a persistent sense of obligation for cultural survival in applied studies of resettlement, 
especially in the context of development-induced displacement (cf. Downing and Garcia-
Downing 2001). Others studying development-induced resettlement have argued that 
these programs should be carried out as development programs themselves, going beyond 
restitution to improving the livelihoods of resettlers (McDonald et al. 2008; Cernea and 
Mathur 2008; Cernea 1996a). But these recommendations focus on including resettlers as 
beneficiaries, not on addressing inequalities within resettled groups. In contrast, some 
anthropologists have been less timid about the role of anthropology in taking sides on 
human rights issues (cf. Nagengast and Vélez- Ibañez 2004; Endicott and Welsch 2001). 
Dominguez (2000) and Nagengast (2004) highlight the fact that cultures and social 
groups everywhere are divided by class, gender, ethnicity, and other factors and culture 
and tradition are frequently invoked as acts of power, legitimating or challenging one 
actor’s power over another. According to this school of thought, it is the responsibility of 
the anthropologist to identify who benefits and loses in the contexts of local and 
institutional milieus. 
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While the above concerns and others will likely remain as challenges to the 
discipline for the foreseeable future, in the interim, individual anthropologists will 
continue to face these challenges on their own and step out of the debates to offer 
recommendations for the application of their work. With this in mind, I would like to 
venture several recommendations based on the findings of this study under three broad 
yet critical domains of application: (1) economic strategies and productive resources; (2) 
a place for minga practice in resettlement, including addressing inequality and promoting 
inclusion, and; (3) a place for heterogeneity in resettlement planning and design. The 
primary objective these recommendations hold in common is the promotion of inclusive 
development strategies that improve the wellbeing of disaster-affected and resettled 
people and the regional focus remains on Ecuador. 
Economic Strategies and Productive Resources 
There are two complementary courses of application worth considering in light of 
study findings regarding economic strategies and productive resources. The first is that 
resettlement schemes should include productive resources and economic opportunities for 
resettlers and, where primary production is the principal economic strategy, productive 
land should be a priority. Cernea (1996a:310) has advised the World Bank that the core 
of the development package in resettlement should consist of provisions based on either 
land-based or employment-based strategies and “the most effective, and relatively less-
costly, are the land-based strategies.” The Pusuca resettlement included land for resettlers 
and therefore created household subsistence and economic opportunities that were 
consistent with those to which resettlers were accustomed. In contrast, the Penipe 
resettlement did not include any land, nor were there any employment opportunities in 
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Penipe. This left 285 households without economic means, and encouraged the return to 
their lands in the risk zone (now marginally productive due to chronic ashfall) in 
communities such as Manzano, or else to migrate to cities near and far in search of 
employment. Both of these strategies took people away from the resettlements for 
varying lengths of time and often placed them at risk of eviction by the state resettlement 
agency for failure to regularly occupy their homes. Moreover, a landless population 
without economic opportunity can become dependent on state or global aid flows, which 
remove significant populations from both subsistence and market production, at once 
increasing their vulnerability and undermining sustainable economic growth. Once 
divorced from their land, they become objects of social control (Lutz and Nonini 2005; 
Williams 1986) for whom development and resettlement are not unlike the experience of 
“gradual onset disaster” (Oliver-Smith 1996b:81). Displacement or the expropriation of 
land removes the main foundation upon which people’s productive systems, commercial 
activities, and livelihoods are constructed (Cernea 2003). The rural regions of Ecuador 
continue to focus largely on agricultural production, although many find land unavailable 
or else struggle to produce on low-productivity land (Sanchez-Paramo 2005:3). Access to 
land and housing remains marginal in Ecuador (UN-OCHCR 2005) and in highland 
region landownership is highly concentrated, with 2.6 percent of owners holding 50 
percent of all land (World Bank 2003b:398). Resettlement could be an opportunity to 
address these disparities in land access. Failing to provide these resources compounds the 
risks and vulnerability faced by resettlers and undermines the recovery process. 
The second recommendation is intended as a complement to the first. This is for 
resettlement and development agencies in Ecuador to develop economic development 
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strategies that support and accommodate economic strategies beyond agriculture and 
pastoralism. The current study points to a problem with development strategies in 
Ecuador that have been discussed by Ecuadorian anthropologists (Martínez 2003b; 
Bretón 2008; Lanjouw 1999). The problem is that, while rural peoples in Ecuador engage 
in a range of economic strategies beyond primary production, development strategies in 
Ecuador—as advanced by such disparate institutions as peasant and indigenous 
movements, the state, non-governmental organizations, and the World Bank—persist in 
prioritizing agricultural and pastoral programs over all others (Martínez 2003b; Bretón 
2008; Lanjouw 1999). Results from the current study point to the ways in which this 
fosters hardship and exclusion in the resettlement site of Pusuca. By promoting 
agricultural and pastoral programs only, households engaging in other economic 
strategies are often marginalized, not merely missing new opportunities, but losing access 
to scarce and vital resources. As discussed in the previous chapter, in the case of Pusuca, 
the problem was not merely that agricultural development schemes were promoted over 
others, but also that these programs were organized in ways that made it difficult for 
households engaged in multiple strategies (agriculture, pastoralism, and wage labor) to 
participate and access the resources of the program. One step in the direction of a more 
inclusive strategy would be to develop program schedules that are more amenable to 
people engaging in multiple strategies, such as scheduling multiple days and times for 
minga participation and taking into account the scheduling constraints of multiple 
households. Another step in this direction would be to develop a range of development 
programs, such as educational and job training programs to help people advance in 
employment or develop small businesses. 
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The accelerated changes associated with disaster and resettlement have negative 
consequences for communities’ already destabilized capacities to control their 
socioeconomic conditions (de Wet 2006b:184). Disaster relief and resettlement programs 
should seek to establish ways to stabilize these capacities without empowering the 
divisions that exist in affected communities. Downing and Garcia-Downing (2001:13) 
make the case that, because benefit distribution may threaten community and cultural 
survival more than the resettlement project itself, as pre-resettlement divisions are 
aggravated by the influx of outside resources, benefit distribution should be clearly 
determined before a project begins. This may be desirable but, as demonstrated in this 
study, disaster relief and resettlement are not single projects, but many. Resettlement 
construction and the granting of homes and land are merely the initial steps, after which 
there are infrastructure, irrigation, agricultural extension programs, and many others that 
build on the physical and social structures established in resettlements. Benefit 
distribution, eligibility criteria, and the means of carrying out projects must be negotiated 
at several stages and adapted based on emerging conditions and lessons learned at each 
stage, with each new project. A useful approach would be to pilot several projects to 
support diverse economic strategies as part of disaster recovery and resettlement 
programs. 
A Place for Minga Practice: Leveling Brokerage Models 
It would be difficult to venture a comprehensive review of the relevant policy 
applications of many of the findings of this study, particularly since the precise roles of 
reciprocity and cooperation in resettlement have not been explicitly developed in the 
literature. There is, nonetheless, room for some general suggestions. The state (however 
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decentralized; see chapter 3), non-governmental organizations, and social movements 
have all developed novel ways of incorporating minga practices into meeting 
development objectives (see chapter 3). The core advantage of this is that extra-local 
organizations and local communities can work together to achieve development goals by 
committing local labor to extend the meager financial resources of institutions to produce 
local projects. It also means that local communities ostensibly have a role in deciding on 
which projects they want to engage in and how they are carried out. The disadvantages 
are that communities that are not organized are often not considered for development 
projects (Bretón 2003; Martínez 2003a) and that the extra-local and local organizations 
engaged in these practices do not appear to understand one another very well, which 
inhibits their capacities to be effective in meeting their short and long term goals. Extra-
local organizations—such as the state, Samaritan’s Purse, Esquel, and the many other 
institutions these organizations bring onto contact with their beneficiaries—remain a bit 
of a mystery to the resettlers and villagers throughout Canton Penipe. Their structure, 
operations, power, and objectives are often unknown to their local beneficiaries and 
collaborators, which often makes it difficult for them to make informed decisions about 
their partnerships and projects. 
The culture of mingas is likewise often misunderstood by the extra-local 
institutions that seek to work with (or co-opt) them for project ends. While it is unclear to 
what extent the mingas I observed in Manzano, Pusuca, and Penipe are representative of 
others in the region and throughout Ecuador (see chapters 3, 7, and above), there are 
certain key features of the mingas I observed that are important for outside organizations 
to consider. The first is that mingas are predicated on an agricultural mode of production. 
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They are forms of reciprocity and cooperation forged in the context of the periodic 
scarcities of labor experienced in small-holder agricultural production. The second is that 
mingas are organized to produce, maintain, and distribute scarce resources and this can 
take one of two general forms. One form is the dyadic exchange, whereby minga leaders 
engage in conspicuous giving to minga laborers in a continuous practice of labor 
recruitment (cf. Whitten 1969). In this context, the minga leader—or, in the context of 
development, the development agency—would not be able to recruit mingas without 
directly providing material resources to minga laborers. The other form is based on the 
production, maintenance, and distribution of shared resources. These resources include 
potable water, irrigation, roads, and other forms of community and production 
infrastructure. These resources require intensive investments of labor to produce and 
maintain and therefore necessitate the perpetual commitment of resource users, which is 
primarily achieved through minga organization in rural Ecuador. Third, minga practice is 
based on forms of brokerage, by which I mean they are organized by key individuals or 
groups who are uniquely able to channel resources that are locally scarce to group 
members in order to organize mingas in the first place and the capacity to attract these 
resources is tightly bound to their ability to organize mingas. 
I observed three distinct models of brokerage in Manzano, the Penipe 
resettlements, and Pusuca. The first can be seen in the mingas organized by cabildos such 
as Manzano play key roles in attracting resources from outside organizations and 
compete with other communities for these scarce resources. They also engage in 
exclusion and the brokers that connect the community to these outside institutions 
accumulate appreciably more resources than do other group members. Their position also 
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enables a fair amount of exclusion that is often invisible to outside organizations who 
perceive the community as tightly-knit and organized. The sustained recruitment of 
participants for the production of common resources is the source of cabildo power. The 
second model was observed in the Penipe resettlement, where the resettlement agency, 
Samritan’s Purse, organized beneficiary mingas to construct the homes and park in the 
resettlement. Samaritan’s Purse considered this a resoundingly successful endeavor that 
capitalized on the traditional strengths of local culture and organizing capacities. 
However, as noted in chapter three, once the initial resettlement construction was 
completed, resettlers ceased to organize mingas in Penipe. This can be explained by 
several factors. The first was that Samaritan’s Purse directly provided resources to 
displaced disaster victims to organize mingas, but then ceased to provide further 
resources to encourage further organization (a key component of the dyadic reciprocity 
model described above). The second was that, lacking land and productive resources, 
there was simply no resource base around which locals could organize (see chapter 3 for 
another precedent of this stunted minga model with the United States Peace Corps). 
Lacking a shared resource base or collective interest (e.g., channeling water to irrigate 
local lands), there was simply nothing for resettlers to organize around. In this model, 
brokers are essentially eliminated from the equation, which not only marginalizes the 
powerful, but inhibits resettlers’ ability to organize and negotiate with outside 
organizations.  
The third model of brokerage was found in Pusuca, where the Esquel Foundation 
provided productive resources to resettlers and helped to promote the poor and marginal 
to positions of leadership. The Pusuca resettlement included the three essential features 
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for minga organization—agricultural production, the production and maintenance of 
scarce resources (potable water, irrigation, etc.), and a role for brokers in community 
organization. This leaves us to consider this last factor, the role of the broker. As was 
seen in Manzano, centralized and historically entrenched brokerage models are associated 
with different forms of exclusion. Brokers with unique ties to outside resources can set 
the terms for program inclusion within their communities and these terms may be rooted 
in historical divisions within the community (e.g., class, ethnicity, gender, politics, etc.). 
In Pusuca, the Esquel Foundation was aware of this and attempted to counter these 
historically-rooted tendencies by promoting the poor and marginal to positions of 
leadership, in an effort to effectively level the brokerage model. This was accomplished 
not only by the inclusion of the poor and marginal to leadership, but also by creating 
multiple opportunities (committees and events) for people to take on leadership roles, 
thereby avoiding a narrow and centralized brokerage model where merely a few key 
actors were had access to outside resources. In Pusuca, there were roughly a dozen 
households that liaised without Esquel and other outside organizations on behalf of the 
community at any given time. However, the active role that the Esquel Foundation played 
in creating and maintaining these and their efforts unfortunately leave wider social 
structures unchanged. Although the creation of new institutions in Pusuca has, only 
narrowly, avoided the reification of power relations, as Esquel steps back and recalls their 
local representative, it is difficult not to get the impression that these unequal power 
relations will return to the forefront and have important consequences for future 
distributions of resources in the resettlement.  
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This section could be considered an attempt to create a sort of profile of the 
mingas encountered in this study in order to inform organizations that would seek to 
work with them. As discussed, an effective and progressive approach to working through 
mingas would be to recognize the ways in which they are based on a specific mode of 
production and organized around the distribution of scarce resources and a brokerage 
structure that could take several forms. In order to address the inequalities and exclusion 
that often inhere in these brokerage structures, it makes sense to advocate for the 
promotion of marginal actors to leadership positions and a general expansion and 
diversification of brokerage through multiple committees. However, it is both difficult 
and well beyond the scope of the present study to envision a means to affect the wider 
social and political economic structures that favor more the more centralized and 
exclusive forms of brokerage associated with the clientelist political systems of Ecuador. 
With that said, there may be strategies worth pursuing at a local level. 
Communities and institutions would be well-served to move toward more 
inclusive strategies—not without standards of eligibility, but with standards that are 
equally accessible for each household. The groups and organizations—local and extra-
local—operating in disaster relief and resettlement need to be more thoroughly exposed 
to one another in order for adaptive policy practice to be effective. Forms of reciprocity 
and cooperation cannot be uncritically cast as mutually supportive and effective. They 
need to be studied in the process of project implementation. Local practices and 
institutions, though often cast as egalitarian, may produce and sustain inequality and 
exclusion (Cleaver 2001:39). These divisions are often deeply entrenched and cannot be 
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undone by merely replacing them and establishing new organizations because wider 
social and political economic structures remain unchanged (Cleaver 2001:44). 
When conflicts emerge, Paine (1990:309) says that the responsibility of 
anthropological advocacy is “to persuade the parties to reflect upon (1) the contexts of 
their disunity and (2) the contexts in which a front of unity is mutually advantageous.” It 
is difficult to say to what extent this approach would be effective in sites such as 
Manzano and Pusuca. Certainly in Pusuca, the Esquel Foundation was able to resolve, 
however temporarily, many conflicts and divisions within the resettlement and to help 
foster cooperation for collective benefit. Manzano, by contrast, was more autonomous 
from outside institutions and tended to set the terms of participation and benefit 
distribution internally and dissent was often met with exclusion. 
The progressive inclusion of previously marginal actors could take several forms 
and build on the suggestion made above about adapting to multiple livelihood strategies. 
One option is to promote new production techniques and increased cooperation with 
outside organizations. Another, demonstrated well in Pusuca, would be to facilitate the 
inclusion of marginal actors to leadership positions in village committees and 
cooperatives. Progress could be made by connecting laborers and producers to economic 
and agricultural advancement training and opportunities. There is of course the potential 
to create tension by usurping the power of traditional leadership and local divisions, but a 
general strategy of increasing connections between local actors and opportunities for 
advancement is a relatively uncomplicated approach that might help overcome persistent 
divisions and exclusion. If there is any application of a study of inequality in disasters 
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and resettlements, I suggest it should be to directly confront that inequality; to work with 
traditional institutions while challenging them on their legacies of inequality. 
A Place for Heterogeneity 
 The results of this study suggest that social (e.g., gender, village of origin) and 
economic (e.g., wealth, class) heterogeneity may contribute to effective and inclusive 
cooperation among resettlers and these findings are supported by other studies in non-
resettlement settings (Ruttan 2008, 2006; Jones 2004). This dynamic is therefore worth 
considering in resettlement policy and practice in several ways. There is no sense or 
justice in advocating for the dissolution of displaced communities, but it is certainly 
possible that resettlement schemes can work to re-establish or maintain community unity 
while simultaneously fostering the development of moderate social heterogeneity in the 
new context. This was accomplished in the Pusuca and Penipe resettlements (the latter 
included resettlers from twelve villages, settled in blocks based on community of origin; 
see chapter 3), although Penipe lacked the productive resources granted to resettlers in 
Pusuca (see above and chapter 3). It is therefore possible to maintain some degree of 
community cohesion while at the same time introducing some social diversity—let us say 
moderate homogeneity—in the form of new neighbors and community organizations. 
The potential advantages could be several. First, by creating a diverse social 
environment, resettlers could be encouraged to build new relationships, which might ease 
some of the tensions with prior relations and the demands they often place on one 
another. Second, new social ties can help connect people to new opportunities outside 
their usual social groups, broadening their contact with institutions and novel 
opportunities, which could help to facilitate diverse economic strategies (cf. Hurlbert et 
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al. 2001; Marx 1990; Granovetter 1973). Fourth, increased social heterogeneity can 
arguably increase the diversity of needs and constraints that must be addressed by local 
leaders and institutions, decreasing the likelihood that they will pursue narrow agendas 
that benefit only a few, such as promoting agricultural development schemes that 
marginalize households engaged in other economic strategies (more on this below). 
Finally, as we have seen in Pusuca, a moderate degree of social heterogeneity could 
create a fertile social environment for community organization and cooperation.  
Conclusion 
Elsewhere, direct compensation principles (e.g., restitution of lost assets) of 
development and resettlement institutions have been thoroughly critiqued for simply 
recreating prior standards of living and not extending land rights to the previously 
landless (Cernea 2003; Downing 2002). The findings of this study support this critique by 
further highlighting the ways in which unequal access and control of resources inhibits 
disaster recovery and adaptation to resettlement. However, this study points to 
opportunities to resolve pre-existing inequalities among disaster-affected and resettled 
peoples by identifying the ways in which local practices of reciprocity and cooperation 
facilitate the unequal distribution of resources and political power. Privileging local 
leadership may foster brokerage structures that reify patron-client relations by granting 
brokers special access to outside institutions and political power. Ideally, institutions 
working in resettlement would look to promote the economic and political advancement 
of previously marginal actors. Participation and consultation tend to be problematic and 
inadequate because of insufficient attention to the complexities of participation (de Wet 
2006b:186-187; Mosse and Lewis 2006; Cooke and Kothari 2001).  
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While many anthropologists working in disasters and resettlement issues have 
focused on policy advocacy, I suggest a brokered approach to policy implementation. The 
position I take here is to envision a role for social scientists in research-based planning in 
disaster recovery and resettlement. This position is based on the persistent problem that 
many aspects of resettlement cannot be adequately addressed by rational management 
procedures and there is a rigidity to the institutional process that frequently makes 
adaptation and negotiation inflexible (de Wet 2006b:187-193). Rew et al. (2000) coined 
the term “policy practice” in order to highlight the fact that policies and their 
implementation are part of the same practice and are negotiated outcomes based on the 
adaptation to emerging conditions. That is, despite the appearance of rigidity in policy 
frameworks, there is an often unrecognized flexibility in policy interpretation and 
implementation. This can be seized upon to factor complexity into policy practice, 
planning, and development because power is embedded in social and cultural practices 
and therefore not always obvious (Cooke and Kothari 2001). 
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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS 
Esta sección de la entrevista trata de sus relaciones con los vecinos de la 
comunidad y los varios tipos de intercambios y cambia manos que se han hecho 
en los últimos 12 meses. Por favor, dígame si usted ha dado a o recibido de la 
persona, o alguien de su casa, alguna de las siguientes cosas en el año pasado…. 
 Comida Cultivos Dinero Herramientas Randimpa Peón
¿Tiene más, 
menos, o igual 
recursos que 
Ud.?
¿Qué son 
para 
ustedes? 
[Name] D    R D    R D    R D    R D    R D  R Mas   igual   menos  
[Name] D    R D    R D    R D    R D    R D  R Mas   igual   menos 
 
[Name] D    R D    R D    R D    R D    R D  R Mas   igual   menos 
 
[Name] D    R D    R D    R D    R D    R D  R Mas   igual   menos 
 
[Name] D    R D    R D    R D    R D    R D  R Mas   igual   menos 
 
[Name] D    R D    R D    R D    R D    R D  R Mas   igual   menos 
 
[Name] D    R D    R D    R D    R D    R D  R Mas   igual   menos 
 
[Name] D    R D    R D    R D    R D    R D  R Mas   igual   menos 
 
[Name] D    R D    R D    R D    R D    R D  R Mas   igual   menos 
 
[Name] D    R D    R D    R D    R D    R D  R Mas   igual   menos 
 
[Name] D    R D    R D    R D    R D    R D  R Mas   igual   menos 
 
[Name] D    R D    R D    R D    R D    R D  R Mas   igual   menos 
 
¿A quién consultaría de esta comunidad para saber de oportunidades con 
instituciones? Favor de nombrar un mínimo de 3 personas y un máximo de 5. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Encuesta Cultura de Mingas en Reasentamientos de Afectados por Desastres en Los 
Andes de Ecuador 
Entrevistado_________________________ ID#___________   Fecha ______________ 
Datos Sociodemográficos 
Primero, le voy a pedir su edad y estado civil. 
Indique sexo según observe Hombre O   Mujer O 
¿Cuál es su fecha de nacimiento? Día ______ Mes______ Año ______ 
¿Cuál es su estado civil? Casado   Viudo   Separado   Divorciado   Nunca Casado 
            O O     O             O   O 
Ahora quisiera preguntarle sobre los habitantes de su casa y sus ocupaciones. 
Comenzando con el jefe de la familia, favor de decirme los nombres de los 
habitantes actuales de su casa con 15 años o más de edad.  
Nombre 
Completo 
Relac. a 
Jefe Fam. 
Edad Ocupación 
1 
Ocupación 
2 
Empleado/a?
 Jefe/a    S O   N O 
     S O   N O 
     S O   N O 
     S O   N O 
     S O   N O 
¿Cuantos niños menores de 15 años viven en su casa? _______________ 
Ahora le voy a preguntar de las cosas que tiene usted en la casa. Conteste cuantos 
tiene de cada artículo. 
Artículos En La Casa # # 
A1 Ducha   A15 Grabadoras   
A2 
Calentador de Agua Eléctrico o de 
Gas   A16 Disco Compacto   
A3 Calentador de Agua de Leña   A17 
Radio que no sea parte de la 
grabadora   
A4 Refrigerador   A18 Televisor   
A5 Cocina Eléctrica o de Gas   A19 Bicicleta   
A6 Lavadora de Ropa   A20 Motocicleta   
A7 
Máquina de Coser de Pedal o 
Manual   A21 Autos (carro, camioneta, etc.)   
A8 Máquina de Coser Eléctrica   A22 DVD   
A9 Cafetera Eléctrica   A23 Horno de Microondas   
A10 Licuadora   A24 
Video juegos (X-Box, Nintendo, 
etc.)   
A11 Plancha Eléctrica   A25 Antena parabólica o telecable   
A12 
Camas de colchón (sin incluir 
cuñas)   A26 Computadora   
A13 Sillones o sofás   A27 Teléfono Celular   
A14 Mesas de comedor  A28 
Otra Cosa 
_______________________  
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¿Cultiva Usted (o alguien de su casa)?     Si O   No O 
¿Qué siembra? ___________________________________________________________ 
En total, ¿Cuánto terreno siembra usted? ______________________________________ 
¿Cuánto terreno tiene de pasto?______________________________________________  
¿Dónde está su terreno (ej. Pusuca, Manzano, otro)? _____________________________ 
Los terrenos que trabaja usted son:  
Propios  O 
Familia  O 
Patrón    O 
Arrendados  O 
A Medias     O 
Otro O ________ 
¿Tiene cuantos de los siguientes animales? 
___ ganado   
___ caballos/mulas/burros   
___ chanchos   
___ gallinas  
___ cuyes    
___ conejos   
___ cabras/ovejas  
___ otros  
O Ninguno    
O NR 
¿Dónde tiene sus animales (ej. Pusuca, Manzano, otro)?___________________________ 
¿Vende sus cultivos? Si O No O 
¿Cuáles? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
¿Donde? Penipe O   Riobamba O   Otro O 
________________________________________________________________________ 
¿Directo al mercado? O   ¿A mediantes? O   U otro? O  __________________________ 
Ahora quiero preguntarle sobre las mingas en su comunidad, como funcionan, y 
como participa la gente. 
Participación En Mingas 
P1 Primero, ¿me puede describir en breve que es una minga y como la hacen en su 
comunidad? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Ahora quiero preguntarle sobre participación en 
las mingas. 
Nunca
/Casi 
Nunca 
A veces Casi 
Siempre
P2 ¿Con que frecuencia trabaja usted o alguien 
de su casa en las mingas? O O O 
P2a ¿Usted puede indicarme las razones por eso? 
P3 ¿Con que frecuencia paga peones para 
trabajar en su vez en las mingas? O O O 
P3a ¿Usted puede indicarme las razones por eso? 
Por favor, dígame quien trabaja más en las mingas…….. 
P4 A) Dirigentes y 
líderes comunitarios 
O B) La gente común 
de la comunidad 
O C) Dirigentes, 
líderes y la gente 
común igualmente 
O 
 
Por favor, dígame que tan cierta son las siguientes 
frases sobre participación en las mingas. 
Nada 
Cierto 
Poco 
Cierto 
Muy 
Cierto 
P5 Ciertas personas o familias trabajan más que 
otras en las mingas O O O 
P5a ¿Cuáles? ¿Por qué? 
P6 Ciertas personas o familias trabajan menos que 
otras en las mingas O O O 
P6a ¿Cuáles? ¿Por qué? 
P7 La repartición de trabajo a las personas en las 
mingas es justo O O O 
P8 La repartición de trabajo a las personas en las 
mingas es igual a cada persona O O O 
Beneficios de Participación 
Ahora, quiero preguntarle sobre los beneficios de las mingas y de participación 
en las mingas. 
B1 ¿Hay beneficios que saca la comunidad de las mingas o no? ¿Cuáles? 
B2 ¿Hay beneficios que sacan personas y familias de las mingas o no? ¿Cuáles? 
B3  
 
¿Se ha beneficiado usted o su familia de las mingas? ¿Cómo? 
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Ahora quiero preguntarle sobre los beneficios de las mingas. Por favor, dígame 
quienes sacan más beneficios de las mingas… 
B4 A) Hombres O B) Mujeres  O C) Hombres y 
mujeres igualmente 
O 
B5 A) Mayores O B) Jóvenes O C) Mayores y 
jóvenes igualmente 
O 
B6 A) Madres solteras O B) Madres casadas O C) Madres solteras 
y casadas 
igualmente 
O 
B7 A) Personas con 
más recursos 
O B) Personas con 
menos recursos 
O C) No importa los 
recursos de la gente 
O 
B8 A) Los que tienen 
cultivos y/o 
animales en la 
comunidad 
O B) Los que no 
tienen cultivos y/o 
animales en la 
comunidad 
O C) No importa si 
tiene cultivos o 
animales aquí 
O 
B9 A) Dirigentes y 
líderes 
comunitarios 
O B) La gente común 
de la comunidad 
O C) Dirigentes, 
líderes y la gente 
común igualmente 
O 
B10 A) Los que viven 
en la comunidad la 
mayoría del tiempo 
O B) Los que casi no 
viven en la 
comunidad 
O C) No importa si 
vive aquí o no 
O 
Por favor, dígame que tan cierta son las siguientes 
frases sobre los beneficios de las mingas. 
Nada 
Cierto 
Poco 
Cierto 
Muy 
Cierto 
B11 Ciertas personas o familias sacan más beneficios 
que otras de las mingas O O O 
B11a ¿Cuáles? ¿Por qué? 
B12 Ciertas personas o familias sacan menos 
beneficios que otras de las mingas O O O 
B12a ¿Cuáles? ¿Por qué? 
B13 Los beneficios que sacan la gente de las mingas 
depende de su participación en las mingas O O O 
B14 Los que casi no trabajan en las mingas sacan los 
mismos beneficios que los que trabajan 
regularmente 
O O O 
B15 Los que trabajan más en las mingas sacan más 
beneficios de las mingas O O O 
B16 La repartición de beneficios de las mingas es 
justo O O O 
B17 La repartición de beneficios de las mingas es 
igual a cada persona O O O 
B18 Cada persona o familia saca los mismos 
beneficios de las mingas O O O 
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Toma De Decisiones 
Ahora quiero preguntarle sobre el proceso de tomar decisiones en la comunidad. 
D1 ¿Me puede describir en breve que es el proceso de tomar decisiones en la 
comunidad?  
D2 Si hubiera la necesidad de tomar una decisión en un proyecto de 
desarrollo en esta comunidad, ¿cómo lo harían aquí? 
A) Dirigentes deciden e informan a los demás O  B) Dirigentes piden 
sugerencias a la comunidad y después deciden entre ellos O 
C) Dirigentes y la comunidad toman decisiones juntos en una sesión O 
D) Otro (especifique) O ___________________________________________ 
 
Por favor, dígame que tan cierta son las siguientes 
frases sobre la toma de decisiones en la comunidad.
Nada 
Cierto 
Poco 
Cierto 
Muy 
Cierto
D3 La toma de decisiones representa los intereses y 
necesidades de la mayoría de la comunidad O O O 
D4 Los intereses y necesidades de usted y su familia 
están tomados en cuenta en proyectos 
comunitarios 
O O O 
D5 Hay ciertas personas o familias cuyos intereses y 
necesidades no están tomados en cuenta en 
proyectos 
O O O 
D5a ¿Cuáles personas o familias? ¿Por qué? 
D6 Hay ciertas personas que choquen con otros en el 
proceso de tomar decisiones en la comunidad O O O 
D6a ¿Cuáles personas? ¿Por qué? 
Quien tiene más influencia en la toma de decisiones en el grupo… 
D7 A) Hombres  O B) Mujeres  O C) Hombres y 
mujeres igualmente  
O
D8 A) Mayores  O B) Jóvenes O C) Mayores y 
jóvenes igualmente 
O
D9 A) Madres solteras  O B) Madres casadas  O C) Madres solteras y 
casadas igualmente 
O
D10 A) Personas con 
más recursos 
O B) Personas con 
menos recursos 
O C) No importa los 
recursos de la gente 
O
D11 A) Los que tienen 
cultivos y/o 
animales en la 
comunidad 
O B) Los que no tienen 
cultivos y/o animales 
en la comunidad 
O C) No importa si 
tiene cultivos o 
animales aquí 
O
D12 A) Dirigentes y 
líderes 
comunitarios 
O B) La gente común 
de la comunidad 
O C) Dirigentes, 
líderes y la gente 
común igualmente 
O
D13 A) Los que viven 
en la comunidad la 
mayoría del tiempo 
O B) Los que casi no 
viven en la 
comunidad 
O C) No importa si 
vive aquí o no 
O
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Por favor, dígame que tan cierta son las siguientes frases sobre el proceso de 
tomar decisiones en la comunidad. 
 Nada 
Cierto 
Poco 
Cierto 
Muy 
Cierto
D14 Ciertas personas o familias tienen más 
influencia que otras en la toma de decisiones O O O 
D14a ¿Cuáles? ¿Por qué? 
D15 Los que participan más en las mingas tienen 
más influencia en la toma de decisiones O O O 
D16 Los que participan menos en las mingas tienen 
la misma influencia que los que participan más  O O O 
D17 La influencia en la toma de decisiones no 
depende de la participación en mingas O O O 
D18 La influencia en la toma de decisiones depende 
del interés de involucrarse en el proceso O O O 
D19 La influencia de la gente en la toma de 
decisiones en la comunidad es justo O O O 
 
Beneficios de fundaciones e instituciones 
Ahora quiero preguntarle sobre los beneficios y proyectos de las fundaciones e 
instituciones que han realizado proyectos y campañas aquí. Por favor, dígame 
que tan ciertas son las siguientes frases sobre beneficios y proyectos aquí en la 
comunidad. 
 Nada 
Cierto 
Poco 
Cierto 
Muy 
Cierto 
R1 La gente que participan más en las mingas 
reciben más beneficios de las fundaciones e 
instituciones 
O O O 
R2 Los que casi no trabajan en las mingas sacan los 
mismos beneficios que los que trabajan 
regularmente 
O O O 
R3 Los dirigentes y líderes sacan más beneficios de 
las fundaciones e instituciones que los demás O O O 
R4 La repartición de beneficios de las fundaciones e 
instituciones es generalmente justo O O O 
R5 Cada casa saca los mismos beneficios de las 
fundaciones e instituciones O O O 
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Ahora le voy a preguntar si usted o alguien de su casa se ha beneficiado o ha sido 
incluido en alguna de las siguientes campañas o proyectos en su comunidad desde 
las erupciones hasta hoy en día. 
 ¿Usted fue incluido? ¿Por qué si/no? 
R6 Raciones de 
MIES 
S O  N O  
R7 Alimentos para 
animales de 
MAGAP 
S O  N O  
R8 Tractor de la 
Junta 
Parroquial de 
Puela 
S O  N O  
R10 Capacitaciones 
de Producción 
¿Institución? 
____________
____________ 
S O  N O  
R11 ¿Otro proyecto 
o beneficio? 
____________
____________
____________ 
S O  N O  
 
Observaciones 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX B: EXCHANGE CORRELATION MATRIX 
Table 11. Manzano Correlation Matrix of Exchange Categories 
 Food Produce Money Tools Randimpa Peon 
 In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out 
In-Degree Food 
r 1 .874 .654 .666 .557 .760 .686 .747 .710 .699 .474 .658 
p  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Out-Degree Food 
r .874 1 .590 .631 .479 .698 .632 .672 .630 .635 .592 .442 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
In-Degree Produce 
r .654 .590 1 .935 .561 .493 .620 .638 .576 .554 .275 .462 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .049 .001 
Out-Degree Produce 
r .666 .631 .935 1 .515 .583 .621 .679 .563 .550 .349 .484 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .011 .000 
In-Degree Money 
r .557 .479 .561 .515 1 .526 .528 .462 .570 .538 .384 .496 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .005 .000 
Out-Degree Money 
r .760 .698 .493 .583 .526 1 .441 .682 .576 .573 .379 .700 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .006 .000 
In-Degree Tools 
r .686 .632 .620 .621 .528 .441 1 .856 .804 .775 .507 .630 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Out-Degree Tools 
r .747 .672 .638 .679 .462 .682 .856 1 .818 .767 .471 .719 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
In-Degree Randimpa 
r .710 .630 .576 .563 .570 .576 .804 .818 1 .966 .486 .638 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 
Out-Degree Randimpa 
r .699 .635 .554 .550 .538 .573 .775 .767 .966 1 .540 .609 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 
In-Degree Peon 
r .474 .592 .275 .349 .384 .379 .507 .471 .486 .540 1 .404 
p .000 .000 .049 .011 .005 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 
Out-Degree Peon 
r .658 .442 .462 .484 .496 .700 .630 .719 .638 .609 .404 1 
p .000 .001 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 
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Table 12. Pusuca Correlation Matrix of Exchange Categories 
 Food Produce Money Tools Randimpa Peon 
  In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out 
In-Degree Food 
r 1 .849 .638 .533 .461 .564 .597 .770 .602 .569 .353 .351 
p  .000 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .025 .026 
Out-Degree Food 
r .849 1 .788 .667 .554 .607 .619 .701 .608 .549 .479 .206 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 .203 
In-Degree Produce 
r .638 .788 1 .865 .560 .609 .573 .520 .498 .460 .393 .150 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .001 .003 .012 .355 
Out-Degree Produce 
r .533 .667 .865 1 .302 .509 .437 .407 .510 .475 .374 .065 
p .000 .000 .000 .059 .001 .005 .009 .001 .002 .017 .691 
In-Degree Money 
r .461 .554 .560 .302 1 .351 .519 .424 .232 .213 .195 .078 
p .003 .000 .000 .059 .027 .001 .006 .150 .187 .229 .633 
Out-Degree Money 
r .564 .607 .609 .509 .351 1 .589 .721 .650 .588 .513 .294 
p .000 .000 .000 .001 .027 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .065 
In-Degree Tools 
r .597 .619 .573 .437 .519 .589 1 .693 .510 .513 .558 .111 
p .000 .000 .000 .005 .001 .000 .000 .001 .001 .000 .494 
Out-Degree Tools 
r .770 .701 .520 .407 .424 .721 .693 1 .510 .509 .421 .241 
p .000 .000 .001 .009 .006 .000 .000 .001 .001 .007 .135 
In-Degree Randimpa 
r .602 .608 .498 .510 .232 .650 .510 .510 1 .837 .517 .382 
p .000 .000 .001 .001 .150 .000 .001 .001  .000 .001 .015 
Out-Degree Randimpa 
r .569 .549 .460 .475 .213 .588 .513 .509 .837 1 .370 .476 
p .000 .000 .003 .002 .187 .000 .001 .001 .000  .019 .002 
In-Degree Peon 
r .353 .479 .393 .374 .195 .513 .558 .421 .517 .370 1 .186 
p .025 .002 .012 .017 .229 .001 .000 .007 .001 .019 .249 
Out-Degree Peon 
r .351 .206 .150 .065 .078 .294 .111 .241 .382 .476 .186 1 
p .026 .203 .355 .691 .633 .065 .494 .135 .015 .002 .249 
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May 24, 2011 
 
Albert Faas 
Anthropology 
 
 
 
RE:  Exempt Certification for IRB#: Pro00004409 
Title:  Reciprocity and Political Power in Disaster-Induced Resettlements 
in Andean 
Ecuador 
 
Dear Albert Faas: 
 
On 5/24/2011, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets 
USF requirements and Federal Exemption criteria as outlined in the federal regulations 
at 45CFR46.101(b): 
 
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, 
achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public 
behavior, unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human 
subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) 
any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably 
place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' 
financial standing, employability, or reputation. 
 
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this 
research is conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical 
principles outlined in the Belmont Report and with USF IRB policies and procedures. 
Please note that changes to this protocol may disqualify it from exempt status.  Please 
note that you are responsible for notifying the IRB prior to implementing any changes 
to the currently approved protocol. 
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The Institutional Review Board will maintain your exemption application for a 
period of five years from the date of this letter or for three years after a Final 
Progress Report is received, whichever is longer.  If you wish to continue this 
protocol beyond five years, you will need to submit a continuing review application 
at least 60 days prior to the exemption expiration date. Should you complete this 
study prior to the end of the five-year period, you must submit a request to close the 
study. 
 
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the 
University of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research 
protections.  If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638. 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John Schinka, PhD, Chairperson 
USF Institutional Review Board 
 
Cc: Various Menzel, CCRP, USF IRB Professional Staff 
 
